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MAKING OF A VOICELESS YOUTH: 




This research has analyzed a set of structural elements, procedures, and behaviors 
within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (thereafter, “Bosnia” or “B&H”) higher education that 
have jointly created an encouraging space for the increasing and self-serving utilization 
of higher education by the country’s post-war elite. Of the particular interest is this elite’s 
impact on the forms of educational corruption, which have shifted away from standard 
bribing processes and moved toward more complex favor reciprocation networks. This 
process has ensured that today’s corruption is perceived as a norm in Bosnia’s higher 
education. Its prevalence has disrupted existing social mobility mechanisms and created a 
duality in the social mobility process so that the unprivileged still work hard to obtain 
their degrees while those with social connections are reliant on Turner’s (1960) 
sponsorship model. 
The analysis goes beyond dissecting corruption’s impact on modes of social 
mobility by redefining Hirschman’s (1970) notions of voice, exit, and loyalty within 
higher education and expanding his theoretical framework to adequately capture and 
understand the unique set of coping mechanisms that has emerged within Bosnia’s 
corrupt higher education. I reinterpret the voice mechanism that Hirschman sees as a 
political tool capable of bringing about change as, ironically, severely diminished in its 
power when observed within a corrupt environment. I further reformulate the notion of 
exit and contextualize it within the corrupt Bosnian educational system by differentiating 
amongst various types of exit. In the process, the study finds that Bosnian students often 
  
 
remain in the same educational institution despite the high level of perceived corruption. 
By ignoring their immediate surroundings and rather than departing physically as 
Hirschman would expect, students choose to exit mentally from the corrupt operational 
framework in which they continue to function physically. 
Lastly, with hard-work and morality marginalized, the question remains open on 
when the youth will push the educational system in Bosnia toward a tipping point, regain 
their voice, and transform from an indolent mass to an active reformer. Projects requiring 
greater transparency of the exam and grading procedures, enhancing external support, 
and providing spaces for disclosure and adequate management of incidences of 
corruption, when and if detected, would constitute a meaningful starting point that would 
help incentivize change. In the absence of concern with the current level of educational 
corruption, however, the dominance of the incompetent elites will only continue to dilute 
the effectiveness of the aid being poured into the EU’s broader nation-building agenda 
for post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Relative to the developed states, where it remains more of an exception, 
corruption1 in the developing world is systemic and critical in stalling the economic and 
political progress of societies. Most researchers have supported the widely accepted 
claims that corruption is deeply damaging and costly to economic growth and 
development (Krueger, 1974; Myrdal, 1968; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993), while others have 
embraced an unconventional argument that corruption can enhance development in 
particular and limited cases (Heckelman, 2008; Huntington, 1968; Leff, 1964; Lui, 1985). 
The exact volume and extent of corruption, as well as its effects on the economic, social, 
and political functioning of a society, remain difficult to decipher: an unlikely few 
countries will admit – for the record – to being corrupt, while a majority will likely point 
to corruption as an insurmountable obstacle to their society’s advancement. 
Consequently, academics and practitioners alike have rarely been exposed to the 
information that would enable them to fully understand the intricacies and depths of the 
phenomenon. 
The analysis that follows is focused on understanding the educational corruption 
that occurs in the developing world, as this phenomenon plays more prominently among 
                                                          
1Herein, corruption is broadly defined as the usage of one’s public authority, through acts perceived as illegal 




the weaker states. Among the developed nations, the instances of corruption are more 
sporadic and often exposed to sanctions if, and when, discovered. In stark contrast with 
the governments of the developing countries, developed nations often take action, 
investigate, and publicly disclose their findings of corruption (Altbach, 2004). Bennett 
and Estrin (2006) have appropriately cautioned that the impact of corruption, particularly 
in the developing world, has to be analyzed within the broader context of relevant factors.   
This study undertakes an analysis of corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
system of higher education to examine the structural and behavioral enablers of 
educational corruption. Though corruption as a topic can lure one into a potentially vast 
area of research, I build my inquiry around two key questions on corruption and remain 
focused on the empirical examination of this phenomenon in the educational sector in 
Bosnia. Firstly, the analysis investigates structural, procedural, and power elements 
within Bosnia’s higher education that may collectively act as enablers of corruption 
within the country’s institutions of higher education. In doing so, the analysis 
simultaneously scrutinizes the influence of the European Union, the “EU-nionizing” 
forces as they collide with a domesticated practice of educational corruption. In the 
context of Bosnia, there is a need to delineate those factors and forces that perpetuate 
corruption, particularly as they continue to prevent Bosnia from joining an expanding and 
EU-nionizing educational space.   
Secondly and throughout the analysis, I examine students’ perceptions of and 
reactions to various forms of corruption. Specifically, I look at students’ perceptions of 
and reactions to the elements of horizontal immobility in higher education, which I 
broadly define as any contextual factor or behavior that helps preclude the seamless 
circulation of students within the national system of higher education. Similarly, I go on 
to analyze, in detail, students’ reactions to and perceptions of vertical or social 
immobility, where the elements and behaviors that stall vertical mobility in education are 




circles. Overall, I delve into the specifics surrounding the students’ perceptions of and 
reactions to mobility issues within education and how they relate to the emergence of 
educational corruption in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
For the research that follows, Turner’s (1960) pioneering work on sponsored and 
contest-based mobility exhibits a particular relevance as it explains differing and 
pertinent modes of social mobility in education. In Bosnia’s higher education, for 
instance, questions relating to educational corruption and mobility modalities are 
indirectly raised when students label professors as “untouchable” (Svevijesti, 2008, n.p.). 
Tanovic observes (Svevijesti, 2008, n.p.) that the enclaves of powerful professors are 
often comprised of unqualified members, yet exclusive and closed to outside talent. In 
contrast, Turner’s (1960) concept is that contest-based mobility is an open contest with 
elite status being merit-based. Others have also viewed meritocracy as a way “to promote 
efficiency, social mobility, and social justice” (Goldthorpe & Jackson, n.d., p. 2). 
In stark contrast with contest-based mobility and possibly more in line with the 
Bosnian model, the notion of sponsored mobility suggests that not all have equal access 
to potential rewards, and elite status may be granted rather than earned. Turner’s (1960) 
notions of contest-based and sponsored mobility help examine the complex social nexus 
within Bosnian higher education, determining whether the two modes of mobility 
possibly coexist or whether one form of mobility marginalizes the other. Similarly, I 
question the elements and behaviors within Bosnia’s higher education that help make 
corruption possible and continuous, thereby precluding the country from fully endorsing 
an arguably more meritocratic system of social mobility that is espoused by the EU 
model of education.  
Next, being concerned with students’ ability to cope with potentially significant 
exposure to educational corruption, this dissertation analyzes the manner in which 
students react to and navigate through inefficient and corrupt organizational spaces. Thus, 




characterizing many developing nations, this exercise may improve our knowledge of 
student populations and their behaviors in the systemically corrupt educational systems. I 
work towards uncovering the ways in which corruption-related experiences transform the 
plans, actions, and motivations of the young individuals being processed through corrupt 
educational systems. More concretely, I look into how students react, where they go, and 
how they cope when they are cornered into dysfunctional organizational spaces and 
possibly faced with educational corruption. Answering these and similar questions on the 
dominion of corruption over the educational processes in a developing, post-conflict, and 
post-socialist country is precisely where the social and intellectual significance of my 
research rests. 
To provide a theoretical interpretation of students’ coping mechanisms, I employ 
Hirschman’s (1970) theory of voice, exit, and loyalty within organizations. By extending 
this theoretical framework into the educational milieu, one can capture and analyze 
reactions of stakeholders to the failing organizations: in this case, reactions of students to 
corrupt and ineffective universities. According to Hirschman, there are two reactive 
responses to the failure of an organization: the firm’s clientele will either opt to “exit” 
their relationship or will “voice” their dissatisfaction with the defective organization. 
Further, Hirschman points out that with a greater exodus from a defective organization, 
the presence of voice lessens.  
While claims of widespread corruption within Bosnia’s higher education are 
frequently made, little scholarly research has been done to validate such claims. This 
study begins by looking at how widespread the educational corruption is in the post-
conflict and developing Bosnia and Herzegovina, and how its presence affects the 
behaviors of the students encountering it. In Chapter I, I review the main issues raised in 
this study and list the key research questions, with a focus on the specific systemic 
elements, issues, and behaviors that I view as most relevant to educational corruption in 




focus on Turner’s (1960) social mobility theory and Hirschman’s framework on voice 
and exit as reactionary mechanisms to failing organizations. The third chapter is where I 
link Bosnia’s particular circumstances to the noted theoretical frameworks to present 
what I theorize is happening with educational corruption in Bosnia. Here, I pay particular 
attention to the post-war elite formation, social mobility, coping mechanisms, and their 
interactions with the corrupt structures in Bosnia’s higher education.  I deepen my 
discussion by taking on the task of modeling the mechanics of social mobility and coping 
mechanisms’ adaptations to and interactions with Bosnia’s corrupt higher education. 
In Chapter IV, I provide a thorough discussion on the qualitative and quantitative 
methods that this study has utilized in data collection, as well as the sampling process 
both for the survey- and interview-based data collection. In doing so, I discuss the 
practical challenges of the sampling process, as well as elaborate on the content of the 
interview guide and survey document. In addition, Chapter IV reviews the overall data 
analysis approach utilized in this inquiry by presenting and discussing a research-
questions matrix that points to the specific method used to answer each research question 
individually.  
The fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters of this dissertation report the key findings and 
aim at specifically answering each of the three research questions, respectively. I 
conclude this study with the eight and final chapter, which summaries this study with a 
particular focus on the key findings and limitations of this study, as well as the agenda for 
future research. Though there were challenges in researching corruption, Bosnia’s higher 
education has provided me with a valuable opportunity to broaden the existing research 
on educational corruption by understanding its links to social mobility and students’ 
coping mechanisms in the newly forming post-war and post-socialist educational setting. 
Studying structural malfunctions, procedural obstacles, and corruption-driven traditions 
in Bosnia’s universities has helped in deciphering the ways in which the country’s largely 




undermining the possibilities for an emerging nation and its youth to effectively join the 
competition-based and EU-nionized space of higher education. 
Relevance of Research: Educational Corruption 
in Post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Background and Organization of Bosnia’s Education 
The downfall of Communism in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s brought 
instability to post-Tito Yugoslavia – at the time a Yugoslav federation consisting of 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia as 
republics, and Kosovo and Vojvodina as autonomous provinces. With the beginning of 
the 1990s, the political instability grew in much of Yugoslavia, and all attempts to 
peacefully resolve political differences between the Yugoslav republics and the militarily 
dominant Serbia failed. As Stipe Mesic, President of Yugoslavia in 1991 and later 
President of Croatia, noted: “Two of the republics [Serbia and Montenegro] had 
expressed their preference for ‘a federation and socialism,’ and four republics [Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia] desired a confederate, ‘union of sovereign 
states’” (Mesic, 2004, p. 21). As was the case with Slovenia and Croatia and irrespective 
of Bosnia’s proclaimed independence on March 3, 1992, Milosevic’s army and its 
supporters in Bosnia proceeded to militarily implement their ideological agenda of 
ethnically cleansing Bosnia. Bosnians who once found pride in their multiethnic society 
were now subjected to ethnic cleansing, war crimes, concentration camps, massive 
displacement, and organized rapes.  
The Dayton Peace Accord, signed in November of 1995, ended violence in Bosnia 
and ethnically divided the country into two main entities (Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Serb Republic) and a third administratively separate unit called Brcko 




Constitution. While the Serb Republic, largely comprised of Bosnian Serbs, has no other 
smaller organizational units due to its homogeneous ethnic population, the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is further divided into 10 Cantons based on ethnic lines of 
division between Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. Cantonal governments, for the most part, 
independently run their educational sectors and implement related policies. Each Canton 
has its own Ministry of Education. In addition, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has its own Federal Ministry of Education that supports the work of all 10 cantonal 
ministries.  
On the Serb Republic side, however, there are no cantons and therefore no cantonal 
ministries of education but only one ministry of education at the entity level: Serb 
Republic’s Ministry of Education and Culture. This ministry acts independently from the 
Federation’s Ministry of Education. At the national level, the country has the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs with one of its sectors being “in charge of coordination of activities at the 
level of BiH, enforcement of international obligations in the area of education, 
harmonization of plans of governmental bodies of Entities and strategy development 
concerning science and education” (UNDP, 2010, p. 22). Despite the existence of the 
section within the Ministry of Civil Affairs that deals with the overall coordination of 
education at the national level, the key organizational and procedural powers are in the 
hands of the local actors. This is best illustrated by the fact that, according to the 
Assistant to the Minister of the Civil Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are 
instances where diplomas from one entity are not recognized in another but also cases 
where the Bureau of Employment does not recognize diplomas coming from certain 
institutions (Slobodna Evropa, 2011). The existence of such cases points to the problems 
of coordination and harmonization within the educational sector in Bosnia.   
In short, Bosnia’s education is governed by an elaborate and decentralized structure, 
which has led to inconsistencies and variations throughout the country. For instance, 




that the manner in which Bologna Process has been implemented in Bosnia has not been 
seen elsewhere; Pack further noted that the Federation should have only one Ministry of 
Education that would ensure a harmonized and standardized implementation of the 
Bologna Process (Slobodna Evropa, 2011). As an example, the length of the study in the 
Serb Republic is based on the 4+1 rule – it takes four years to obtain Bachelor’s and one 
year to obtain Master’s – while the Minister of Education in the Federation, Damir Masic, 
noted the length of the study in the Federation varies from 3+1, 3+2, 4+1, to 4+2 
(Slobodna Evropa, 2011).  
In terms of enrollment, only 9.9% of Bosnian children attended preschools in 2009 
while the net primary school enrollment rate in 2006 was at about 97.9% (UNDP, 2010). 
The enrollment rates for the secondary education increased since 2001, and are presently 
estimated to be above 80% (UNDP, 2010). The higher education enrollment rates have 
“almost doubled” over the past decade while, from 2001 to 2007, the graduation rates 
from the higher education institutions in Bosnia have tripled (UNDP, 2010). Of the entire 
population aged 15 to 24, 99.2 % were found to be literate in 2009 with the comparable 
adult literary rate being at 97.6% (UNDP, 2010). Furthermore, the unemployment 
remains high and, for 2010, amounts to 42.7% while the government continues to provide 
limited investment in education as only 4.51 of the country’s GDP is spent on education 
(UNDP, 2010). 
In Bosnia, it seems, a contextualized version of a decentralization model in the 
post-war educational system has created a fragmented educational space that is 
characterized by high costs and a lack of transparency. The fragmentation of Bosnia’s 
system of education is clearly evident in the absence of a ministry of education at the 
national level and the presence of multiple ministries of education at both the entity and 
cantonal levels. The educational sector is also known for its highly fragmented budgetary 
structure: there are two entity-based budgets, 10 cantonal budgets, and 1 budget for the 




Education for Bosnia and Herzegovina confirmed that there are over 50 schools in the 
present-day Bosnia fitting the profile of “two schools under one roof”, where - within one 
physical location - operate two separate schools that may have adopted ethnicity-based 
segregation practices (UNDP 2010, p. 25). While this analysis by no means suggests that 
decentralization is not desirable in educational settings, it does suggest that no 
educational or governing model can be successfully and uniformly generalized to any and 
all settings.  
Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Higher Education 
Since the cessation of hostilities in the Balkans in mid-1990s, the independent 
states of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, and most 
recently Montenegro and Kosovo have worked, to varied extents, toward ethnic 
reconciliation, infrastructural reconstruction, and a transition from formerly socialist to 
more market-driven capitalist economies. Their economic and political development has 
progressed at different levels, with Slovenia joining the European Union (“EU”) in 2004, 
while the remaining countries in the region are still in the process of applying or being 
reviewed in preparation for their membership. In particular, an ethnically divided Bosnia 
and Herzegovina continues to face challenges with internal and post-war reconciliation, 
while half of the population lives in or close to poverty: 19.5% of the population remains 
below the poverty line, and another 30% are only slightly above the line (Devine & 
Mathisen, 2005). The country’s unemployment rate remains high at 43.6% for 2009 
(Center for Public Employment Services of Southeast European Countries, 2011). 
According to the International Monetary Fund’s Country Report (2010) and of those 
employed, most Bosnians are working in the public sector given the country’s highly 
decentralized government structure that suffers from significant redundancies. The public 
sector salaries are significantly above those in the private sector, making the government 




the International Monetary Fund’s Country Report (2010) indicates that “the share of 
public sector in total employment in B&H is among the highest in Europe” (p. 15) with 
only France and Belgium ranking above of Bosnia. 
Characterized by a weak and complex governing structure that is largely dependent 
on international guidance, Bosnia continues to face a vast array of development-related 
challenges, including broad societal corruption, as well as corruption specific to the 
educational sector. In comparison to the pre-war state of corruption, the overall 
perceptions of corruption as being significantly present in Bosnia and Herzegovina have 
increased over time (Transparency International, 2004). According to Transparency 
International’s (2004) research on corruption perceptions, only 10% of the sampled 
population in the Federation was of the view that corruption was significantly present in 
the pre-war period while slightly above 20% of the Serb Republic sample thought that 
corruption was notably present during the same period. Transparency International has 
recorded an increasing trend in terms of perceived corruption in both entities of the 
country, and a shocking 85% of the surveyed population in the Federation perceived 
corruption as significantly present while over 90% of the surveyed residents in the Serb 
Republic shared the same view as of 2002. This notable difference between the levels of 
perceived corruption pre-war and post-war is suggestive of a significant increase in 
corrupt activities in the post-war period. 
Even though all of the newly independent states in the Balkans have dealt with 
different types and gradations of corruption in their economic, political, and educational 
systems, Slovenia’s economic and political development has been accompanied by the 
least amount of corruption. In 2009, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted its first Anti-
Corruption Strategy, but it has consistently failed to attract foreign direct investment and 




Corruption Perception Index (“CPI”),2 Slovenia was ranked the highest and holds 27th 
place out of 179 countries (with a CPI of 6.6 out of 10), while other former republics of 
Yugoslavia have found corruption to be a salient obstacle to their economic, political, and 
social progress. For instance, Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were ranked 
at 64th (with a CPI of 4.1), 79th (with a CPI of 3.4), and 84th (with CPI of 3.3) places, 
respectively (Internet Center for Corruption Research, 2007). In fact, Transparency 
International’s most recent Corruption Perception Index for 2011 has placed Bosnia even 
lower than previously: for 2011, Bosnia took 91st place in the world with its CPI of 2.9 
(Dimitrova, 2011). As to the educational corruption that is of the primary interest herein, 
Chapman (2002) similarly finds that 31%, 38%, and 42% of students in Croatia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and Serbia, respectively, believe that corruption is widespread among 
university professors. 
In 2005, Transparency International B&H organized an anonymous corruption 
disclosure campaign during which it received a large number of complaints about 
educational corruption together with numerous complaints referring to the administrative 
bodies of the local government. Of the total number of complaints, 25% pertained 
directly to educational corruption and came both from professors and students while the 
rest referred to corruption in other sectors of the society (Knezevic, 2005). As an 
indication of the extent of societal corruption, Bosnians were found willing to participate 
in bribing to secure employment; ensure best medical care; avoid high taxes; obtain 
electricity, water, or phone; win a court case; obtain better grades; secure return of one’s 
property; and avoid traffic tickets (Transparency International, 2004).  
Another collaborative study conducted by the University of California and the 
University of Sarajevo evaluating current state of the country’s justice system confirmed 
                                                          
2CPI scores represent the perceptions of the level of corruption in a specific country as perceived by 
businessmen/businesswomen and analysts. The highest score of 10 suggests that the country in question is “highly 
clean,” while a CPI score of 0 suggests that the pertinent country is “highly corrupt.” The CPI is published by Internet 




that corruption is present in the justice system, as well as that the professional status of 
the justice-related jobs is in deterioration (Center for Human Rights at the University of 
California and Center for Human Rights at the University of Sarajevo, 2000). 
Furthermore, Dzihanovic-Gratz was noted for her recent research confirming corruption 
in the post-war privatization process of Bosnia’s public companies (Mujkic, 2010) while 
the frequency analysis of corruption-related articles in Bosnia’s media found that, only 
for the period from August 15th to August 28th of 2011, 135 articles were published on 
the topic (PrimeCommunications, 2011). Though Bosnia has made a first step towards 
addressing the corruption issue by forming the Agency for Prevention and Coordination 
of the Fight Against Corruption, its head, Sead Lisak, has stated that, in Bosnia, the issue 
is vast as Bosnians “bribe even for a ‘good’ cemetery location” (Magazin Plus, 2011). 
Thus, corruption remains one of the key obstacles to Bosnia’s post-war development.    
In the past, Transparency International B&H has evaluated the state of corruption 
at Bosnia’s universities. Using a representative sample of 500 students from the 
University of Sarajevo, Transparency International B&H found that 60.2% of the sample 
thought “that there is a great presence of corruption at the [Sarajevo] University” 
(Knezevic, 2005, n.p.). The surveyed students found “bribery in the examination process 
and admission to the faculty, as well as the insistence on purchase of obligatory reading 
materials” to be the most common manifestations of educational corruption (Knezevic, 
2005, n.p.). More recently, research conducted at the University of East Sarajevo (in the 
Serb Republic) showed that 55% of the surveyed students believe that corruption is the 
one of the most pronounced problems in education (Café.ba, 2011). The research was 
conducted at five faculties and relied on a sample of 450 students (Café.ba, 2011). To 
note and in line with this research, corruption was defined beyond bribery and included 
reliance on social networks (Café.ba, 2011). 
As to the recent initiatives in the region, Croatia’s Minister of Education and Sport, 




Responsibility in Education (Javno, 2008). Primorac vehemently announced that he 
would not make any exceptions for any perpetrators of educational corruption, and 
further added that the financing of this new anti-corruption initiative would be provided 
through the Trans-European-Mobility Scheme for University Studies (“Tempus”) (Javno, 
2008). Importantly, Tempus financing provides some insight into the source of Croatia’s 
recent decision to halt the longstanding corruption in the country’s educational system. 
Briefly, Tempus aims at developing and reforming higher education of the South Eastern 
European countries in accordance with the Bologna Declaration, which hopes to create a 
unified higher education system in much of Europe. 
As Croatia stands in line for its admission to the EU, the government has felt 
external pressures to speed up the process of synchronizing its higher education with that 
of EU members. Recently, the European Commission has researched the state of 
corruption in Croatia and has publicly labeled Croatia as more corrupt than African 
countries (Dnevnik, 2008a). Similarly, Nenad Stazic, a prominent politician from the 
Social Democratic Party (“SDP”), has repeatedly stated that the Croatian government 
continues to provide necessary infrastructure and laws that ensure continued corruption 
(Krnetic, 2010). 
Facing the threat that the widespread corruption in the country and its educational 
system could jeopardize or delay its entry into the EU, Croatia’s government has moved 
toward implementing anti-corruption policies. Cleansing higher education of corruption 
is portrayed by the governing elite as a solid exemplification of Croatia’s willingness to 
achieve compatibility with the more transparent educational institutions of the European 
Union. Whether for window-dressing purposes or with an intent to make a real change, 
on September 18, 2008, the Croatian police raided four faculties at Zagreb University, 
taking away more than 20 professors, their assistants, and other administrative personnel 
that are believed to have been involved in corruption (Dnevnik, 2008b). In the process, 




and searched for evidence of corruption (Dnevnik, 2008b). While students of those 
faculties remarked that the corruption had been going on for the past ten years, it was 
only recently that Croatia’s police raided Zagreb’s faculties and professors’ offices to 
verify claims that admissions could be bought for 9,000 Euros and passing exam grades 
purchased for 400 to 2000 Euros. This meaningful shift in political attitudes potentially 
stems from Croatia’s desire to join the European Union and differentiate itself from often 
politically looked-down-upon Balkan states. 
Affected by the recent events in Croatia, Svevijesti.ba, a popular news website in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, openly called Bosnia and Herzegovina’s citizenry to mimic 
anti-corruption initiatives from Croatia by taking action against corruption practices in 
education. References to public disclosure and discussion of educational corruption were 
made by Bosnia’s media outlets, including both television and online sources (Dnevnik, 
2008c, 2008d; 24satainfo, 2008). However, the entity and cantonal ministries of 
education, as well as higher educational institutions, remained officially silent on the 
issue. 
Unexpectedly, this initiative resulted in a widespread grassroots reaction and 
anonymous, yet public, sharing of experiences of educational corruption: over a period of 
several days, about 100 students and parents posted their letters and comments on the 
svevijesti.ba website and disclosed specifics about the corrupt faculties and professors in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was a first-of-its-kind call to students, parents, and others 
throughout Bosnia to publicly declare what forms of corruption they had encountered and 
to name corrupt professors (Svevijest.ba, 2008). Participants powerfully wrote: 
Corruption in the faculty of sport in Sarajevo (sic) has been going on since 
the end of the war … it is a public secret that an exam with prof. dr (sic) Ivan 
Hmjelovjeca [costs] 500 KM [equivalent to circa 365 dollars as of 
September 19, 2008] while I and others like myself have spent two years 




Faculty of Philosophy in Tuzla, as you already know, has so many corrupt 
professors. Here, immediately, I can say that the head of faculty, prof. dr. 
Azem Kozar, is one of the key [corrupt professors]. He asks for money for 
the admissions, sells exams to lazy students, and does not run away from 
sexual services, especially [those of] the blondes.... As rumor has it, to his 
“loyals” [emphasis added], he writes master theses and doctoral dissertations 
for 20,000 and 30,000 KM, respectively [equivalent to circa 14,637 US 
dollars and 21,955 US dollars, respectively, as of September 19, 2008]. 
(Student under code name “Nije Bitno”) 
For years now, ... public stories [circulate] about corruption in universities, 
corruption with the admissions, corruption with the exams, corruption with 
administrative processing of diplomas, etc. etc. [sic] How much of 
corruption is there and is it there [at all]? Lots of people claim that there is 
[corruption], but those responsible to do something [about it] say that they 
do not have the evidence [and] that the students and other witnesses are not 
willing to share their evidence or declare someone as corrupt. Corruption is 
usually understood as a student giving a professor some amount of money to, 
without demonstrated knowledge, receive a [passing] grade for the subject in 
question. However, corruption in the universities is more than buying 
“special treatment” monetarily or even in some other way. I think that an 
equally damaging and dangerous corruption is the one that exists with the 
Master theses and dissertations’ defenses, which are not based on an 
adequate scientific research. One form of corruption that is almost never 
talked about outside of the university setting is the form [of corruption] that 
exists among the members of the teaching cadre. In other words, the 
standards and norms to advance professionally ... are so “flexibly defined” 
that it is possible with the election of new people or with their advancement 
promote candidates that do not have adequate qualifications. That is, I 
believe, not done only because of money but because of some other 
relations [emphasis added]. Those can be familial relations, can be “love 
relationships” or can be “no conflict” relations. What does [no conflict] 
mean? That means that there may be a department where there are people 
without the adequate qualifications for the university professions, but they 
partake in the commissions that ensure they promote each other, in style of 
“you to me - me to you” [emphasis added]. Such environments are then 
totally closed – they do not allow for the entry of new, young and quality 
people. They do everything in that tight circle, and this is a very dangerous 
form of corruption in higher education. Therefore, corruption is much more 
than buying exams, which would be difficult to occur unless it was for these 
other forms of corruption. (Professor Lamija Tanovic, University of 
Sarajevo) 
A claim that corruption is systemic and well-organized in highly corrupt settings 




death threats that the organizers of this public campaign received: “[y]ou [Svevijesti.ba] 
wrote today and from now on you listen and be ready to fly into the air” (Dnevnik, 
2008c, 2008d; 24satainfo, 2008). The campaign has also unveiled a high level of 
sophistication in the workings of corrupt institutions and individuals in higher education 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the political and educational leadership has defended 
the functioning of the country’s higher education by the absenteeism of the formal 
complaints against corruption, Denis Camdzic, from the Union of Students of Federation 
B&H, stated that educational corruption is so well-ingrained in the structure of the higher 
education that students do not trust anyone and would not publicly or officially 
acknowledge the existence of corruption (Dnevnik, 2008c).  
Recent events in Bosnia and neighboring Croatia suggest that the elites of 
developing countries often lack the will to substantively minimize and properly sanction 
educational corruption because it is the powerful elite circles that benefit from corruption 
in education and beyond. To fully examine this proposition, Turner’s sponsored and 
contest-based mobility models are later introduced into the analysis and contextually 
applied to help examine the relationship between the patterns of social mobility and 
educational corruption present in Bosnia. As Tomusk (2000, p. 240) interestingly states, 
“power is legitimizing itself through the educational systems”, and one may add that, in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s context, power is legitimizing itself through educational 
corruption. Particularly powerful and illustrative are students’ labels of professors as 
“untouchable” (Svevijesti, 2008a, n.p.), as well as Tanovic’s observation (Svevijesti, 
2008a, n.p.) that circles of powerful professors are often unqualified, yet closed to outside 
talent. To elaborate, key administrative and teaching positions are often held by 
politically-backed individuals who may not necessarily possess the adequate 
qualifications for their positions. Though they may lack adequate qualifications, these 
professors are loyal to each other, and collectively control and, at times, unwelcome the 




law student of Tuzla University submitted an official complaint to the Anti-corruption 
Commission of Tuzla Canton stating that law professors were demanding sexual favors 
for passing grades (Svevijesti, 2008b). The complaint was disregarded until an 
independent investigation into a prostitution chain stumbled across evidence against the 
law professors (Svevijesti, 2008b). Several years later, Bosnia’s police closed down a 
prostitution chain in Tuzla region and unveiled that professors from Sarajevo and Tuzla’s 
Law Faculties were forcing female law students to engage in sexual acts in exchange for 
passing grades (Svevijesti, 2008b). Specifically, the head of the Sarajevo Law Faculty, 
Fuad Saltaga, and Professors Bajro Golic, Zdravko Lucic, and Sanjin Omanovic were 
under investigation (Svevijesti, 2008b). The University of Sarajevo banned Professors 
Golic and Lucic from teaching until the age of 70 because they “sexually exploited 
students at the Law Faculty in Tuzla” while Professor Omanovic was temporarily 
suspended from teaching (Hadzovic, 2011, n.p.). They are, however, still faculty 
employees and “are only excluded from teaching and scientific processes” (Hadzovic, 
2011, n.p.). More importantly, despite their conduct, these professors can still teach at 
other universities within Bosnia (Hadzovic, 2011). For about four years, those students 
who were providing sexual services to Omanovic, Golic and Lucic were given the exam 
questions that could then be sold to other law students with the help of Jasmin Masic, 
who drove female students to locations where sexual encounters would take place 
(Hadzovic, 2011). Masic was sentenced to two years in prison (Hadzovic, 2011). 
Here, one must note the relevance of Waite and Allen’s (2003) inquiry into the 
neglected topic of power and corruption in higher education. In Bosnia’s context, one of 
the first professors who spoke of powerful and established corruption in the country’s 
higher education was Meho Basic from the Faculty of Economics at Sarajevo University 
(Avdic, 2008). He presently claims that the corruption model has become only more 
complex as the professors involved are well-aware that their behavior has become 




not elaborated on the specifics of such complexities, anecdotal evidence suggests that 
Bosnia’s professors have gone as far as to never directly ask for bribes, but do so 
indirectly through their administrative liaisons. Simply, the elite status and political 
power of the professors allows for the perpetuation of the status quo and further 
deterioration of youths’ morale in Bosnia. The existence of various forms of educational 
corruption is likely to have deeply damaged the central purpose of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s higher education: Bosnian youths are no longer taught that hard work 
equates with achievement and instead are being trained in and adapting to the complex 
workings of widespread corruption, which remains a dominant feature of their war-torn 
country. 
An important background element in the analysis of educational corruption is the 
role of the Bologna Process, which has been sporadically and selectively introduced into 
Bosnian higher education. In the words of a Bologna promoter, Bologna is supposed to 
be “all about – mobility, recognition, efficiency, competitiveness and attractiveness of 
European [h]igher education” (Adam, 2007, p. 2). Though Bosnia adopted the Bologna 
Declaration in 2003, the institutions of higher education often continue to practice the old 
approach to education, where students enjoy only limited mobility; where learning is 
equated with the factual memorization of books; and where young Bosnians are not given 
practical opportunities to apply their knowledge and to gain a competitive advantage over 
students elsewhere. The Bologna Process and goals, if seriously implemented, would 
arguably introduce a different type of higher education in Bosnia that would structurally 
be more transparent, organized, and student-centered, preventing corruption from 
flourishing as at present. One would hope that the introduction and acceptance of the 
Bologna Process would be accompanied by clearer performance measurements, a 
common credit system, a defined process of accreditation of universities, and 




educational system, possibly allowing for earlier detection of non-transparent deviations 
within the system. 
The current situation at Bosnian colleges is further complicated by the 
monopolistic power that each faculty within a particular university holds, a status which 
somewhat conflicts with the need for a solidified and shared strategy toward 
implementing the Bologna Process. The post-war ethnic division allowed for extensive 
decentralization of power within the educational system. While this analysis by no means 
suggests that decentralization is not desirable in educational settings, it does suggest that 
no educational or governing model can be successfully and uniformly generalized to any 
and all settings. In Bosnia, it seems, a contextualized version of a decentralization model 
in the post-war educational system has created a fragmented educational space that is 
characterized by high costs and a lack of transparency. The fragmentation of Bosnia’s 
system of education is most evident in the absence of a ministry of education at the 
national level and the presence of multiple ministries of education at both the entity and 
cantonal levels. The country itself is divided into two entities: Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Serb Republic. While Serb Republic has no other smaller organizational 
units largely due to its homogeneous ethnic composition, the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina is further divided into 10 Cantons based on the ethnic lines of division 
within Federation. Following the cantonal borders within Federation, cantonal 
governments, for the most part, independently run their educational sectors and 
implement related policies. Each Canton has its own ministry of education. In addition, 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has its own federal ministry of education that 
supports the needs of all 10 cantonal ministries. On the Serb Republic side, however, 
there are no cantons and therefore no cantonal ministries of education but only one 
ministry of education at the entity level. This ministry acts independently from the 




Furthermore and within the country’s higher education, each of Bosnia’s faculties 
remains highly independent within their corresponding universities. To illustrate, Hasib 
Gibanica, from the Canton of Sarajevo’s Ministry of Finance, noted that communication 
between his Ministry and faculties financed through his Ministry is “poor” (Center for 
Investigative Reporting, 2004a, n.p.). Gibanica further remarked that, even though the 
faculties the Ministry finances were obliged to share their financial information with the 
Ministry, the Ministry was limited in its ability to verify these financials (Center for 
Investigative Reporting, 2004a). Faculties also generate revenues independently of 
Ministry funding, while a proper set of guidelines and regulations to oversee revenue 
spending by the faculties is absent (Center for Investigative Reporting, 2004a). 
It may be the independence of Bosnia’s individual faculties that partly accounts for 
their excessive control over their students and for the lack of synchronized and successful 
EU-nionization of Bosnia’s higher education institutions. Therefore, and as noted earlier, 
it is important to determine whether there are structural complexities and procedural 
inefficiencies within Bosnia’s higher education that play a significant role in supporting 
corrupt behaviors. Simply, what elements and behaviors within Bosnia’s system of higher 
education make corruption possible? For instance, some institutions of higher education 
in Bosnia may continue to make it excessively laborious for students to transfer to other 
universities, which is why the concept of credit transfers or spending a semester 
elsewhere is often unknown to many Bosnian students. Other faculties, however, have 
taken first steps toward bridging the gap between the current state of Bosnia’s higher 
education and the EU-propagated model of education. An appealing research setting for 
an examination of the current status of EU-nionization in Bosnia’s higher education has 
been created by variation at the faculty level in moving toward the EU model. Such a 
setting also provides salient insights into corruption-related behaviors and reactions that 
may have been instigated by the organizational and structural changes brought about with 




(2009) offers a new component in its educational setup that is based on the ECTS system 
(“European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System”). Its Summer School helps 
students “... compensate for a poor performance in a previous semester ... [and] spreads a 
heavy workload during the Fall and Spring semesters” (n.p.). The Faculty of Economics 
has further introduced a Quality Assurance System that evaluates professors and teaching 
assistants, but the question remains whether these changes that bear some resemblance to 
the structures and organizational patters of the European Union’s universities have a 
significant effect on changing corrupt behaviors, if any, and whether the exchange of 
favors and briberies continue to exist and possibly dominate. Similarly, the Faculty of 
Economics in Sarajevo has reshaped its academic program into a “3+2+3” system in the 
2004-2005 academic year, where a Bachelor’s degree is obtained in three years, and an 
additional two years of studies are needed to obtain a Master’s degree, while another 
three years of studies will yield a PhD diploma (Faculty of Economics in Sarajevo, 2009). 
It is however challenging to implement the Bologna-related organizational and 
policy changes to reflect the arrival of the EU into the Balkans region parallel to 
addressing the issues of bribes, personal connections, and social networks may still be 
employed to obtain degrees of higher education.  It may be that the EU-influenced 
changes in higher education continue to function simultaneously with the existing 
corruption practices that linger throughout Bosnia and possibly other countries in this 
formerly communist region. The example of Romania may be particularly notable here, 
as the country faced EU sanctions over corruption. Romania joined the EU on January 1st 
of 2007, but has been threatened with EU sanctions over widespread corruption that has 
infiltrated the highest political levels in the country (EurActiv.com, 2008). 
Often seeing that morality leads to marginalization within a corrupt system, 
students in corrupt educational systems who fail to engage and accept corrupt behavior 
may exit the system simply because they were either unable or morally unwilling to 




coping mechanisms employed by those students who, after their exposure to educational 
corruption, remain seemingly loyal to the system even as they continue to maneuver 
through all of its structural inefficiencies. For those students who have participated in 
bribery or other corrupt behaviors during the course of their studies, one can expect to see 
them internalize and accept corruption as a legitimate manifestation of social interactions 
in their society. 
As the case of Croatia exemplifies, it is only when external pressure is present and 
political power of the elites is threatened that the elites are willing to sacrifice their 
control and frequent abuse of higher education. In contrast, and as the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina suggests, when such political decisiveness is absent and governing elites fail 
to act, any and all efforts to end educational corruption are limited. Thus, Bosnia provides 
an opportunity to research the parallel universes where claims of higher education’s EU-
nionization representing mobility, effectiveness, and transparency coexist with claims of 
corrupt behaviors, limited horizontal and vertical mobility, and ineffective institutions of 
higher education. In developing my dissertation through the upcoming chapters, I hope to 
unveil ways in which these two universes co-exist or which one dominates over the other.  
Research Questions 
To examine the current corruption and social mobility trends in Bosnia’s post-
socialist and post-war higher education, this dissertation answers three key questions. 
First, the analysis asks students about the most frequently occurring facilitators and forms 
of educational corruption. This question looks at a basic set of trends that enables one to 
begin discussion on corruption. Second, this study moves on by looking into differential 
experiences and behaviors between various social groups and their relation to corruption. 
The goal of the second group of questions is to dig deeper into the ways in which 




beyond. The third group of questions explores students’ reactions, presuming that a 
significant level of educational corruption is found to exist in Bosnia. These questions 
aim at expanding the existing understanding of behaviors and reactions of students in 
highly corrupt educational settings. They look into students’ visions and interpretations of 
what is presently occurring in Bosnia.  This dissertation gives a voice to the youth 
impacted by educational corruption while also working to solidify our understanding of 
complex interactions between highly popularized EU-nionization processes, coping and 
mobility mechanisms, and corruption in Bosnia’s higher education.  
1. Facilitators and Manifestations of Educational Corruption 
a. What is a reasonable definition of corruption in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s higher education? What is the perceived level of 
corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s higher education? 
b. What are some of the key facilitators of educational corruption: 
specifically, which procedures, behaviors, organizational settings, and 
structural elements of the educational system support corruption? 
c. What specific forms does educational corruption take in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s higher education? 
2. Impact of Educational Corruption 
a. Is there any differentiation between educational corruption’s impact on 
students of lower socioeconomic status versus those who are well-
connected and members of higher echelons in the society? Is there any 
difference in the perception of corruption levels between students of 
different ethnicities and/or different socioeconomic backgrounds? 
b. What is the relationship between educational corruption and social 
mobility: specifically, how are the mechanisms of upward mobility 
affected by educational corruption? 




a. When university students are faced with corruption, how do they 
respond? What are their views on exiting, remaining loyal, and/or 
voicing their dissatisfaction over educational corruption? 
b. Do these students’ views in any way differ from those of students who 
believe corruption is absent or minimal? 
c. Are students’ views (i.e., on corruption, exit, voice, loyalty) in any way 





LITERATURE REVIEW ON EDUCATIONAL CORRUPTION 
An increasing interest in the topic of educational corruption has grown among both 
practitioners and academics, motivating the two camps to embark on understanding 
corruption and its impact in the developing as well as the developed world. In recent 
decades, the World Bank and other international organizations have labeled corruption as 
one of the key barriers to the sustainable development of poor nations. Therefore, the 
literature review geographically gravitates toward the literature on educational corruption 
in the developing world, as this phenomenon weighs more prominently among the 
weaker states rather than the developed nations. In the latter, instances of corruption are 
more often than not linked to the individuals responsible and frequently sanctioned if and 
when discovered. 
Facilitators and Manifestations of Educational Corruption 
Appearing in various forms, this literature review first argues that educational 
corruption is a systemic and chronic process with a profound societal impact on 
developing countries. The complexity of the impact can best be understood by unveiling 
the key facilitators of educational corruption, as well as the varied forms in which 
corruption emerges within the institutions of higher education. Thus, I set the stage for 
the review by looking into the forms in which corruption in highly corrupt developing 




corruption may appear elusive, largely due to the acceptability and prevalence of the 
phenomenon in developing countries. In line with Waite and Allen’s (2003) and Sayed 
and Bruce’s (1998a) views, this review espouses an inclusive definition of educational 
corruption that refers to educational corruption as all immoral acts employed by 
individuals in the educational system for either personal or collective benefit of a group, 
class, and/or organization. The study employs the broader and more inclusive definition 
of educational corruption, as developing countries may not necessarily have proper 
guidelines, laws, and/or regulatory frameworks that elaborate on what constitutes 
educational corruption. 
In their perceptive analysis, Waite and Allen (2003) assert that there are in fact two 
distinguishable approaches to defining corruption: one is a social perspective that labels 
as corrupt all acts that are deemed immoral, and a second approach is restrictive and 
reserved only for illegal acts. Sayed and Bruce (1998b) thoughtfully recognize that taking 
a social perspective toward defining corruption allows a researcher to include in his/her 
definition “what is commonly meant by corruption, it places the emphasis on morality 
and has its roots in classical conceptions of corruption which sought not so much to 
identify behavior, but to judge the overall political health of a society and its institutions” 
(p. 3). While Sayed and Bruce’s (1998b) definition of corruption as seen through a social 
lens holds great appeal, one ought to be cautious with using this generalizable and only 
morality-based definition of corruption, as societal acceptance of corruption as a norm 
may, over time, redefine what is moral and immoral (Waite & Allen, 2003). Specifically, 
in some developing countries, it may be socially acceptable to give gifts to teachers, but 
such gestures might calculate into teachers’ behaviors and possibly translate into a 
tendency to privilege some students at the expense of others. An alternative approach to 
this social definition of corruption is a legal one: all illegal acts that benefit one or more 





In emphasizing the differential between developed and developing states, 
educational corruption degrades developing societies economically, morally, and 
socially, further preventing them from catching up with the developed world. In stark 
contrast with the governments of developing countries, Altbach (2004) rightly posits that 
developed nations often take action, investigate, and publicly disclose their findings of 
corruption in an attempt to control and limit corruption if and when it arises. While 
Rumyantseva (2005) and Waite and Allen (2003) do not share their insights into the 
differences between the educational corruption in developing versus developed nations, 
Altbach (2004) furthers this discussion by characterizing educational corruption in the 
Western world as sporadic rather than systemic. Altbach saliently observes that if 
“malfeasance is detected, it is usually publicly exposed and the perpetrators [are] 
disciplined. The academic system itself is not corrupt, and efforts are made to cleanse the 
institutions” (p. 1). 
To exemplify, the United States Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) has 
initiated an investigation into “diploma mills,” which GAO’s Office of Special 
Investigations (OSI) “defined ... as nontraditional, unaccredited, postsecondary schools 
that offer degrees for a relatively low flat fee, promote the award of academic credits 
based on life experience, and do not require any classroom instruction” (Statement of 
Cramer before the Subcommittee on 21st Century Competitiveness, Committee on 
Education and the Workforce, September 23, 2004, p. 2). During their investigation, the 
GAO’s investigators bought two degrees from an Internet-run “diploma mill” and even 
successfully set up another “diploma mill” to test the rigor of the process for setting up an 
accredited higher educational institution in the US. While incidents of corruption may 
occur in any educational system – including those as sophisticated and developed as that 
of the US – such incidents remain sporadic and isolated in the developed world. 
In line with the view that corruption in education in many developing states is 




applicants or those who bribe or otherwise influence the academic authorities responsible 
for admissions, or those who can manipulate the admissions process gain entry regardless 
of their academic qualifications” (p. 1). Similar to Heyneman et al. (2007), Altbach 
(2004) lacks an extended doctrine on why this profound, collective, and habitual 
manipulation of academic processes is permissible and continuous. However, Altbach 
does share some important insights on the contextual traits of the developing countries 
that can help explain why educational corruption occurs: perpetually poor societies where 
university personnel are not adequately compensated for their work; societies where 
politics prevails in all decision making, including the academic arena; and those non-
Western societies whose social structures may not be compatible with the Western 
organization of most universities throughout the world. 
A major danger of corruption in the developing world rests in its systemic and 
habitual nature, which benefits the elites by allowing them to, instantly turn unqualified 
members of their networks into seemingly qualified candidates for a particular job. As 
Shaw (2008) perceptively observes, it is only when schools are functioning efficiently 
that the most qualified candidates are matched with the most demanding and growth-
enhancing positions in a country’s economy. When educational corruption is present, the 
most capable individuals may not be allocated to jobs that require their talents; in other 
words, “the misallocation of talent ... is accelerated in countries that do have corruption in 
education” (p. 32). In his work, Shaw looks at the determinants of a student’s educational 
corruption, and he finds that the student’s perception of the practice and acceptability of 
educational corruption at his/her school affects the student’s willingness to bribe. The 
author goes on and finds that women, relative to men, are more likely to bribe their 
professors. In determining the facilitators of corrupt behavior, Shaw further illustrates 
that students’ views on what constitutes corruption are significant in determining how 
likely these students are to offer bribes. Those students who think of bribing as a crime 




as a criminal act. Similarly, Shaw observes that those students whose fathers are 
businessmen show greater propensity toward bribery relative to other students. Students’ 
proneness to corruption is also dependent on students’ perception of corruption in the 
educational institution they attend. In some ways, it appears that the perception of the 
extensiveness of corruption becomes a perpetuator of corruption: when students believe 
corruption is widespread, they do not resist the system but try to fit in by being more 
likely to engage in corruption. 
Raised to the forefront of development agendas, practitioners and academics alike 
have begun to look into the types, causes, and consequences of corruption. Existing 
research on the topic has aimed at creating typologies and gradations of corruption in 
order to understand its effects on academia and beyond (Altbach, 2004; Chapman, 2002; 
Heyneman, 2004; Rumyantseva, 2005; Sayed & Bruce, 1998a; Transparency 
International, 2007; Waite & Allen, 2003). Some, however, have gone further in 
quantifying it. Among several of their notable works on the topic, Heyneman et al. (2007) 
have written a seminal piece on the costs of educational corruption. In the process, 
Heyneman et al. first evaluate the perceptions of corruption in higher education in several 
countries of Central Asia and Europe, including Serbia, Croatia, Bulgaria, Moldova, 
Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic, where large numbers of students surveyed noted 
the presence of educational corruption and some depicted it as a “norm” (p. 5). One 
identifiable similarity among the abovementioned countries is that bribery is often driven 
by market forces: more desirable professions have the greatest likelihood of bribery 
taking place (Heyneman et al., 2007). 
Heyneman et al. (2007) continue by validating the following viewpoint: the 
weakening of the USSR and the breakup of the central monitoring system, relative to the 
past, yielded an educational structure prone to corruption. The authors further argue that 
the decentralization and privatization processes created a fertile ground for corruption, 




corruption in education by noting that the sellers and buyers of bribes may vary 
depending on a specific type of corruption. For instance, in the case of procurement and 
accreditation activities, the authors observe that the bribe is given by an educational 
institution and sold by the government. In the case of the teacher-student relationship, 
Heyneman et al. point to a student as the seller of a bribe and the teacher as the buyer of 
it. Knowing more about typologies of educational corruption and quantifying the 
corruption or the perception of it is a salient and still evolving research area in education, 
but understanding how educational corruption functions to help perpetuate failed states 
and power of their elites is another area in educational research that calls for further 
inquiry. 
Broadening the research agenda on educational corruption, Waite and Allen (2003) 
were among the first to inquire into the unexplored interplay between power and 
corruption in education, and ways in which seeking a collective benefit for a group can 
become an instigator of corruption and possibly allow for the perpetuation of corruption. 
In their notable piece on the topic, the authors look into “an ethnology of corruption and 
abuse of power in educational administration” (p. 281). The limitation of current research 
on educational corruption, as they see it, is immediately evident in the widely accepted 
definition of corruption earlier noted: corruption is often and generally defined as an 
individual’s abuse of public position for his/her own good (Palmer, 1992, in Sayed & 
Bruce, 1998b). While educational corruption is viewed as an immoral act that is most 
often pursued for individual benefit, Waite and Allen (2003) expand this definition by 
referring to Sayed and Bruce’s (1998b) notion of collective benefit when defining 
corruption among the police. Waite and Allen (2003) build on this expanded definition of 
corruption as “any use of power or position through discrete acts or behavior(s) that 
benefit an individual, group, or organization” (p. 282). The authors further recognize the 
salience of differentiating not only between individual and collective forms of corruption, 




Waite and Allen claim that a subtle or haphazard type of corruption is perfectly embodied 
in the case of an uninformed member of the educational administration who has 
repeatedly used a university computer for personal activities. 
Other education researchers have also worked to define and classify corruption and 
to determine the facilitators of corruption-related behaviors (Chapman, 2002; Heyneman, 
2004; Rumyantseva, 2005). In his effort to classify corruption within educational 
systems, Chapman (2002) looks into educational corruption as occurring at any level of 
the educational governance: at the ministry level, school, region, classroom, and among 
international agencies. To illustrate, Chapman interestingly lists forms of corruption 
transpiring at the ministry level, including manipulation with construction and supply 
contracts, favoritism in promotions and hiring, misuse and stealing of national and 
international funds, charging illegal fees, requesting bribes in exchange for procedural 
approvals, and forcing the purchase of specific materials produced by family and friends. 
By introducing a new set of actors in corruption, Chapman (2002) adds value to 
corruption research by pointing to the possible corruption schemes among the 
international actors that are, often and almost instinctively, presumed to be benevolent 
actors in education. He continues by soundly purporting that the types of corruption are 
diverse and will depend on the socio-economic, political, and cultural context in which 
they occur. Additional examples of the corrupt activities taking place within the 
international agencies, per Chapman, include bribes, making excessively high payments 
that are unnecessary but aimed at obtaining certain services or information, siphoning 
funds away from projects, and making decisions on the allocation of projects not based 
on the objective evaluations but based on social, family, or business connections. 




Table 1: Chapman’s Classification of Forms of Corruption by Level  
 
Governing Level Form of Corruption 
Central Ministry Kickback on construction and supply contracts; 
Favoritism in hiring, appointments, and promotions decisions; 
Diversion of funds from government accounts; 
Diversion of funds from international assistance funds; 
Ghost teachers and employees; 
Requiring payment for services that should be provided free; 
Withholding needed approvals and signature to extort bribes (e.g. gifts, favors, 
outright payments); 
Directing the location of construction and services to locations that offer 
opportunities for gain by oneself, family, or friends; 
Requiring the use of materials as a way of creating a market for items on which 
oneself, family or friends hold an import or production monopoly. 
Regional/District Overlooking school  violations on inspector visits in  return for bribes or favors; 
Diversion of school supplies to private market; 
Sales of recommendations for higher education entrance; 
Favoritism in personnel appointments (e.g. headmasters, teachers) 
School Level Ghost teachers; 
Diversion of school fees; 
Inflation of school enrollment data (in countries in which central ministry funds 
are allocated to school on basis of enrollment); 
Imposition of unauthorized fees; 
Diversion of central MOE funds allocated to schools; 
Diversion of moneys in revolving textbook fund; 
Diversion of community contributions. 
Classroom/Teacher 
Level 
Siphoning of school supplies and textbooks to local market; 
Selling test scores and course grades; 
Selling of change grade; 
Selling grade-to-grade  promotion;  
Selling admissions (especially to higher education); 
Creating the necessity for private tutoring; 
Teachers’ persistent absenteeism to accommodate other income producing work. 
International 
Agencies 
Payments of bribes; 
Payment of excessive or unnecessary fees to obtain services; 
Skimming from project fund; 
Allocating (or acquiescing in the allocation of ) project related opportunities on 
the basis of candidates connections rather than on merit.  
 
Source: Chapman (2002). Sectoral perspectives on corruption: Corruption and the education sector, MSI, Table titled 
“Illustration of common forms of corruption in the education sector, by level of the education system,” p. 10. 
Rumyantseva (2005) contributes to this discussion by suggesting that educational 
corruption emerges in various forms, including, but not limited to, “favoritism in 
procurement, favoritism in personnel appointments, ghost teachers, selling admissions 
and grades, private tutoring, and skimming from project grants” (p. 84). She also 




not impact the values, beliefs, and future life path of students as directly as the types of 
corruption most explicitly involving students. Rumyantseva offers a rich overview of 
types of corruption, but she focuses on the individual gains and consequences rather than 
collective benefits and shared motivations of those involved in the corrupt activities. 
Using a different rationale than that of Heyneman (2004), Rumyantseva (2005) further 
enriches the typology research in educational corruption by dividing educational 
corruption into: “corruption in selection, corruption in accreditation, corruption in 
procurement, professional misconduct, and corruption in educational property and taxes” 
(p. 85). 
At times, corruption may intangibly and subtly affect the creation of social 
hierarchies; thus, it is important to recognize the diversity of variables that may drive and 
shape corruption in education. To name a few, some relevant facilitators of educational 
corruption in war-torn countries such as Bosnia may include poverty, ethnicity, wealth, 
political affiliation, personal character, and other individual traits. Depending on the 
social, political, and economic context, some or all of these factors may play an important 
role in how educational corruption develops in a particular setting. Confalonieri, Leoni, 
and Picci (2007), for instance, note that one’s proneness to corruption is often impacted 
by one’s willingness to risk his/her reputation being tainted in the eyes of the public. 
Confalonieri et al. go on to propose that the internet-based disclosure of information, 
particularly for public projects, can help improve transparency, because individuals 
involved in these projects will be more cognizant of their behavior, as people generally 
desire to maintain their good reputation. 
Though it is indispensable to achieving a deeper understanding of educational 
corruption, literature on the interplay between power, social mobility, and corruption in 
the educational sector, in particular, has been conspicuously missing. It was only a few 
years ago that Waite and Allen (2003) pioneered such an effort. If a society embraces 




other mechanism rather than meritocracy plays a key role in determining social standing 
in a society. Those who have the power will likely remain in power, and educational 
corruption may partly be credited with the maintenance of this elite status continuation. 
Thus, the elites of developing countries where favors are often exchanged through 
social networks may not be predisposed to adequately sanction educational corruption 
because of the benefits of power reinforcement that it provides to their social classes and 
closed circles of power. A version of this corruption-preserves-class-power notion 
emerges from Chapman’s (2002) writing, wherein he purports that “gatekeepers’ ... 
motivation is often economic – to supplement income – but may also be an effort to 
extend [emphasis added] their status or power” (p. 8). Unfortunately, Chapman’s 
decoding of the intricate interplay between corruption and the power of gatekeepers in 
educational institutions is limited to these brief remarks and buttressed only by an 
extensive discussion of typologies of educational corruption. Chapman sees the 
gatekeepers of educational institutions as separate entities from the top political 
leadership. In doing so, he fails to recognize the linkages that exist between elites in the 
political and educational leadership of the developing countries and the benefits of 
corruption to them, which make opposition to educational corruption unlikely in the 
absence of a fundamental political change or massive external pressure. However, 
Chapman still properly rationalizes that “when top leadership is corrupt, they lack the 
moral platform to demand honesty in others” (p. 11). Therefore, corruption at the political 
top, either directly or indirectly, signals the approval of the educational corruption; in 
other words, political corruption is likely to facilitate further expansion and perpetuation 
of educational corruption. Indeed, it is unlikely that extensive educational corruption 
would ever be viable in the presence of uncorrupt political leadership, underlining the 
earlier point that the connections among corrupt leaders in all spheres often exist and are 




Together with other forms of social, economic, and political power, educational 
corruption in the developing world has gradually become a systematic and acceptable 
behavior that allows utilization of educational institutions for the maintenance of social 
inequalities and for turning universities into likely mechanisms of elite status 
preservation. To keep themselves in power and secure reciprocation of favors by others 
holding equivalent positions in other sectors of society and economy, the academic elites 
have often fostered or not opposed activities in universities where exams and diplomas 
can be obtained with good connections and in matters of days. It is not uncommon to 
exchange favors by passing friends or relatives within the elite circles. 
While Heckelman (2008) eloquently argues that corruption can indeed be 
beneficial to growth and development, his view clearly does not apply to all forms of 
educational corruption. For instance, giving out diplomas to incompetent economists, 
doctors, engineers, and/or attorneys can only have severely negative consequences for the 
growth of a developing country. Heckelman intelligently observes that corruption can be 
beneficial to those societies where corruption helps entrepreneurs circumvent inefficient 
rules; in his own words, “if a first best solution of ‘good rules’ is unavailable then 
corruption that avoids some of the restrictions created by bad rules becomes second best 
solution and alternative path to growth” (p. 1). 
Though Altbach (2004) recognizes that educational corruption by special and 
privileged groups is tolerable in countries with a general deviation from meritocracy-
based mobility, neither Heyneman et al. (2007) nor Altbach (2004) explicitly explore a 
notion that corruption, as one of the dominant features of the educational systems in the 
developing world, has gradually evolved into a practice supported by the upper classes 
and operating in their interests. It is this self-interest of the elites that likely undermines 
their, and therefore the government’s, motivation to halt corruption in education and 
elsewhere. Such elite networks likely serve as some of the key perpetuators of 




pragmatics of corruption-related activities inadvertently acknowledge the underlying 
pressure of self-reproduction that prevents the elites and governments from opposing 
corruption. In many cases, doing so would likely be in conflict with the elites’ interests to 
secure their children’s future and position in the society. 
Indeed, the course of corruption development can be usurped only if prominent and 
influential community members are actively involved in countering it: those with 
“necessary skills and social status [emphasis added] to stand up against corruption” 
(Transparency International, 2007, p. 3). Along the same lines, Chapman (2002) rightly 
asserts that “commitment of top leadership to honest operation” (p. 12) in the educational 
infrastructure is essential to the diminishing of corruption. However, Chapman does not 
state that obtaining this commitment is virtually impossible without significant external 
pressure or shifts in political interests of the elites. Chapman, in agreement with Hallak 
and Poisson’s (2005) suggestions, talks about a “clear code of conduct” and “clear, 
workable accountability system” as some of many preconditions for the lessening of 
educational corruption (Chapman, 2002, p. 12). While there exists an obvious value to 
having a set of transparent procedural guidelines, as well as the standards that guide 
teachers and professors in their work, many norms, anti-corruption policies, and 
declarations exist only in obscure regulations and rarely make the next step toward 
implementation. Unless the most prominent and powerful decision-makers are 
collectively dedicated to halting corruption, any internal force shy of a broad communal 
consensus would not suffice to end corruption. 
Impact of Educational Corruption 
To expand this discussion beyond the drivers and forms of educational corruption, 
this literature review seeks to understand the complexities of the impact educational 




corruption, bribes are not the sole form of corrupt behavior in the educational sector. 
Often, trading of favors occurs and largely transpires under the veil of either explicit or 
implicit understanding that favors are reciprocated among the privileged. Therefore, 
educational corruption may have complex implications for the models of social mobility. 
Those who employ their social networks or leverage their family’s social standing to 
move up may see educational corruption as highly beneficial while others who have a 
disadvantageous social standing may find educational corruption serves as an obstacle to 
their aspiration of merit-based achievement. While the efforts of the corrupt to conceal 
their activities make a delineation of “who benefits” from “who suffers” difficult, 
Lomnitz (2002) was first to find that “[m]aterial payment in return for favors is graft. It 
means the absence of any possibility of personal relationship of having friends in 
common. Accepting a bribe is an acknowledgement of social inferiority, like accepting a 
tip or gratuity” (p. 175). Projecting Lomnitz’s conception of the relationship between 
power, social class, and corruption onto the educational arena, one would suspect that 
money is never or rarely paid for passing grades, obtaining of diplomas, or undeserved 
professorships among the privileged, while those of unprivileged social backgrounds 
would be the ones to engage in offering bribes. 
In his pioneering work on upward mobility in education, Turner (1960) compares 
two types of social mobility within educational systems: the educational system in the 
US, where mobility is contest-based, and that of the UK, where he views mobility as 
sponsored. Turner focused on simplified yet salient differences that existed between the 
US and UK educational systems at the time of his writing. Such differences often are 
more subtle in developing countries, further complicating any study of social mobility in 
such settings. For Turner (1960), “the most conspicuous control problem [in the society] 
is that of ensuring loyalty in the disadvantaged classes toward a system in which their 
members receive less than a proportional share of society’s goods” (p. 859). On the one 




hard working to move upward socially and become a part of the elite. In this model, 
importantly, the elite is a fluid concept, as Turner (1960) argued that one’s belonging to 
the elite can be changed at any point in time and as a result of an open contest. 
On the other hand, Turner (1960) characterized the UK educational system as 
sponsored because a few are chosen early on by the elites and later sponsored to go to the 
best schools based on some appearance of merit. For Turner (1960), “under sponsored 
mobility elite recruits are chosen by the established elite or their agents, and elite status is 
given on the basis of some criterion of supposed merit [i.e. entry examination] and cannot 
be taken by any amount of effort and strategy” (p. 856). He compares such a system to 
belonging to a private club, where the membership is allowed only if the existing 
members deem the potential entrants similar in their traits to the established members; in 
other words, no price, no effort, and no ability will secure the club’s membership without 
the explicit sponsorship of the existing members. With sponsored mobility, 
differentiation among different classes via education is accomplished through their 
segregation into schools for the elites and non-elites. The elites are then given the sense 
of ownership over the others because of their superior status in their society (Turner, 
1960). 
It is important to note that Turner (1960) wisely elaborated that the models he 
presented are “the ideal types [that] are not fully exemplified in practice since they are 
normative systems” (p. 856). Rightly so, he emphasized that “no normative system can be 
devised so as to cope with all empirical exigencies” (p. 856). Turner understood the 
importance of the normative formulation of upward mobility models in education, as well 
as the limitations of the same. In doing so, Turner allows one to contextualize and 
flexibly apply his normative vision to better understand the phenomenon of social 
mobility in a corrupt higher educational system of a developing country, such as that of 




systems, but he recognized the shortcomings of his normative visions and encouraged 
researchers to utilize them as the basis for further inquiry. 
Morgan (1990) notes that the comparison between the British and American 
systems of education has remained relevant several decades after Turner’s (1960) initial 
piece on mobility in education of the two countries. Morgan (1990) concurs that the 
American system of education continues to propagate the suitability of higher education 
for all, while the British system remains largely selective and sponsored: “The elite 
themselves, and their agents, are the judges of whether ... [the] ability is present, and they 
select, recruit and train their successors rather than allowing them to emerge at the end of 
a mass competition” (p. 39). She further underscores that, in England, “the sponsored 
mobility norm favours controlled selection rather than a prolonged open contest,” and the 
vast majority is directed toward “form[ing] more ‘realistic’ plans” (p. 40). Interestingly, 
Morgan goes as far as to build predictive models for higher education entry in the US and 
England and expectedly finds that it is easier to predict entry into the higher education in 
England than is the case in the US. In the US, one’s ability on standardized exams is only 
one among many factors predicting one’s entry into the system of higher education, while 
the entry tests devised and utilized by the British elites to determine who gets their 
sponsorship for higher education have the key predictive value. One should also note that 
others have challenged Turner’s (1960) theory of mobility by suggesting that, despite the 
increasing relevance of achievement in determining social mobility, even in the American 
society, the ascribed qualities, such as the social status, of an individual continue to have 
an effect on one’s social mobility (Kinloch, 1969). 
Though the application of Turner’s (1960) notions of sponsored and contest-based 
mobility have been revisited by other researchers (Baker, 1982; Kinloch, 1969; Morgan, 
1990), this analysis aims at uniquely reexamining these notions of social mobility as they 
relate to corruption in higher education. Heyneman et al. (2007) invaluably point to the 




inadvertently reinforce one of this dissertation’s key arguments. Heyneman et al. 
concretely show that highly educated individuals in corrupt societies do not benefit from 
their education as much as do those who reside in more transparent societies. If a merit-
based system is in place, one’s education should correlate with one’s social status and 
income level, as it is reasonable to expect that an individual’s superb academic 
performance and/or obtaining of a master’s or doctoral degree would be generally 
reflected in the higher income and social standing relative to those of individuals with 
less education or unremarkable academic performance. However, as Heyneman et al. 
suggest, income is not always reflective of one’s academic credentials, particularly if the 
individual in question resides in a highly corrupt society. In deepening this argument, 
Turner’s (1960) renowned work on sponsored and contested mobility comes into play, as 
it clearly differentiates between the contest-based mobility that welcomes the merit-based 
participation of all in an open contest for the highest standing in a society, and the 
sponsored mobility that emerges in social settings where elite status is handed to the 
privileged and is not necessarily earned through a commitment to hard work.  
In the context of a developing country such as Bosnia, students who are entering 
colleges may be persistently exposed to the demands of corrupt professors. Demands to 
engage in corrupt behavior may be implicitly signaled by professors failing students 
repeatedly, despite their demonstrated knowledge, or explicitly by professors demanding 
bribes for passing grades or by making sexual advances until a student enters an intimate 
relationship or exits the academic milieu. However, educational corruption may also 
come in the form of social connections and the reciprocation of favors, which assures the 
elites’ upper hand in deciding who will occupy the key positions in their society and the 
world of academia.  
Consequently, most students who operate in a highly corrupt setting soon realize 
that moving up the academic ladder is not necessarily correlated with one’s hard work 




society. For some, such type of academic life deflates the motivation and discourages 
them from fully participating in the educational system. Others begin to search for ways 
to become a part of the corruption process. Murphy et al. (1991) have made a significant 
contribution by unveiling the rationale behind “rent seeking” behavior and why 
sometimes even the most capable individuals may opt to engage in corruption. While in 
the organized societies the most gifted individuals may start businesses that would earn 
them the greatest return on their investment of time and effort relative to working for the 
government or military, there are countries where entrepreneurship is not a path toward 
highest earnings (Murphy et al., 1991). Instead, it is the “ability to solicit bribes . . . for 
the benefit of one’s family and friends” (p. 505) that drives the most talented people, in 
some less functional societies, to disregard innovative and entrepreneurial jobs and seek 
those with government or military for their own benefit and the benefit of their closest 
networks. 
If a society persistently tolerates corruption, its attitude may help tilt the balance 
toward a sponsor-based rather than competition-based mobility, with the consequent and 
associated patterns arguably spilling over into other domains of social activity. In other 
words, one could expect that the upward mobility model that society, intentionally or 
unintentionally, preaches through its educational outlets is what the young eventually 
adopt and, later, promote through their own actions, attitudes, and behaviors. 
Interestingly, Turner (1960) also underlines the salience of another prerequisite for the 
sponsored mobility model to evolve: the sponsored mobility model emerges where there 
is “a social structure that fosters monopoly of elite credentials” (p. 858). While Turner 
envisions the “monopoly of credentials ... typically [as] a product of societies with well 
entrenched traditional aristocracies employing such credentials as family line” (p. 858), 
Turner’s analysis does not take into account developing countries where monopolies over 
production of credentials can fall into the hands of a few following shocks to structural 




their aristocratic establishment to those Turner refers to in the UK. For instance, in the 
context of Bosnia, where most faculties lack clear guidelines as to the award of 
doctorates, the decisions on who obtains the highest academic degrees in the society are 
in the hands of those who have monopolized the individual faculties and who often 
sponsor the award of degrees to the members of their close circles. To account for the 
complexity of the social hierarchies and manners in which they are formed, Turner wisely 
posits that the models he portrays are guided by the “principles ... [which] are assumed to 
be present at least implicitly in people’s thinking, guiding their judgments of what is 
appropriate on many specific matters” (p. 856). 
To exemplify the severity of educational corruption’s impact in a society and its 
relation to the notions of power and social standing, Waite and Allen (2003) depict an 
extreme example of a corrupt school in China, where 41 children and adults were killed 
when a school exploded due to the firecrackers children were forced to make during their 
lunch break in order to generate additional revenue for the school and for Communist 
Party officials. Notably, Chinese officials offered an alternative story for the events that 
took place, protecting the corrupt activities that led to the children’s deaths. By using this 
example, Waite and Allen powerfully illustrate how the common interests of elites 
overshadowed their motivation to cease the immoral behaviors in education, even when 
the costs of such activities were measured in children’s lives. A parent devastated by a 
loss of two children simply yet powerfully stated: “In China officials help officials. No 
one is helping us” (p. 285). 
Unlike Waite and Allen’s (2003) attempt to unravel the particulars of the linkages 
between power and corruption, Heyneman et al. (2007) narrow their focus on the impact 
corruption can have over income generation: to reiterate, they validly observe that 
educational corruption affects academic success in that it does not translate legitimate 
educational attainment into an individual’s economic gain in the form of income. To 




in as heavily in the employers’ decision-making processes, not only because the quality 
of education is distorted or uncertain, but also because the job applicants’ social 
predispositions and membership in a dominant and socially well-entrenched class often 
prevail. In line with this argument and returning to the notion of mobility, Altbach (2004) 
fittingly states that even “academic posts are often ‘sold’ in the sense that those seeking 
appointments to lectureships or professorships must curry favor with selection 
committees” (pp. 1-2). While professors move upward by belonging to the right social 
networks and irrespective of their research or teaching accomplishments, which 
sometimes can be equated to plagiarized works of others, some students enter and 
graduate from universities thanks to briberies and connections (Altbach, 2004). These 
corrupt processes, therefore, profoundly affect the educational systems and processes by 
deviating from the initial purpose educational systems have purportedly emerged to 
serve. 
An understanding of the impact of corruption in education requires recognition of 
another, socially broad consequence: corruption in education involves youth and teaches 
young women and men immoral behavior (Heyneman et al., 2007). In a similar fashion, 
Chapman (2002) and Rumyantseva (2005) underline that corruption in institutions of 
higher education trains young students to accept and adopt corruption as tool to forward 
their personal careers. Chapman (2002) further believes that youth is “mis-educated” by 
being taught the prevalence, methods, and apparent legitimacy of corruption rather than 
to work hard; nonetheless, the author limits his interpretation of the consequences of 
mis-education to noting that systemic and widely spread educational corruption “instills a 
value that is highly destructive to the social and economic development of a country” 
(p. 2). 
While Heyneman et al.’s (2007) work does not fully address the complexities of 
corruption in the educational systems of developing countries, it quantitatively captures 




Transparency International’s 2005 data on 55,000 people from 69 countries, Heyneman 
et al. rely on two different regression models to look into the question of corruption: the 
first of their models estimates whether an individual will have high income, and in that 
version income is coded as a dummy variable, with high income being coded as 1 and 
low or medium income being coded as 0. They then follow with another regression 
model, where low income is predicted and coding is reversed from the previous model: 
low and medium income is now coded as 1, and high income is coded as 0. 
Through their organized and compelling argument, Heyneman et al. (2007) predict 
income based on corruption-related and other independent variables. To note, Heyneman 
et al. do not utilize any data on the direct involvement of the surveyed individuals in 
corruption, as no such questions were asked in the survey. Instead, a categorical variable 
that captures the subjects’ perception of corruption within education is used to predict 
income. Other predictors were utilized in the regression models and included age, gender, 
region, higher education, secondary education, and interaction terms between education 
and corruption. They then arrive at an important conclusion: the economic benefit of 
higher education declines with an increase in the perception of educational corruption. In 
other words, Heyneman et al. uncover an identifiable similarity among the poorer 
countries examined: the highly educated are more likely to report low income if 
educational corruption is present than the highly educated who perceived their 
communities as not educationally corrupt. However, one should be cognizant of the 
upward bias here, meaning that those lower income groups may have a tendency to place 
the blame on corruption even when there is no direct evidence that the cause of their low 
incomes is corruption. 
Given the complex nature of corruption, one way of evaluating the presence of 
corruption and its impact is to look at the quality of education and to what extent 
education serves as a signaling tool for employers. This notion first introduced by 




believe that the variance of degree quality at corrupt educational institutions is high. As 
for the employers, degrees from corrupt educational institutions, the authors further 
claim, may not help in gauging whether a job candidate should be hired or not. 
Consequently, if employers always seek to hire the most qualified candidates – whether 
one assumes that education provides needed on-the-job skills or that it only signals to 
employers which candidates have the raw set of qualities that predetermine them for 
success – those that bought their degrees would eventually lose their jobs or at the least 
fall into the least desirable positions over time. Generally, the preceding views on how 
corruption distorts the quality of education and interferes with the hiring process are 
convincing, but they do not encompass a more socially embedded educational corruption 
that often takes place in developing countries. 
In short, the underlining assumption of the Heyneman et al.’s (2007) work is that 
those in need of workers are indeed looking for the best candidates, and educational 
corruption gets in the way of properly labeling who those candidates are. In the 
functioning societies, this assumption is firmly valid; however, its application to the 
developing world becomes somewhat limited. Some employers in developing countries 
may desire to hire candidates based on their political affiliation or their belonging to a 
dominant social class rather than their academic success. Hiring politically well-
connected individuals, irrespective of their level of competence, may curry favor for 
government contracts and help in circumventing government regulations. It is not a rarity 
that those who are well-connected socially end up in the top positions in society despite 
their poor academic success, or their degrees or exams being obtained without merit. In 
such instances, it may have not mattered whether a degree signaled a particular set of 
skills or basic raw intelligence, but rather that it obtained social justification to the elites 
for the hiring of the pre-selected individuals. In others words, Turner’s (1960) model of 




for further inquiry into the complex interlinkages between power, educational corruption, 
and social mobility. 
Educational Corruption: Ways to Cope through Exit, Voice, and Loyalty 
Third, in focusing on corruption in higher education, which often allows for the 
persistent and unmerited obtaining of diplomas or professorships, I further posit that the 
purposeful acceptance of corruption by the elites in control of individual faculties 
profoundly affects students. Often, they accept educational corruption as a norm, which 
in turn allows corruption in the educational systems to continue. Furthermore, this 
continuous exposure to the lack of merit and immorality that is associated with 
educational corruption likely produces complex behaviors and reactions to corruption that 
are yet to be fully examined and understood. 
As earlier noted, particularly appealing and pertinent to the argument of this paper 
is Waite and Allen’s (2003) work, which would agree that the minimization or cessation 
of corruption is difficult to achieve because those in power can partly credit the 
maintenance of their elite status to the perpetuation of corruption. In all their eloquence, 
Waite and Allen realistically contest: “Corrupt systems are difficult, if not impossible, to 
challenge and change from within, especially since the power operant in such systems is 
self-protective and self-perpetuating” (p. 294). In further agreement with Waite and 
Allen, constraining corruption to the notion of personal benefit appears immune to the 
elements of educational corruption that benefit a social group or class. Thus, I reiterate 
the salience of defining educational corruption as the usage of one’s public authority to 
unjustly privilege, often, not only oneself but also a group of individuals one may belong 
to. In their contribution to the research on education and corruption and influenced by 
Klitgaard, Maclean-Abaroa, and Parris’s (2000) view of corruption, Hallak and Poisson 




fundamentally important; specifically, they believe that “monopoly power and lack of 
accountability mechanisms favor the development of corrupt practices in the education 
sector” (p. 2). However, later on in their discussion on the linkages between corruption 
and education, they choose to focus on successful anti-corruption policies, which include 
forming adequate regulatory systems and the improvement of management processes. 
Importantly, once students realize that the socially connected flow through the 
system and the exchanges of favors among social equals affect the social mobility model, 
further questions arise as to students’ reactions and behaviors within such a system. Do 
these students choose to exit, remain loyal, or voice their dissatisfaction? In lieu of bribe-
selling, some of those who are already limited by their financial means would likely opt 
to exit the university settings when they are subjected to repeated calls for bribes. 
Drawing on the renowned work of Albert Hirschman (1970) seems particularly valuable 
here. Hirschman’s analysis is largely economic in nature and mostly directed toward the 
functioning and performance “lapses” of business organizations (p. 23). For Hirschman, 
these temporary deviations from typical performance are “lapses from efficient, rational, 
law-abiding, virtuous, or otherwise functional behavior” (p. 4). His broad definition of 
lapses from typical performance clearly includes actions that may be deemed as illegal, 
potentially referring to the inclusion of corruption and other forms of illegal business 
behavior. However, Hirschman does not elaborate on non-law-abiding forms of 
performance lapses but elaborates more on quality or efficiency problems that, in his 
view, are “repairable lapses” (p. 4). For Hirschman, a perfect institution, regardless of 
how perfect it may seem, simply does not exist in the real world. In fact, all institutional 
players may fall back in their quality or efficiency at some point in time, but mechanisms 
of a competitive market may help them rebound to the initial position of efficiency and 
functionality. 
According to Hirschman (1970), while exit is deeply economic in nature, voice as 




customer pool, their reaction directly affects the company’s business through declining 
revenues, unless the demand is inelastic and the price per unit of the goods or services 
provided is increased to compensate for the loss of volume. Hirschman sees voice as a 
form of political activism and perceives it as particularly “messy,” as customers would 
voice their dissatisfaction in different forms and with varied intensities: from simple 
complaints to massive public protests. In re-evaluating Hirschman’s work, Klein (1980) 
looked into the notions of voice and exit, and rightly noted that the model of reacting 
through exit or voice is not sufficiently complex. 
Specifically, Klein (1980) sees Hirschman’s (1970) assumption of somewhat 
mutually exclusive exit and voice mechanisms as overambitious because human behavior 
tends to be characterized by the political lethargy rather than activism. Additionally, 
Klein (1980) underlines that voice is much more informative relative to exit. Simply, 
voice provides details as to the consumer’s dissatisfaction, while exit, in the form of a 
simple and abrupt departure, may continue to puzzle the company as to why the 
consumer left. For Hirschman (1970), whether customers opt to exit or voice their 
dissatisfaction will ultimately be a function of the level of loyalty the customers feel 
toward the company: more loyal customers will complain but remain with the company, 
while others will exit. There is also a possibility that consumers become dissatisfied with 
the institutional performance and choose neither to exit nor to voice their views. For critic 
Klein (1980), this is the situation Hirschman (1970) explains by resorting to the notion of 
consumer loyalty; in Klein’s (1980) view, Hirschman (1970) sees loyalty “as a residual” 
(p. 419), because he uses it to explain why some consumers may remain with a particular 
firm without resorting to the exit or voice mechanisms. Also, there may be multiple 
transaction costs associated with changing institutions. The area of transaction costs has 
been a particular focus of Oliver Williamson (1981), who rightly believes that human 




economics of the transaction in question. In other words, Williamson believes in the 
importance of human nature in economic dealings. 
One may add that students in highly corrupt educational systems may opt for a no-
voice-no-exit path due to fear of voicing their views combined with the lack of alternative 
educational opportunities that would adequately respond to their needs. Therefore, 
staying put often seems as the best choice given the circumstances. In addition, Klein 
(1980) insightfully brings up the point that it is very possible to exit the institution in 
question and then decide to voice one’s dissatisfaction. In the case of educational 
corruption in Bosnia, this would include those students who have exited due to corruption 
but chose to voice their views in the virtual setting through, for instance, the earlier 
discussed Svevijesti.ba campaign against corruption in Bosnian universities. 
To further elaborate, Hirschman (1970) logically observes that a sizeable exit by 
customers can push the firm into bankruptcy. In the educational sector examined here, the 
public universities in developing countries often act as if they are immune to the presence 
of private competition and operate under the presumption of perpetual existence. In some 
ways, they simply remain immune to a massive exodus of students. In fact, Klein (1980) 
similarly disputes Hirschman’s (1970) “assumption of producer responsiveness” (p. 417). 
For Klein (1980), Hirschman (1970) is disregarding the issue of “professional 
dominance” or “bureaucratic dominance” in various institutions (p. 417). Even 
Hirschman himself accepts that variations of his theory may exist in different sectors. For 
instance, he recognizes that in the case of the public education, the exit of students for 
alternative schools may lead to a further decline in the quality of public education. 
Herein, he argues, political activism rather than exit would prove more beneficial in 
pushing for the improvement of public education. 
Hirschman (1970) additionally finds that firms may at times increase their price to 
increase revenues, which can motivate some consumers to exit. This presumes that the 




in response to increased prices. So, with inelastic demand, the loss of customers is 
proportionally less than the gain in revenues, and such exit would not necessarily 
instigate change on the part of the firm because the loss of revenue due to some 
customers’ exit could be compensated by the revenues gained via a price increase. In 
education, various factors clearly complicate the exit mechanisms or ways in which 
students choose to cope, as well as the reactions of educational institutions. Consideration 
of price-influenced exit is important in academic settings, since exit could occur due to 
the increased cost of education. The motivating factor for this exit would not be 
educational corruption per se but an increase in the price of schooling. However, it is 
worth noting that students and their parents may be informally calculating the cost of 
bribery into their calculations of schooling costs, especially when students attend public 
universities. 
When the price of a particular service increases due to a bribe, the poor are more 
likely to exit relative to the wealthier segments of the population. This was shown in the 
research of Donald Heller (2001), who finds that providing financial aid to the poor may 
help overcome “the existing low-tuition and fees [that can] still act as a barrier to college 
enrollment” (p. 30). While not directly related to the educational sector, Kaufmann, 
Montoriol-Garriga, and Recanatini’s (2008) logic seamlessly aligns with the notion that 
educational corruption affects more profoundly those of lower socio-economic status; 
indeed, Kaufmann et al. rightly assert that bribes have a greater effect on poor families 
not only because they must sacrifice a more substantial portion of their already meager 
incomes, but also because the poor select out from even seeking public services due to 
their awareness of the need to pay additional bribes to obtain desired services. Generally, 
the price elasticity of the poor is much higher than that of the wealthier segments of any 
population; in other words, with changes in price, the poor’s consumption of the goods in 
question will decline while that is less likely to be the case for the wealthy (Hohnen, 




segments of developing societies, simply opt out of the system due to the massive 
financial burden that briberies represent to their families. Even relatively low-tuition can 
be a “price-barrier” for the poor (Heller, 2001, p. 27). 
When contextualized into the educational sector and modified to account for the 
question of social mobility, students who enter faculties without “proper” socioeconomic 
background may be – similar to what Kaufmann et al. (2008) see occurring in the broader 
public sector – opting out of the highly corrupt educational system because of their 
inability financially, and likely socially, to address continuous exposure to corruption in 
Bosnia’s higher education. Others, however, may simply adjust to paying the higher 
price. In turn, the additional revenues obtained by faculty members would likely offset 
some losses that may have occurred due to the exit of some students. This ability of the 
faculty to easily compensate for the lost revenues would likely create no incentives for 
faculty members to change their corrupt behavior. 
For poor students, coming to terms with lifelong poverty or belonging to the lower 
class may be more easily rationalized than navigating through the corrupt educational 
system that, even if diplomas are obtained, may not guarantee employment due to the 
necessity of social networking and connections in order to obtain an adequate job after 
college. Existing research on educational corruption has rarely looked deeply into these 
intricate relationships of power, exit, voice, socio-economic status, mobility, and bribery 
in educational corruption, which is precisely why this analysis employs both Turner’s 
(1960) and Hirschman’s (1970) works to pursue the topic in depth in the context of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s higher education. Lastly, the lack of a comprehensive look at 
the reactions of students who witness social mobility being defined by corruption and 
social networks rather than meritocracy is the primary instigator behind my decision to 





THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: EDUCATIONAL CORRUPTION AND 
 
ITS IMPACT ON SOCIAL MOBILITY AND COPING MECHANISMS 
This chapter presents a comprehensive picture of the corruption in public higher 
education in Bosnia. I begin by discussing the emergence of corruption while focusing on 
the role that the post-war elite re-creation played in the process. One of the goals of this 
chapter is to review the manner in which infrastructural elements, behaviors, and 
procedures can create an encouraging space for the elite to engage in corrupt activities. 
Here, I specifically argue that the post-war elite have allowed for various structures, 
organization, behaviors, and procedures within Bosnia’s post-war educational system, as 
these permit the elite members to use the educational system to their individual and 
collective advantage. 
The primary purpose of the corruption analysis and those systemic elements that 
enable corruption to occur in Bosnia’s higher education is to help conceptualize ways in 
which social mobility and students’ coping mechanisms have consequently been affected. 
In doing so, the chapter employs and also expands on Hirschman’s (1970) and Turner’s 
(1960) earlier discussed work to show their theoretical relevance and applicability to the 
educational systems in the new post-conflict and post-socialist geo-political frameworks. 
This is then followed by concluding thoughts that only significant sanctions against the 




mobility, and dis-empowers youth in Bosnia’s higher education have the potential to 
diminish ongoing and systemic corruption. 
The Elite Re-creation and its Relation to Corruption 
The country’s longstanding elite dissipated as a consequence of the communist 
system’s disintegration that, together with the 1990s war, brought about the overall 
structural and political fall of the country. To compensate for the lack of the communist 
and educated elite that departed the country prior to the war or were marginalized due to 
the political shift from communism toward nationalism, those who most actively engaged 
in the organization of life and defense during the war were now emerging as Bosnia’s 
new and generally more nationalistically driven elite. As Andreas (2004) elaborates in his 
work on political economies and criminal activities in the war-time Balkans: 
In the Bosnians capital of Sarajevo, for example, the city’s social structure 
has undergone a metamorphosis as a consequence of the military siege and 
its aftermath. While many of the best-educated professionals fled abroad, 
many residents who were previously on the margins of the society have 
experienced rapid upward mobility [emphasis added] through their wartime 
roles and political connections. The daily Sarajevo newspaper Oslobodjenje 
lamented during the siege “Before our eyes, the new class is being born in 
this war, the class of those who got rich overnight, all former ‘marginals.’”3 
(p. 5) 
For the new elite, the first step in the post-war period was to legitimize what was 
gained by illegal activities that took place during the 1992-1995 war. The local 
politicians, war profiteers, and military leaders, aka Bosnia’s new elite, worked toward 
justifying their newly gained positions of power. While the international community 
propagated war amnesty, referring only to “dodgers and deserters” (Andreas, 2004, p. 5), 
the new elite worked to secure its new economic and social standing by ensuring that the 
                                                          
3As quoted in Munir Alibabic, Bosna u Kandzama KOS-a (Bosnia in the Claws of KOS), 




amnesty “include[ed] such crimes as illegal commerce, tax evasion, and illegal use of 
humanitarian aid. The amnesty cover[ed] January 1991-December 22, 1995, a time 
period that closely corresponds to the rise of nationalist political parties” (p. 5). I label 
this legalization of the war-time acquired wealth as the Phase 1 (see Figure 1 below) of 
the Elite Legitimization process entered in and espoused by the political newcomers, who 
were often closely tied to the military leadership, as well as the underground economy of 
the Balkan wars, and who felt an urgent need to legitimize their newly acquired 
economic, social, and political prominence. 
 
Figure 1: New Elite Legitimization Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Emerging Elite: war profiteers, 









With the post-war reorganization of the country came re-invention of the country’s 
educational system as well. Revamping the higher education system according to the new 




to many organizational challenges, obstacles, and inefficiencies within the educational 
system, which consequently created a system conducive to corruption. For instance, 
ethnic fragmentation and political partitioning of the country into smaller governing units 
spilled into the educational setting, leading to an uncoordinated and disorganized 
educational system that has resisted consistent efforts to adopt the EU-based educational 
model. The EU-nionized educational terrain in the rest of Europe and its official 
acceptance by the Bosnian government may have in fact only exacerbated the existing 
problems due to higher education’s systemic inability to properly adopt and follow 
through the requirements of the Bologna Process. 
While so much of the still evolving higher education in post-communist Bosnia 
remains unknown and in flux, the systemic pattern of corruption in higher education has 
become a prominent feature of Bosnia’s education. With the departure of the decades 
dominating elite of the post-WWII Yugoslavia and with Bosnia’s newly found 
independence, there was a need to create the new organizational structures to portray the 
semblance of a functional society and to process the incoming reconstruction and 
reconciliation aid from the Western world. Bosnia lacked an educated elite, with the elite 
vacuum becoming particularly evident once the war ended and the country entered its 
reconstruction stage. 
The emerging elite largely profited from war-time activities and took over the 
political scene, but also felt a need to complete legitimization of its political and social 
standing through education. In what I call the Second Phase of the Elite Legitimization 
(see Figure 1, p. 54), I argue, the newly forming elite felt compelled to finalize the elite 
legitimization process by obtaining the educational degrees that its members often lacked 
in order to maintain legitimacy for their socio-economic prominence and justify their 
long-term hold of political power. 
While educational legitimization may have first began as a form of compensation 




conditions, the chaotic circumstances that characterized Bosnia immediately in the post-
war allowed for the abuse of the educational system to expand significantly and to 
incorporate many of those individuals who rose to their prominent political standing 
during the war but lacked significant educational pedigree to justify and support their 
socioeconomic and political status long-term. No longer was Bosnia at war and cut off 
from the rest of the world, but now it became the center stage for a massive influx of 
foreign aid, organizations, and experts who were in need of development partners, which 
only placed further pressure on many new and rising elite members to buttress their 
sudden shift from the margins of society into the social limelight via fake diplomas. In 
the context of Bosnia, where the educational system was partitioned along political lines, 
with no authoritative state-level institutions to monitor educational practices and 
processes, instantaneous production of educational credentials for the new political and 
economic elite became feasible. Therefore, the primary beneficiary of corruption in 
higher education became the new elite, who seized the opportunity to obtain educational 
pedigrees as the war came to an end and continued to espouse corruption in the years that 
followed with the ultimate goal of securing their legitimacy and consequently their 
positions of power long-term. 
What is of particular interest to me as the researcher is this elite creation’s impact 
on forms of corruption, which have shifted away from standard bribing and moved 
toward more complex organizational processes favoring reciprocation networks among 
the elite. First, I argue, these educational corruption patterns, as played out in Bosnia, 
have pushed the social mobility mechanisms away from Turner’s merit-based and more 
toward his sponsored mobility model. Second, the severity of educational corruption’s 
impact is ultimately reflected in the ways in which youth manage and cope with their 
perceptions and experiences of corruption. I view educational corruption as being part 
and parcel of the de novo post-war elite legitimization process, as having had a 




corruption-coping mechanisms in Bosnia’s higher education. Not only is the social 
mobility process altered, but youth are emerging increasingly convinced that they are 
disempowered by such a system and helpless to change the status quo. 
Bosnia’s higher education is still being crafted, but without substantial 
international community engagement, the system will continue to play a part-time role as 
a diploma-making mechanism for the corrupt circles. Paradoxically this phenomenon is 
occurring in conjunction with the internationally rooted expectation that the educational 
system will serve as the basis for creating an improved, capable, and more mobile 
workforce for a new Bosnia. Caught between the two worlds – one proposing 
meritocratic mobility, harmonized, and EU-integrated educational space and the other 
holding onto the sponsored mobility model that has served the de novo elite well – 
emerged a hybrid system that is uncoordinated, chaotic, inconsistent, and susceptible to 
the ongoing corruption-related practices and behaviors. The increasing utilization of 
higher education to benefit the new elite members has signaled to the public the Bosnian 
leadership’s acceptance of educational corruption as an acceptable form of behavior that 
bears no consequences. 
Sponsored and Merit-Based Mobility: Life on Loan? 
In the post-war period, new Bosnia and Herzegovina had to position itself as an 
equal partner in its communication with the West, which involved re-creating the state 
from physically, morally, and organizationally leveled institutions. In the process and 
with the rise of new institutions, more opportunities for corruption emerged than would 
have in more stable times. While Tito’s communist vision had well over four decades – 
of peace – to institutionalize itself by the time former Yugoslavia began to unravel, the 
post-communist and post-war Bosnia was to become Europe’s partner in peace and 




the international community had envisioned for the new Bosnia, including, more recently, 
Bologna-inspired reform of higher education. 
To be clear, this dissertation does not idealize the past, nor does it directly or 
indirectly claim that the pre-war communist system did not face the issues of corruption, 
reliance on personal connections, and immorality. However, this research does imply that 
the general operational framework and quality of education notably differ from the 
pre-war organization where decades were invested into establishing and maintaining the 
pre-war educational system, its infrastructure, and quality standards. As Zdravko Grebo, 
a law professor from the University of Sarajevo, confirmed in an interview with Peter 
Andreas,4 the elite creation process is decades long elsewhere, but in the Bosnian war, it 
was the get-rich-overnight approach that created the new elite. 
Emerging in such complex circumstances, the Bosnian higher education experience 
presently takes on one of the two generalized scenarios: either students of insignificant 
social backgrounds obtain diplomas through a struggle and extraordinarily hard work as 
this social group lacks personal relationships or through the ability to bribe authorities in 
a system whose laws and rules’ applicability is a function of one’s socio-economic status; 
or with relative ease as one’s social network, political status, and material wealth are 
appropriately leveraged during the educational process. In other words, corruption has 
become an integral part of Bosnia’s social fabric, and while the lower socioeconomic 
groups may see it as a barrier and a form of exclusion, the elite members view it as an 
opportunity to help propel each other’s professional status by reciprocating favors. 
Steadily, Bosnians have come to understand that with political and social 
prominence comes the ease of mobility in higher education. Educational corruption now 
fairly consistently benefits the new elite and their immediate family members and friends. 
                                                          
4Peter Andreas interview with Zdravko Grebo, Sarajevo (July 15, 2002). Please see bibliography for P. 




Given that the war ended about a decade and a half ago, children of those who took the 
positions of power in the new Bosnia have in most cases reached college-appropriate age, 
thereby further complicating the elite’s favor-reciprocation process and emerging modes 
of social mobility. 
The elite’s favor-reciprocation principle is crucial to the post-war distortion of the 
social mobility mechanisms in Bosnia’s higher education. It is a behavioral standard that 
I define as often unspoken yet mutual understanding between two or more parties in the 
educational or any other setting where an expectation exists that a favor by party A to 
party B would, in some form and at some point in time, be reciprocated by party B (see 
Figure 2 below). Simply asking for a favor of someone else is effectively asking for a 
loan that will be presumably repaid later on in life. This is assumed to be occurring only 
when party A and party B have an underlining understanding that they are of somewhat 
equivalent social standing or are mutually aware that they can be beneficial to each other. 
 
Figure 2: Elite’s Favor Reciprocation Process 
 
In the educational sector, this could translate into party A engaging in a conversation with 
party B about, for instance, passing party A’s child on an exam. In response, party B will 
evaluate party A’s social standing and relevance, as well as party A’s power to 
reciprocate the favor in the future. In many cases, the form in which the favor is going to 
be reciprocated is unspecified at the outset and the expectation may never be verbalized, 
but understanding that party A’s favor obliges party B to reciprocate is almost always 




As presented earlier, Lomnitz (2002) was the one who noted that “[m]aterial 
payment in return for favors is graft. It means the absence of any possibility of personal 
relationship of having friends in common. Accepting a bribe is an acknowledgement of 
social inferiority, like accepting a tip or gratuity” (p. 175). This suggests that Lomnitz 
would support the view that bribes rarely take place between social equals for passing 
grades, obtaining of diplomas, or undeserved professorships because of the parties’ 
embarrassment due to the awareness of their comparable social standing or mutually 
beneficial relationship. Based on the educational legitimization of the new elite in Bosnia, 
I further expand on Lomnitz’s view and theorize that it is not necessarily shame 
associated with accepting the bribe from a social equal, but that it often is the 
understanding that a one-time bribe is a more narrowly defined and appropriate form of 
corruption for the poorer and less influential individuals because their social and political 
power to reciprocate favors is simply limited. In other words, when elites engage in 
corrupt processes, they share a mutual understanding that the favor exchanges have much 
greater potential and may have much greater value than a bribe taken at one point in time 
and for a finite value. For instance, a hospital director may ask a professor to pass a 
director’s son during an exam and the professor may do so with the awareness that he 
may one day end up fighting for his life in the hospital run by the doctor in question. This 
is an example that illustrates how poorly defined, largely unspecific, yet highly effective 
favor-reciprocation processes may be in tailoring the social mobility process to the needs 
and requirements of the new Bosnian elite. The example also reinforces how difficult it 
may be to quantify the impact of corruption in education onto a society at large. 
In short, with the educational and political system lacking a unified apparatus for 
regulating and overseeing the public universities, the educational space has turned into a 
system where distortions to both horizontal and vertical mobility are highly pronounced. 
Herein, horizontal immobility is a defined term that signifies the difficulty or 




immobility is a defined term where de-linking of the competence and academic and 
professional success has occurred. In fact, it is being replaced by linking movement up 
the academic ladder to one’s social and political connectivity rather than to academic 
merit. Vertical mobility is what is typically referred to as social or upward mobility, but 
awareness of difficulties with the horizontal mobility of students and within the public 
system is equally important when analyzing settings prone to educational corruption. 
While a merit-based model of social mobility is still possible in Bosnia’s system, 
sponsored mobility as defined by Turner (1960) continues to occur as well and is possibly 
becoming the dominant model in the country’s higher education. While both modes of 
social mobility are still visible within Bosnia’s emerging higher education, the extent of 
disorganization at the national level has likely tipped the balance in favor of sponsored 
mobility as the increasingly dominant modus operandi in higher education in Bosnia. The 
elite’s continuous acceptance and support of sponsored mobility mechanisms jeopardizes 
the country’s prospects for development and will likely continue to marginalize the 
meritocracy principles and behaviors that are crucial for effective functioning of the 
country’s educational system. At the present time, the country is unable to ensure that the 
new generations of doctors, teachers, economists, and lawyers are properly trained and 
not a product of the continuous favor-reciprocation process. The new post-war elite, 
however, do not seem to be intimidated by the negative implications of their collective 
behavior and, as my research illustrates in later sections, continue to enjoy the benefits of 
the academic legitimization and sponsored mobility secured by the educational corruption 
processes of Bosnia’s higher education. 
Lastly, in the less developed world, educational corruption has played a salient role 
in discouraging the lower socioeconomic groups from higher education participation and 
completion while supporting the influential to move up in society by obtaining the 
degrees necessary to legitimate to the lower classes the social dominance of the elites. In 




obtain skills and knowledge that will improve their careers and overall welfare, while 
educational corruption, if known, is discouraged and sanctioned. The elites and the 
wealthy of the developed world send their new generations to the most competitive 
universities to ensure their children’s future success in the society. In contrast, for the 
elites of the developing world, diplomas can often be only a necessary formality that 
socially justifies why a particular member of the elite would land an otherwise unmerited 
position in the society.  
Knowledge on educational corruption is dispersed through a vast body of literature 
on educational systems in developing countries. The importance of my approach is to 
undertake comprehensive research examining the processes of educational corruption in a 
presumably highly corrupt educational system and their consequences on the mobility 
and coping mechanisms of the students in higher education institutions. I hope my 
examination and application of earlier discussed theoretical concepts to the sector of 
education will prove profoundly valuable in the ongoing quest of academia, 
policymakers, and practitioners to better understand corruption and its broad impact on 
development. 
Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Re-visited 
Many insights shared in Hirschman’s (1970) work on exit and voice may prove 
invaluable in analyzing the Bosnian students’ consideration of exiting the institutions of 
higher education versus remaining loyal to the corrupt system or possibly voicing their 
dissatisfaction with the quality of education as affected by educational corruption. When 
applied to Bosnia’s higher education, exit is a complex notion, and Hirschman himself 
points out that the mechanics of exit are not always simple or well understood. A frequent 
expectation that failure of a firm in providing a quality product will lead to an immediate 




competitive market. However, in Hirschman’s view, the firm of interest possibly “enjoys 
some latitude as both price-maker and quality-maker – and therefore, in the latter 
capacity, also as a quality-spoiler” (p. 21). 
As Hirschman (1970) views it, the firm may serve a mixture of “alert” and “inert” 
customers. The voicing of complaints by alert customers would possibly give the firm an 
incentive to improve its performance, while the inert customers would remain loyal, 
allowing for sufficient time for the firm to work toward improving its performance 
(p. 24). The transaction costs of shifting to another provider may be too high and affect 
the reaction of the customers: in the educational sector, this could translate into an 
individual not being willing to transfer to another university because it takes too much 
time or not voicing his/her dissatisfaction with corruption as that may bear negative 
consequences for a student operating in a corrupt environment. 
I revisit Hirschman’s (1970) notions of voice, exit, and loyalty in the context of 
education and build upon his theoretical framework to better understand the unique set of 
coping mechanisms that has emerged in Bosnia’s higher education. I reinterpret the voice 
mechanism that Hirschman sees as a political tool capable of bringing about change, as, 
ironically, severely diminished in its power when situated in an intensely corrupt 
environment. In most cases, I argue, an operating framework involving a high perception 
of corruption impacts the manner and magnitude in which students voice their 
dissatisfaction with corruption. I, in essence, theorize that a predominantly corrupt setting 
dis-empowers voice as a political tool. 
Voice mechanisms in a corrupt setting can be indications of an unhealthy 
environment in which students operate; in other words, they cannot really function 
effectively in such an environment. For instance, a student complaint may simply be 
dismissed without proper investigation. Had it not been for fear of repercussions brought 
about by a corrupt, dysfunctional, and unregulated system of higher education, the 




This research therefore devises a new and education-specific framework with a range of 
outcomes for the voice mechanism. Specifically, voice can happen in lieu of exit, post-
exit, and prior to exit (see Figure 3 below). 
 










When voice occurs in lieu of exit, it can be an official, public, and internal voice 
(see Figure 3 above). The official voice is defined as the articulation of complaints shared 
with the official university bodies or simply individuals working in an official capacity 
within the university setting. Whether complaints are pursued by contacting official 
committees, if such are established to address the corruption concerns, uncorrupt 
professors, or corrupt professors allows us to differentiate among the loud, moderate, and 
low voice, respectively. The magnitude of voice, depending on its effectiveness in 
addressing the institutional lapses as Hirschman (1970) would see them, is classified as 
loud, moderate, or low. In the case of higher education in Bosnia, I see lapses as the 
behaviors, procedures, and systemic traits that are facilitating or are part of the corruption 
process. 
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Contacting the official bodies within the faculty has the potential to result in a loud 
voice, as such a reaction is most likely to instigate an official inquiry into the student’s 
complaint and arguably result in an official follow-up and visible attempt to correct the 
corrupt behavior within the university in question. While potential for change is greatest 
when a loud voice is used, it should be noted that it does not guarantee a substantive 
change or correction of the existing behavior or lapse in the system. If students are 
cautious and fear potential consequences following their complaint, the loud voice is an 
unlikely course of action. Instead, they may be more inclined to express their 
dissatisfaction by speaking with the uncorrupt professors, what I label as a moderate 
voice. Here, the impact is likely moderate due to a limiting potential for change relative 
to the loud voice: the power of the uncorrupt faculty over the corrupt circles of professors 
is especially limited in settings where corruption is systemically present. In other words, 
the likelihood of corruption-related correction following communication between an 
uncorrupt faculty member and a student is less likely than when the official path or 
recourse is taken; therefore, the power of this particular voice is limited. As compared to 
other forms of voice mechanism, students’ low voice is least effective in substantively 
changing corruption processes and largely serves as an emotional outlet for students 
rather than as a corrective and politically capable tool as Hirschman (1970) would see it. 
Voice is low when students limit their reaction by informally complaining to a corrupt 
professor or a powerless staff member, who is unlikely to take any form of action on 
behalf of the student. Such voice is often an emotional reaction on the part of the student 
that will generally have a limited impact on improving the circumstances within the 
system. Direct communication and complaining to a corrupt professor are more likely, 
however, to result in further repercussions for the student rather than in correction of the 
corrupt behavior or practice that led to the complaint. 
In addition to the official voice, there is also what I call a public voice that is often 




synonymous with the voice Hirschman (1970) sees as a political tool (Figure 3, p. 64). 
Public voice is generally classified as a loud response because it has a greater potency to 
shake up the existing system and lead to a correction of the behavior in question. For 
instance, dissatisfied but active students may organize public protests – thereby 
manifesting their loud voice – or approach media outlets to openly and more aggressively 
address corruption issues. This classification of public voice as loud, however, does not 
mean that it will, with certainty, impact correction in corruption-related behaviors. 
Rather, I argue that of all the potential reactions a student or group of students may 
choose, public voice has the greatest potential to instigate a change. This is particularly 
the case when such protests start occurring on a regular basis, and, over time, continuous 
public pressure creates sufficient momentum, placing all actors involved under public 
pressure to address the inefficiencies and problems that are a source of contention.  It is 
only with an external voice that is loud and reaches popular masses who can protest, that 
a change can occur.  
Lastly, in lieu of exit, students could react with their internal voice, which is 
generally classified as a low voice (see Figure 3, p. 64). When it comes to the internal 
voice, the impact is minimal as a result of students often sharing their dissatisfaction with 
their family members and peers only. An internal voice is powerless within a corrupt 
institution. Such an internal and minimally invasive form of activism can only help 
secure continuation of the corruption in Bosnian higher education rather than disrupt the 
status quo. 
If voice post-exit occurs, it likely manifests itself either as public voice or internal 
voice, where public manifestations are typically loud, as they occur either through media 
outlets, public protests, or possibly even as court proceedings. Internal voice, however, is 
of low volume and low impact, as it continues to involve communication limited to 
conversations between students and their family members, friends, and peers. Exit post-




unaddressed; when a student has been intimidated through the educational process (i.e., 
repeatedly failed, told to leave); or when students’ activism has led to pressuring a 
student to leave the faculty in question (see Figure 3, p. 64). 
Similar to my adaptation of Hirschman’s (1970) notion of voice to a corrupt 
educational setting, I reformulate exit and contextualize it to the corrupt Bosnian 
educational system. While, for Hirschman, customers sensitive to what he labels as 
“performance lapses” (p. 24) will react by exiting that firm’s customer base, they are 
likely to remain in the market for the same or similar product offered by another 
company. For Hirschman, exit is parting with a specific company in question and likely 
replacing it with another competitor in the market. This dissertation expands on that 
concept of exit by looking more deeply into the types of exits from a particular institution 
while assuming that a similar form of replacement will not always follow. 
I differentiate between various types of exit that students may make due to 
educational corruption (see Figure 4, p. 68). First, some students may physically remain 
in the same institution but mentally check out or exit due to the presence of corruption 
and the lack of merit they witness on an ongoing basis. In other words, they make 
motivational exit either by losing motivation to work hard or by continuing to pursue 
their degrees while exiting mentally from their corrupt surroundings. Though Hirschman 
(1970) in his work introduces the notion of customers’ loyalty to a particular firm, herein, 
remaining within the same corrupt university is not due to loyalty to a particular faculty 
and understanding of the occasional lapses but more likely due to the students’ awareness 
of the systemic presence of corruption and the individual disempowerment that stems 
from the setting in which they operate. 
Second, I also posit that students may transfer within the nation to another faculty, 
program, or university, and such transfer is generally classified as transferring within the 




behind the transfer (see Figure 4 below). In other words, the issue of significance is not 
whether the student changed his/her major from English to Economics or transferred 
 













from one university to another, but rather whether the student opted to transfer because of 
corruption. For instance, students who are at less corrupt institutions may transfer to more 
corrupt institutions to take advantage of faster graduation. This transfer can occur from 
one faculty/department to another faculty/department within the same institution or can 
extend to transferring to entirely different institutions and, in many cases, into ghost 
private institutions, which are schools that often exist on paper but lack proper 
infrastructure to teach students (see Figure 4 above). To give an example, a particular 
faculty within a university may have a greater concentration of corrupt teachers, 
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within the sector that is entirely unregulated and unsupervised may emerge where 
diplomas are obtained in an already discussed overnight fashion. 
Those who are in discord with the immoral behavior, however, may seek to 
transfer to less corrupt institutions domestically – be it within the same university or to 
another university (see Figure 4, p. 68). Some students may exit by leaving to go abroad 
for work or study; and others may simply exit all forms of higher education, both 
domestically and internationally, due to the pressures of educational corruption (see 
Figure 4, p. 68). To note here and based on the report by the International Organization 
for Migration, the estimates for the number of Bosnians who presently live abroad are 
very high. Though unknown how much of it may have resulted from youth’s 
dissatisfaction with the educational system in the country and prospects for the merit-
based mobility, the estimates range from the Bosnia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007 
estimate of 1.34 million to the World Bank Remittance Migration and Remittances 
Factbook’s estimate of 1.47 million (International Organization for Migration, 2007). As 
a percentage of the total population, almost 38% of Bosnia’s population has left the 
country with most emigrants living in the US, Australia, Croatia, Germany, Switzerland, 
Canada, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden, and France (International Organization for 
Migration, 2007). Though exact numbers are unknown, International Organization for 
Migration (2007) estimates that “there has been a depletion of the skills of the population 
over recent years” (International Organization for Migration, 2007, p. 36).  
Much of the research conducted on corruption often and inexplicitly presumes that 
students are upset with the educational corruption in their universities, and this research 
does so to a certain extent. It is also important to recognize the form of exit that is made 
by students who espouse educational corruption and take advantage of it by purposefully 
looking for the more corrupt colleges in order to obtain their diplomas in a matter of days 
or months. In general, Bosnian students know which faculties and/or universities are 




particular trait of educational corruption allows me to expand on the framework set by 
Hirschman (1970) simply because, in the context of customers of business organizations, 
a customer would be unlikely to replace one inefficient company with a more inefficient 
business organization. Unfortunately, it may well be the case that such behavior is 
presently practiced in the higher education systems of developing countries and, 
therefore, should be accounted for. In other words, exit can be motivated not only by the 
desire to alert the institutions in question of quality or, in this case, non-transparency 
problems but also by the desire to take further advantage of the ongoing corruption by 
departing the less corrupt and joining the most corrupt institutions. 
In the context of the educational sector, the exit mechanisms are complex. In 
countries such as Bosnia, members of the student body population often claim that 
corruption is widespread; yet large numbers of students keep the universities in business 
by appearing to continue to function normally and remaining loyal to the same 
universities they label as corrupt. As some have already noted, the majority of those 
enrolled drop out of Bosnia’s faculties in the first year of their university studies 
(Pitkanen, 2008). With the mechanics of exit, I am particularly interested in 
understanding why those who stay in the highly corrupt system remain inert and how 
they continue to cope with corruption for those years that remain. Inertness in Bosnia, I 
argue, may be occurring due to the extent of educational corruption and the students’ 
realization that their individual exits or voices would not instigate a systemic change. In 
some cases, students may also be inclined to stay put as the transaction costs of 
transferring or being repeatedly failed, thus, losing years at a time, may simply be too 
high. As the preceding discussion suggests, more intricate work on corruption’s impact 
on students and their consequent reactions is needed, and I try to initiate this much 
needed discussion by suggesting that in an overall corrupt setting, both exit and voice are 





In sum, Chapter III outlines ways in which Bosnia’s higher education became an 
integral component of the post-war elite legitimization process. More importantly, the 
Chapter takes the next step and theorizes that, gradually, corruption expanded beyond the 
initial and limited top leadership’s legitimization and became entrenched in Bosnia’s 
higher education. Today, I argue, corruption is perceived as a norm in Bosnia’s higher 
education, and its prevalence has disrupted the social mobility mechanisms and created 
duality in the social mobility process so that the unprivileged still work hard to obtain 
their degrees while those with social connections are reliant on the sponsorship model. 
Though plausible, I further test these arguments in the upcoming Chapter IV. I begin 
Chapter IV by outlining the research methodology relied upon in this study as well as the 
rationale behind specific methods used to test presented theoretical framework in hope of 
painting a clearer picture of the interaction taking place between corruption, social 




RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the overall research design used in the study while, first, 
outlining the methodological framework that aims at successfully and comprehensively 
answering the research questions and, second, at elaborating on the sampling approach 
used to arrive at the findings of this research. The chapter begins with a Methodological 
and Analytical Approach sub-section’s brief overview of the qualitative and quantitative 
approach in social sciences and builds on that to provide a rationale as to why the mixed 
research is chosen as an optimal tool to collect and analyze data on the issues of 
corruption, social mobility, and coping mechanisms in Bosnia’s higher education. I also 
detail on the methods used to analyze data, including the binary logistic regression and 
the model comparison approach as important elements of the quantitative component of 
the mixed-methods strategy I undertake. Here, I present a matrix of the research 
questions and methods applied to answering them while illustrating concretely how I link 
this study’s research questions to specific sections of surveys and/or interviews that have 
helped answer them. 
I continue by concisely reviewing the content analysis as the qualitative component 
of the mixed-methods approach. Importantly and throughout the Methodological and 
Analytical Approach sub-section, I elaborate on the rationale behind my decision to 
utilize each method in answering earlier posed questions. I do so by discussing the 
relevance of each method to the context I study and questions I ask, as well as by 
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exemplifying earlier use and applicability of the selected methods to research in 
education. I end Chapter IV with the sub-section on Sampling, where I detail on the 
sampling process and data collection instruments as well as on linking them through the 
set of variables to the research questions and theoretical framework examined here. This 
section, however, does not analyze the data or present findings, but outlines the overall 
research strategy as a prelude to the findings-related chapters. 
Methodological and Analytical Approach 
Rationale for Mixed Methods Framework 
The study’s analysis of corruption-related procedures and behaviors in academia 
provides an opportunity to decode the ways in which the newly formed elites have 
transformed and monopolized inefficient universities precluding Bosnia and its youth 
from effectively joining the EU-unionized space in higher education. The mixed methods 
approach is well-suited to decoding and analyzing such complex trends because it allows 
me to ask the same questions from multiple angles and, therefore, develop a multifold 
perspective on the issues of concern. Opting for quantitative research only, with this topic 
in mind, would exclude some of the most invaluable insights shared by the students in 
one-on-one interviews.  Similarly, relying solely on interviews would not provide a 
sufficiently large sample size, which is preferable when looking for the key trends in 
Bosnia’s higher education, such as for instance finding out what is the most frequently 
occurring form of corruption or most frequently adopted corruption coping mechanism. 
While the quantitative approach’s advantage rests in its ability to segregate important and 
generalizable patterns in large samples (the what), quantitative research lacks explanatory 
power as to the particularities of local cultures and complex contexts (the why and how). 
Over the years, both methodological approaches have gained validity and today remain 
invaluable in helping researchers understand various social science phenomena. Gorard 
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et al. (2004) simplify differentiations between quantitative and qualitative research, 
noting that an essential difference between the two is that the narrative nature of the latter 
allows the researcher simply to ask direct questions, while quantitative methods seek 
more complicated and indirect ways to answer the same research questions. However, 
Gorard et al. additionally underscore that, though qualitative work may be narrative and 
in-depth by its definition, it is not the sole authority on examining and understanding 
meanings of things, cultures, people, phenomena, or societies. In fact, Hammersley 
(1996) alludes to the usage of in-depth interviews to, at times, help in the formulation of 
surveys, illustrating that one methodological approach can be informed by the other.  
This study aims at comprehensively analyzing the corruption’s impact on the 
student population, as well as its relationship with the mechanisms of social mobility and 
respondents’ coping abilities. To analyze these issues within the earlier formulated 
theories empirically, the flexibility and comprehensiveness of the mixed-methods 
approach validates its applicability and suitability to this research. Simply, quantitative 
methods allow me as a researcher to examine, for example, whether the perceived level 
of corruption is high or low and whether corruption trends are tilting towards the bribing 
framework or favor-for-favor exchange mechanisms. However, the deeper understanding 
of why, for instance, students perceive corruption as existing or how the favors are being 
exchanged amongst the members of the social elites can only be enhanced by qualitative 
methods that allow the more complex and intricate information to enter the analysis. 
Therefore, this research chose to rely on the additive value of mixed methodologies by 
combining multiple methods to reveal additional information. Combined qualitative and 
quantitative methodology, or mixed methods research, was initially used in 1959 by 
Campbell and Fisk (Creswell, 2009), while Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003) argue that 
such an approach was used as early as the beginning of the 20th century. Others have 
traced this methodological approach, in sociology, to as early as 1855 (Erzberger & 
Prein, 1997).  
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To briefly review the broader methodological landscape, Creswell (2009) notes 
that social scientists can conduct three types of research: quantitative, qualitative, and 
mixed methods research. For research using a quantitative approach, Creswell points out 
the frequently used survey or experimental design where “experimental research seeks to 
determine if a specific treatment influences an outcome” is significant while survey 
research collects data on a sufficiently large sample with the goal of detecting the 
common patterns that then can be generalized onto the population of interest (p. 12). The 
list of possible strategic approaches in qualitative research is somewhat longer and 
includes: ethnography, grounded theory, case studies, phenomenological research, and 
narrative research. Among these varied qualitative strategies, case studies have been 
frequently applied in educational research, as they allow researchers to examine the 
subject of the study in depth. 
Today, mixed methods research continues to evolve, but some initial strategies 
have already emerged and continue to be popularized. Three key approaches to mixed 
methods research are sequential mixed methods, concurrent mixed methods, and 
transformative mixed methods (Creswell, 2009). While sequential mixed methods 
sequence the research so that the outcome of one stage facilitates the articulation of the 
next phase, concurrent mixed methods occur at one point in time with the goal of using 
data together to gain more profound knowledge of the phenomenon studied. As the title 
reveals, research that applies transformative mixed methods chooses a theoretical 
background that guides and informs methods and data collection, allowing for changes 
and transformations along the process. 
This study used the concurrent mixed methods approach, where the data on 
students’ perceptions on corruption, social mobility, and EU-nionization were collected 
via interviews and surveys simultaneously and analyzed accordingly. As others would 
agree (Creswell, 2009; Newman & Benz, 1998), the blend of the qualitative and 
quantitative methods is complementary rather than mutually exclusive, and the primary 
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goal of using such an approach here was to merge the information obtained via different 
methods and give a fuller picture of the educational corruption processes and trends in 
post-war and developing Bosnia. In the process, I have recorded and analyzed any 
crossover of similar or identical findings arrived at via quantitative and qualitative 
methods, as I have done with any significant differences. Informed by a pragmatic 
worldview, I am in favor of drawing on a theoretical foundation or method of data 
analysis to ensure the most optimal understanding of the research problem (Creswell, 
2009). Such flexibility is required herein due to the complexity of interactions examined 
in the world of educational corruption, social mobility, and students’ coping mechanisms.  
Application of Mixed Methods Framework 
The salience of combining the qualitative and quantitative methods in this 
particular case is magnified because of the interactive and intricate nature of corruption, 
social mobility, and coping mechanisms. Here, the concurrent mixed methods approach 
helps bring the research questions, proposed theories, and overall methodological design 
together by creating an optimal path to answering the posed questions. In Bosnia’s post-
war context where very little to none research has been previously conducted on 
educational corruption, social mobility, and coping mechanisms, it was particularly 
important to provide students with multiple opportunities to voice their views on these 
important issues. Providing multiple questions that, in different formats, address the same 
research question provided me as a researcher with a comprehensive source of 
information that has helped examine and validate my answers to the posed research 
questions. It has also allowed this study’s participants multiple opportunities to engage in 
the research and share their insights relating to corruption, social mobility, and coping 
mechanisms. To illustrate, for research question 2, which is principally concerned with 
how mobility mechanisms may be affected by educational corruption (see Table 2, 
pp. 78-79), I note that a set of items from the survey seems relevant in addressing this 
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question and are further complemented by two sections in the interview guide titled 
Socio-Economic Differences and Coping with Corruption (see Appendix B for further 
details).  
I had designed the survey and interview-guide sections with the mixed-methods 
approach in mind and with understanding that almost each question studied could be 
approached and asked in multiple ways helping to prompt the study participants to share 
their perceptions on corruption, social mobility, and coping mechanisms in higher 
education of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As specified in Table 2 (pp. 78-79), most 
questions in the interview guide and survey were centered around the concepts this study 
embarked on understanding, including social mobility, perceived corruption, coping 
mechanisms, procedural/organizational/behavior traits that facilitate corruption, forms of 
corruption, and EU-nionization process. For example, question 3 per Table 2 (see 
pp. 78-79), focuses on the impact of educational corruption and its relation to coping 
mechanisms among students and the EU-nionization of Bosnia’s education.  
Similarly, the first research question (see Table 2, pp. 78-79), is addressed in the 
survey, where data on the level and facilitators of corruption come from questions such as 
Survey item #16, which asks participating students how widespread corruption is. 
Further, item #17 is as relevant in answering the same research question, as it lists most 
frequently observed forms of corruption in Bosnia’s higher education, including but not 
limited to: buying passing grades, buying diplomas, publishing plagiarized books, 
inappropriate relationships between students and members of faculty, passing exams 
because of social connections, obtaining diplomas in an excessively short period of time, 
passing exams because of influential parents, and others. In addition, the Student 
Interview Guide (Appendix B) includes a section covering the issues of perceived 
corruption, corruption facilitators, and rationale behind the persistence of the same, 
providing another significant source of data for answering the first research question.  
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In short, Table 2 (see pp. 78-79) provides a summary of the mixed methods 
research as applied to this study. Comprehensiveness of the mixed-methods data 
collection approach has allowed for discussion of many questions under various sections 
of the survey and interview guide, providing several opportunities for multiple types of 
data analysis on a similar set of issues. This approach benefits the study in that it provides 
multiple formats in which the findings of this study can be linked back to the study’s 
conceptual framework on corruption, social mobility and coping mechanisms. 
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FORMS OF 
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Rationale for and Application of Logistic Regression 
In line with its overall mixed-methods approach, this study uses survey and/or 
interview questions when they directly answer the research questions and analyzes 
various descriptive statistics as they help in uncovering current corruption trends in 
higher education in Bosnia. Where pertinent, the research also applies another statistical 
method to further examine variables stemming from the surveyed students’ responses. 
While many statistical methods avail themselves to the survey data analysis, I chose the 
binary logistic regression as a preferred statistical method for several reasons. First and 
foremost, the binary logistic regression allows for the analysis of dichotomous outcomes, 
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such as questioning whether there is perceived corruption or not in Bosnia’s higher 
education. As an alternative approach, probit regression could have also been used but 
which one is used is often a function of researcher’s preference as both generally produce 
very similar results (Gill, 2001; Greene, 1997). 
The key assumption of the binary logistic regression is that the dependent variable 
is dichotomous and takes on either a value of 1 or value of 0 with each of these two 
values having its corresponding probability that is a function of the independent variables 
used in the model (Cabrera, 1994). As Cabrera notes: “The application of binary logistic 
regression in higher education to deal with dichotomous dependent variables is not new. 
Its use can be traced back to the late ‘60s and early ‘70s” (p. 226). Educational research 
has applied the binary logistic regression to the study of numerous topics, including 
issues such as “college persistence, transfer decisions, and degree attainment” (p. 226). 
Secondly, binary logistic regression is often deemed flexible, having lesser number 
of assumptions that ought to be satisfied relative to some other statistical methods 
(Norusis, 2009). The specific advantage of binary logistic regression is that it provides 
flexibility in terms of distribution of the predictor variables relative to, for instance, the 
often used linear regression models. Logistic regression does not make any specific 
assumptions about the distribution of the predictor variables (Bewick, Cheek, & Ball, 
2005). In other words, binary logistic regression provides the flexibility to work with a 
mixed predictor pool including both categorical and continuous variables that need not be 
“nicely distributed” (Wuensch, 2009). 
While many variables may resemble a normal distribution – defined as a frequency 
distribution where many observations gravitate toward the mean or the center of the 
distribution while the rest move away from the mean and decline in frequency – that may 
not be always the case. Specific to this research and given the number of variables 
derived from 39 survey questions, the study chose binary logistic regression to allow for 
inclusion of various variables without the constraint of the normal distribution 
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assumption. For instance, the student’s ethnicity captured by the ETHNICITY variable 
(see Figure 5 below) does not have the bell-shaped curve typically seen with normal 
distribution, which would mean that this predictor could not be used within those 
regression models that assume the independent variables are normally distributed. In 
short, whether a variable has normal distribution or not is not problematic for logistic 
regression, allowing for indiscriminate use of predictor variables in that regard. 
 










To be specific, research question 2a (please see Table 3, pp. 86-93) hypothesizes 
that there is a differential in perception of corruption degree between students of different 
ethnic backgrounds. To allow for the use of ETHNICITY as a predictor, the logistic 
regression is used and, in the base model, student’s ethnicity is the only predictor, while 
in the expanded model, other independent variables were added reflecting, for instance, 
household income levels and father’s employment. The rationale behind including these 
two predictors is that household income levels and family influence, being reflective of 
the father’s employment and social standing, arguably have an effect on students’ 
perception of corruption.  
In addition, it should also be noted that the student survey consisted of 39 questions 
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the gradation amongst different responses. Later on and as needed, I also recoded some of 
the categorical variables into binary variables. Fore instance, the variable called 
CORRUPTION_DEGREE measures the level of perceived corruption amongst students 
who are placed into various groups: those who thought corruption was “highly 
widespread” (1), “widespread” (2), “neither widespread nor absent” (3), “somewhat 
absent” (4), and “completely absent” (category 5). While analyzing this variable has 
resulted in several important observations on the perceived level of corruption in 
Bosnia’s higher education, I had also recoded this categorical variable into the binary 
variable called CORRUPTION_DEGREE_FINAL (CDF) that measures whether 
corruption is perceived as present to any degree (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). This 
binary dependent variable was used for the ethnicity-related models where I wanted to 
differentiate between those students who thought corruption was absent and the rest.  
The key rationale behind this approach is that I wanted to both extract information 
from the categorical variables through descriptive statistics to capture gradations in the 
student answers. At the same time, I wanted to further analyze the same set of 
relationships through the binary logistic regression to see the impact of various 
independent variables on the occurrence of a certain event – in the case existence of 
perceived corruption – or not.  Other research has also relied on recoding categorical 
variables into the binary dependant variables. For instance, Straus and Sweet (1992) 
looked at the occurrence of verbal aggression amongst US families. Even though they 
tracked the numbers of yelling incidences occurring in the family during a year, they 
noticed that data provided them with many families that did not yell and others that 
yelled frequently. So, Straus and Sweet (1992) opted to use logistic regression and 
recoded the numeric variable so that all those families that experienced at least one or 
more yelling incidents a month were deemed aggressive (coded as 1) and those who did 
not experience a yelling incident were deemed non-aggressive (coded as 0). The key 
  
83
however with the binary dependant variable’s recoding is that categories are “mutually 
exclusive” (Sweet & Grace-Martin, n.d., p. 159), a rule that this study followed. 
In line with the study’s rationale for the mixed methods research, I break some of 
the research questions into multiple hypotheses, which are then evaluated by specific 
logistic regression models, content analysis of the questions from the interview guide, 
and/or descriptive statistics of the directly provided answers from the survey questions. 
Whenever the logistic regression approach was used, each proposed hypothesis (as 
illustrated in Table 3, pp. 86-93) was tested with two models using the model comparison 
approach (Judd & McClelland, 1989). 
Question 2b, which looks into social mobility mechanisms, is analyzed from 
several different perspectives (see Table 3, pp. 86-93). First, the survey question asks 
directly whether merited promotion amongst the faculty members is typically seen within 
higher education, but the issue is further analyzed by building a logistic regression model 
to determine how best to predict when students will perceive merited promotion as 
occurring or not. With Hypothesis 2 for question 2b (see Table 3, pp. 86-93), I 
specifically hypothesize that students’ satisfaction with the state of their faculty and 
teaching affects students’ perception of the mobility mechanisms within that faculty. 
Arguably, students who are more satisfied with the manner in which their faculties are 
run and ways in which they are taught will be more inclined to ascribe their teachers’ 
upward mobility to Turner’s (1960) contest-based model. With greater teaching and 
procedural satisfaction, I would expect to find that mobility is perceived as merit-based 
rather than not. Similarly, with greater dissatisfaction, students would perceive mobility 
as sponsored rather than merit-based. 
I tackle this hypothesis with the base model, where the binary dependant variable 
of whether the faculty is perceived as being promoted based on merit or not is predicted 
by the level of procedural satisfaction at the faculty. The model is then expanded to 
include other predictors, including whether the program is part of ECTS (The European 
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Credit Transfer and Accumulation System) or not, the level of teaching satisfaction, and 
students’ years of studying. Whether students perceive their program as being part of the 
ECTS is an important predictor, as that will be telling of the extent to which the Bologna-
based EU-nionization efforts are relevant in affecting merit-based mobility as applied in 
Bosnia. Similarly, length of studies is another predictor included in this model, as it is 
presumed to affect students’ view of merit-based mobility, with those studying longer 
being increasingly more aware of corruption issues and therefore seeing the mobility 
process as sponsorship- rather than merit-based. Lastly, it is assumed that the level of 
satisfaction with teachers and teaching processes would have a significant impact in 
forming students’ perceptions of merit-based mobility. 
The macro theoretical framework proposed in this research suggests a linkage 
between the post-war elite formation process and a shift in social mobility away from the 
merit-based model and toward sponsored mobility, and Hypothesis 3 for question 2b tests 
this claim (see Table 3, pp. 86-93). I theorize that students’ social and political 
involvement affects whether they perceive promotions as merit-based or not. In this case, 
the base model is built so that the perception of merited promotion in academia is 
predicted with the variable measuring the level of participants’ sociopolitical 
involvement, where sociopolitical involvement is used as a proxy for the elite status in 
Bosnia’s society. Arguably, the person who is active socially and politically in his/her 
community is generally deemed to be of a higher social status. In the expanded and more 
complex model testing of Hypothesis 3 for question 2b (see Table 3, pp. 86-93), 
additional predictors include variables measuring the level of teaching satisfaction, 
procedural satisfaction, years students are studying, and whether their program is part of 
ECTS or not.  
When it comes to the question of horizontal mobility within the system, which is 
addressed as part of question 2b, Hypothesis 5 (see Table 3, pp. 86-93) assumes that 
student transfer is limited due to corruption. This issue is directly addressed with the 
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survey question (Item #30) on reasons for non-transfer. Similarly, Hypothesis 4 (see 
Table 3, pp. 86-93), which helps address the research question 2b analyzing whether 
Bosnia’s higher education espouses contest-based versus sponsored mobility, 
hypothesizes that vertical mobility mechanisms are clearly dysfunctional, as the best are 
often not the first to graduate. This question, however, does not necessitate the 
application of logistic regression because it is directly answered in the survey Item #10. 
For research questions 3a and 3b (see Table 3, pp. 86-93), which are tasked with 
examining an earlier introduced claim that corruption is an important element in students’ 
decision to exit their faculties, Items #28 and #29 (Hypothesis 1) provide direct responses 
to this question. As to voice and coping mechanisms, several hypotheses are presented, 
including Hypothesis 2 (see Table 3, pp. 86-93), which proposes that a safe and 
anonymous system would help students voice their dissatisfaction with corruption. Under 
the same sub-heading, Hypothesis 3 (see Table 3, pp. 86-93) points to a consensus among 
students that, even if voicing mechanisms were in place, student complaints would not 
lead to an effective and systemic change. In the context of a highly corrupt environment, 
such behaviors and perceptions are expected to emerge from this research as a norm 
because of the environment of mistrust in Bosnian higher education. As to coping 
mechanisms, Hypothesis 4 (see Table 3 below) is there to claim that students cope with 
corruption differently and the carefully crafted survey questions directly address that 
claim. In fact, a number of sub-questions stemming from research questions 1 and 3 can 
be directly answered through analysis of data collected via surveys. As to research 
question 3c (see Table 3 below), which questions whether the introduction of the ECTS-
based programs had any effect on changes in corruption, a simple means of descriptive 
statistics is sufficient to answer this question. Further contextualization of this and other 
sub-questions is also provided by the content analysis of the interview transcripts in order 
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Ethnicity Base Model: 
Ethnicity Final (ETHF): 
Bosniaks=1, Non-Bosniaks=0 
 
Ethnicity Expanded Model: 
ETHF 
 
Household Income_500 (HI500): 
500 KM or less=1,  all else=0; 
Household Income_1500 (HS1500):  
500-1500 KM=1, all else=0); 
Household Income_2500 (HI2500): 
1500-2500 KM=1, all else=0; 
Household_Income_3500 (HI3500): 
2500-3500 KM=1, all else=0 
 
Father_Position_Worker (FPW): 
Worker=1, all else=0; 
Father_Position_Intellectual (FPI): 
Intellectual=1, all else=0; 
Father_Position_Executive (FPE): 
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Merited Promotion Base Model: 
Procedure_Satisfaction_Final1 
(PSF1): very satisfied=1, all else=0; 
Procedure_Satisfaction_Final2 
(PSF2): satisfied=1, all else=0; 
Procedure_Satisfaction_Final3 
(PSF3): neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied=1, all else=0; 
Procedure_Satisfaction_Final4 
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Merited Promotion Expanded 
Model: 
Procedure_Satisfaction_Final1 
(PSF1): very satisfied=1, all else=0; 
Procedure_Satisfaction_Final2 
(PSF2): satisfied=1, all else=0; 
Procedure_Satisfaction_Final3 
(PSF3): neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied=1, all else=0; 
Procedure_Satisfaction_Final4 
(PSF4): dissatisfied=1, all else=0 
 
Teaching_Satisfaction_Final1 
(TSF1): very satisfied=1, all else=0;  
Teaching_Satisfaction_Final2 
(TSF2): satisfied=1, all else=0; 
Teaching_Satisfaction_Final3 
(TSF3): neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied=1, all else=0; 
Teaching_Satisfaction_Final4 
(TSF4): dissatisfied=1, all else=0 
 
Competent_Graduate_Final1 
(CGF1): always=1, all else=0;  
Competent_Graduate_Final1 
(CGF2): almost always=1, all 
else=0; 
Competent_Graduate_Final3 
(CGF3): often=1, all else=0; 
Competent_Graduate_Final4 








ECTS_final (ECTSF):  
ECTS=1, all else=0 
 
Years_Studying_Final (YSF) 
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Impact Base Model: 
Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final
1 (SPIF1): highly involved=1, all 
else=0; 
Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final
2 (SPIF2): somewhat involved=1, 
all else=0; 
Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final
3 (SPIF3): neither involved nor 
uninvolved =1, all else=0 
Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final
4 (SPIF4): somewhat uninvolved 
=1, all else=0 
 
SocioPolitical Involvement 
Impact Expanded Model: 
Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final
1 (SPIF1): highly involved=1, all 
else=0; 
Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final
2 (SPIF2): somewhat involved=1, 
all else=0; 
Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final
3 (SPIF3): neither involved nor 
uninvolved =1, all else=0; 
Sociopolitical_Involvement_Final
4 (SPIF4): somewhat uninvolved 
=1, all else=0 
 
Procedure_Satisfaction_Final1 
(PSF1): very satisfied=1, all 
else=0; 
Procedure_Satisfaction_Final2 
(PSF2): satisfied=1, all else=0; 
Procedure_Satisfaction_Final3 
(PSF3): neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied=1, all else=0; 
Procedure_Satisfaction_Final4 
(PSF4): dissatisfied=1, all else=0 
 
Years_Studying_Final (YSF) 
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(TSF1): very satisfied=1, all else=0;  
Taching_Satisfaction_ Final2 
(TSF2): satisfied=1, all else=0; 
Teaching_Satisfaction_Final3 
(TSF3): neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied=1, all else=0; 
Teaching_Satisfaction_Final4 
(TSF4): dissatisfied=1, all else=0 
 
Competent_Graduate_Final1 
(CGF1): always=1, all else=0;  
Competent_Graduate_Final1 
(CGF2): almost always=1, all 
else=0; 
Competent_Graduate_Final3 
(CGF3): often=1, all else=0; 
Competent_Graduate_Final4 
(CGF4): rarely=1, all else=0 
 
Student_Type_Final1 (STF1): 
Excellent=1, all else=0;  
Student_Type_Final2 (STF2):  
Very good=1, all else=0;  
Student_Type_Final3 (STF3):  








ECTS_final (ECTSF):  
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Now that the key areas of this research where the logistic regression will be 
applied have been outlined, it should be noted that the simple binary logistic regression 
model takes the form where it predicts “the logit, that is, the natural log of the odds of 
having made one or the other decision” (Wuensch, 2009, p. 2). The formula for simple 








Figure 6: Simple Binary Logistic Regression 
ln(ODDS) = ln[ Yhat / (1-Yhat) ] = a +bX 
 
Source: Wuensch, 2009, p. 2 
Herein, ln(ODDS) stands for the natural log of the odds of one of the two possible events, 
while Yhat stands for the predicted probability of the event coded as 1 (i.e., for instance, 
corruption is present), while (1- Yhat) would then represent the predicted probability of 
the other event that is coded as 0 (i.e., corruption is absent). In other words, the 
dependent variable is the logit, where logit is defined as the natural log of the odds. Log 
(odds) = logit (p) = ln (p/1-p). Logit can also be called a log of the odds that a particular 
event will occur: it is the probability of one or an event occurring versus probability of 
zero or the event not occurring. 
The logistic regression’s coefficients are expressed in log-odds units, but they are 
always converted into the odds ratios in order to be easily interpreted. The odds ratio is 
simply the natural log base ‘e’ raised to the power of B or coefficient.6 Going forward, 
the interpretation of the binary regression logistic results is focused on interpreting the 
odds ratios, where for categorical variables, for instance, the odds ratio represents the 
difference in odds of the event happening between the category in question and the 
reference category for that particular variable. It is important to note that while the binary 
logistic regression does not make any assumptions about the predictors’ distributions, it 
does presume that there is a linear relationship between the logit of the dependent 
variable and the predictor variable.  
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Testing this linearity assumption is necessary only when the independent variables 
are continuous or ordinal but not with categorical, interval, or dummy variables. To do 
so, this analysis relies on the Box-Tidwell Transformation test, which requires that, for 
each of the continuous or the ordinal variable predictors (i.e., X) in the model, a new 
variable is created, where X is multiplied with the natural log of X (i.e., X*ln(x)). Such a 
transformed variable, created for each predictor X of interest, is then included in the 
logistic regression model. If the coefficient(s) for the transformed variable(s) turn out to 
be significant, the assumption of linearity is violated.  
As to the categorical variables, research has supported using “Likert scales” – such 
as the ones used herein with five levels including values such as, for instance, “very 
satisfied”, “somewhat satisfied,” “neither satisfied nor dissatisfied,” “somewhat 
dissatisfied,” and “very dissatisfied” – as the interval variables, especially when they 
have at least five categories (Jaccard & Wan, 1996). The rationale behind it is that the 
intervals or differences between different values of the variable in question are 
equivalent. For instance, differences between “very satisfied” and “satisfied” versus 
“very dissatisfied” and “dissatisfied” are assumed to be equal to each other. With ordinal 
variables, those differences are not necessarily the same, and the focus is instead on the 
rankings of various values of the ordinal variable in question. For all categorical 
variables, this study uses the Indicator contrasts, where the reference category is always 
the last category of the categorical variable and is presented by codes of zeros in all other 
categories. To exemplify, if there is a variable with categories coded as 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, 
the category coded as 5 would be the reference category to which all others are 
individually compared. 
Even in the event that the logistic regression model contains variables with the 
nonlinearity present between the independents and the logit of the dependent, the 
predictor can be reformulated to create categories for a continuous variable and use the 
newly recoded variable within the logistic regression model. This is a standard resolution 
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and approach to non-linearity in binary regression modeling. To also note, all categorical 
variables are recoded using Indicator coding, which effectively transforms each category 
into a dummy variable. For the logistic regression to be reliable, small or absent 
measurement errors are desired in combination with small numbers of missing cases. In 
the data collection here, a large survey-based sample was drawn minimizing the 
percentage of not applicable or missing answers, as well as their impact on the overall 
findings. With the sufficiently large sample available for analysis for each of the models 
presented herein, the missing values were nearly negligible.  
To note, the independent variables selected for each model serve as the set of 
indicative predictors and will be relied upon only if multicollinearity is absent in each 
model. In the course of this analysis, I test for multicollinearity by calculating Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF) for each model, where VIF determines whether the 
multicollinearity is inflating the variance of each relevant coefficient. The reciprocal of 
VIF is tolerance, and “a tolerance of less than 0.20 is cause for concern; a tolerance of 
less than 0.10 almost certainly indicates a serious collinearity problem” (Menard, 2001, 
p. 76). Conversely, VIF of 10 or greater indicates presence of multicollinearity.7  
To sum up and as earlier exemplified, the logistic analysis in this study follows a 
general format in two steps, with simple logistic regression being conducted first, 
followed by an expanded model with more than one predictor (i.e., X1, X2, X3…, etc). This 
model comparison approach (Judd & McClelland, 1989) allows for a comparison of the 
two models and consequent determination of which model has greater predictive value in 
answering the question posed. By using a model comparison approach for data analysis, 
                                                          
7
 SPSS does not provide, within logistic regression calculations, VIF and tolerance values for each predictor, 
but these values are calculated as part of the linear regression models within the SPSS. Though linear regression is not 
used here, it is calculated for each model in order to obtain VIF and tolerance levels. VIF and tolerance levels are not 
affected by the relationship between the dependant variable and independent variables as they measure 
multicollinearity among independent variables only. This approach of measuring multicollinearity in the logistic 
regression models is widely adopted as the standard approach in testing multicollinearity. For further details on VIF 
and logistic regression please see Scott Menard’s 2001 Applied Logistic Regression Analysis: Second Edition in Series 
on Quantitative Applications in Social Sciences.   
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Judd and McClelland (1989) have illustrated the applicability of regression modeling in 
social science research. A process of model building is utilized in order to determine a set 
of explanatory variables that best predict the dependent variable and help shed light on 
the relationships this research argues exist between educational corruption, social 
mobility, and coping mechanisms utilized by the student body in Bosnia’s higher 
education.   
Rationale for and Application of the Content Analysis Method 
In addition to the logistic regression whose exact application to the research 
questions was discussed in the previous sub-section, I utilize qualitative methodology as 
well. The primary rationale behind adding a qualitative methodological approach into the 
mix is that logistic regression, being a quantitative tool, cannot get as specific in 
analyzing the contextually finer issues as the qualitative approach can. Therefore, the data 
collected via in-depth surveys are analyzed and merged with the data analysis from 
surveys. The main tool utilized to collect data qualitatively is the Student Interview Guide 
(see Appendix B). The guide consists of four general subsections outlining those key 
questions that guided the in-depth interviews with Bosnian students. The four sections 
include: “Perceived Corruption, Corruption Facilitators, and its Persistency”; “Socio-
economic Differences”; “Coping with Corruption”; and “EU-nionization.” 
Qualitative research is of essence in uncovering the contextual idiosyncrasies of 
educational corruption that can be missed through exclusive reliance on data collection 
methodologies characteristic of quantitative analysis. Not focusing on a particular 
method, Marvasti (2003, p. 88) underscores the relevance of three different stages in 
every type of the qualitative research; Huberman and Miles (1994) have labeled these 
stages as: “‘data reduction,’ ‘data display,’ and ‘conclusion: drawing/verifying.’” In the 
data reduction stage, the pool of information obtained via interviews is downsized in 
order to manage and simplify all of the data collected. As to the data display process, 
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researchers often review the interviews and write some overarching and summarizing 
notes (Marvasti, 2003). In the quantitative methodology, this would be equivalent to 
looking for overall trends or patterns in the data by using statistical analysis. The last 
stage of qualitative research is focused on drawing conclusions. 
This dissertation applies the content analysis method by, in essence, reducing 
detailed interview-based data to relevant themes and looking for patterns and repetition of 
certain concepts. The content analysis method was first developed by Gottschalk and 
Gleser (1969). It is generally defined as “the manual or automated coding of documents, 
transcripts, newspapers, or even audio of video media to obtain counts of words, phrases, 
or word-phrases clusters” for further analysis (Garson, 1998, p. 1). For this research, the 
individual student interviews were first transcribed in detail, then analyzed for any 
potential patterns that could further inform the quantitative analysis and complement 
other findings. For those questions not addressed via logistic regression, analysis stems 
from the content analysis of the interview transcripts and/or descriptive statistics derived 
from the surveyed sample. For instance, Research Questions 1a and 1b (please see 
Table 3, pp. 86-93) are addressed directly in the survey questions, while additional 
insights are also provided based on the interview data analysis. In the process, the 
analysis applied “a quasi-statistical approach to counting responses, in order to establish 
patterns” (Gorard et al., 2004, p. 6), which in essence means that any recurrent trends and 
patterns became part of the findings of this study and are presented in a table format, 
when appropriate. Gorard et al. saliently observe that even qualitative analysis, in 
searching for patterns, rests on some type of frequency labeling. Here, particular attention 
was paid to those notions that were repeatedly discussed and brought up by various 





According to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s last census of 1991, the country’s 
population totaled 4,377,033, of which 3.7%, or 122,967 individuals, were college 
educated. In the post-war period, the census has not been performed, and the exact 
number of those attending and later graduating from both private and public colleges 
remains unknown. The remnants of the educational system inherited from the former 
Yugoslavia have undergone a significant metamorphosis in the post-communist and post-
war period due to the mushrooming of new, private, and often unregulated higher-
education institutions; to name a few: Banja Luka College, Panevropski Univerzitet 
Apeiron Banjaluka, Univerzitet za Poslovni Inzenjering i Menadzment Banja Luka, 
Univerzitet Sinergija Bijeljina, Internacionalni Univerzitet “Philip Noel Baker” Sarajevo, 
Sarajevo School of Science and Technology, Internacional University of Sarajevo, 
Otvoreni Univerzitet Apeiron Travnik, Univerzitet u Travniku, and Americki Univerzitet 
u Bosni i Hercegovini Tuzla and others. The number of students is increasing from year 
to year: in the fall semester of the 2009-2010 academic year, 71,082 students enrolled in 
the higher education institutions only in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(HercegBosna.org, 2010). This is a 4% increase over the prior year. According to the 
Bureau for Statistics of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the public 
universities in the Federation, some of the largest ones include: University of Sarajevo 
with the student population totaling 32,343 students; University of Tuzla with 13,896 
students; University of Mostar with 12,909 students attending either the Bosnian or 
Croatian branch; University of Bihac with 5,008 students; and University of Zenica with 
4,463 students. 
Even though the private universities and colleges often came up during interviews 
with students, the focus of this research is the public institutions in higher education of 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina. Throughout the interview process, many of the participants, 
either current or former, labeled their public faculties as corrupt but still less corrupt and 
more rigorous relative to the private institutions. Surveys, an integral part of the data 
collection process, were conducted at the public institutions. Similarly, the interviewed 
students were either students or recent graduates of public institutions.  
There are eight public universities and an unknown number of unregulated and 
unaccredited private institutions of higher education in Bosnia. Each university consists 
of multiple faculties that operate fairly independently from the university itself. This 
study surveyed students from six public faculties and interviewed students from a 
similarly diverse group of public faculties, aiming at collecting data from several 
different faculties to allow for as diverse a sample as possible. The primary focus of this 
study, however, is to analyze corruption trends irrespective of faculty type. 
In general, contact with the faculties was established by meeting with the relevant 
university rector, followed by meetings with his/her faculty deans. The rector of the 
university supported the research being conducted and in writing communicated with and 
called on the faculty deans to cooperate and provide necessary support for my research. 
This approval at the university-level was followed by a meeting with each of the relevant 
deans to discuss the logistics of conducting research at their faculties. Even though 
written approval was obtained for eight faculties, six deans provided their support, while 
two deans ultimately decided their faculties would not participate in the research because 
of the delicate nature of the topic studied. This process in itself unveiled the challenging 
nature of conducting research on corruption, as well as the extent of the independence 
and control individual deans have at their faculties as each faculty dean’s relationship 
with the university rector is partly dependent on the strength of the personal relationship 
between the faculty dean and his/her rector. This points to the potential bias in the sample 
as the faculties included in the study were not randomly selected. Instead, the faculty 
selection was a function of my ability as the researcher to gain access and permission to 
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conduct research at a specific faculty. For instance, while the sample size utilized in this 
research is relatively large, allowing for a detailed analysis of a number of trends 
discussed throughout this research, the survey-based sample itself was collected only at 
those institutions that had agreed to allow their student population to be surveyed. As one 
might expect, the management of the most corrupt faculties would have likely resented 
the idea of allowing research on corruption to take place, deciding not to participate in 
this research. In other words, this research could have excluded the most corrupt 
institutions from its pool of faculties. Assuming that the institutions most sensitive to the 
research on corruption are also most corrupt, there is a possibility that the outcomes could 
have differed if the two institutions that refused to participate in the research due to the 
topic explored were part of the sample. However, to caution, without the ability to survey 
students from what would have arguably been more corrupt institutions, I cannot 
establish with certainty whether inclusion of these two institutions would have altered the 
outcomes of this study in any meaningful way.  
Those deans that welcomed my research also lent necessary support in that they 
provided access to various class schedules and classrooms where surveys would be 
conducted. They also made introductions to the relevant faculty and administration 
members. Once I obtained each dean’s support, I was able to survey any and all students 
throughout the faculty in question. The student selection process, at that point, was in no 
way constrained except for ensuring that my surveying was cognizant of the ongoing 
educational processes. The selection of the students was not random as it was a function 
of the activities taking place in the classroom as well as the class schedules. For instance, 
I often surveyed students while they were taking a break between two parts of one long 
lecture. In the process, I had made every effort to compensate for these sample selection 




Importantly, students’ participation, both for those interviewed and those surveyed, 
was voluntary. Of those invited to participate, the vast majority of students chose to 
participate in the survey, likely due to the novelty of the experience as well as the 
relevance of this particular topic to students’ daily lives. It should also be noted that the 
students may have participated because they may be studying at the less corrupt 
institutions. Had I conducted research at those institutions that declined to take part in the 
study, the student participation may have been lower. 
Lastly, this research looks deeply into the issues of corruption that can, in Bosnia’s 
often politicized environment, be misused for political and non-academic purposes. Thus, 
I kept the locations and names of the respective faculties coded, further ensuring absolute 
anonymity or confidentiality, as appropriate, of the subjects involved. In doing so, I had 
detached this research from the political tensions and complexities of the localities in 
question and, instead, focused on answering key questions raised in this study. Such an 
approach added an additional layer of comfort and sense of safety for me as the 
researcher in discussing the corruption-related findings. 
Sample Structure 
Given that the study uses a mixed methods approach, it was important that the 
sampling process reflects the needs of such an undertaking. In other words, data were 
collected based on the surveyed sample of students in combination with data collected 
through interviews of other students. A sample of Bosnian students was surveyed and 
another was interviewed to collect data on students’ perceptions of corruption, social 
mobility, and the EU-nionization process. While the surveys obtained information 
through mostly close-ended questions, in-depth and open-ended questions (Creswell, 
2009) guided the inquiry during the student interviews. The interviewees and surveyed 
students both came from a variety of public faculties. The data were collected 
concurrently, where a portion of the researcher’s time was dedicated to conducting 
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surveys when large groups of students were available, while the remaining time was 
spent on in-depth interviews. 
As noted in Figure 7, an attempt was made to both survey and interview students at 
each of the public faculties involved. However, given the limitations of the sample size 
with those who were interviewed, not all of the interviewed students came from faculties 
where students were surveyed. More importantly, all of the interviewees did come from 
public universities in Bosnia. Furthermore, this research sampled data independently. 
Non-independent samples are those that are repeatedly approached through, for instance, 
before-after samples or pre- and post-treatment. The type of sampling further reinforces 
the applicability of the logistic regression to this study. The binary logistic regression 
modeling presumes that the sample is drawn via independent sampling. 








Data collected via surveys involved obtaining a representative and random sample 
from all six public faculties, where a sub-sample at each of the four faculties exceeded 
100 surveys. To be specific, the upcoming findings chapters of this dissertation rely on 
both survey- and interview-based data gathered from a sample of 762 surveyed students 
from 6 different faculties and 15 student interviews with students who either graduated or 
are currently studying at the public faculties in Bosnia. This study initially aimed at 
applying “stratified random sampling” (Muijs, 2004, p. 39) within each faculty with the 
 
 
SAMPLE OF COLLEGE 

















goal of obtaining a representative sub-group of students from each year of study (circa 75 
freshmen, 75 sophomores …, etc.). However, this sample design could not be utilized due 
to the fact that some faculties did not have a graduating class sufficiently large to make 
that subset comparable to others.  
In addition, high dropout rates reduced subsequent classes in most Bosnian 
faculties, so it was relatively easy to survey 100 to 200 first- or second-year students 
given that the introductory courses have the highest enrollments and attendance and, in 
most cases, are mandatory. It was, nonetheless, more difficult to obtain equivalent sub-
samples among students in their third or fourth year of studies. Thus, I focused on 
obtaining a sizable random sample. Another issue that came up during the data collection 
stage is that not all faculties had comparable enrollment rates; thus, one faculty did not 
have 75 or more students, not only in their senior year of studies, but also in earlier years. 
In other words, an equivalent subset of students per each year of study could not be 
obtained at each faculty due to the enrollment variation among the faculties and by year. 
In most cases, however, the number of first-year students was substantively greater than 
that of those graduating.  
Also, perfect stratification was not possible, as in many cases a sophomore, for 
instance, may have been attending the lecture for a course typically taught during the first 
year of studies because he/she was re-taking an exam he/she failed during the first year. 
This made differentiation between students by seniority more difficult and therefore 
unreliable. In short and in line with the mixed methods research framework, I have 
adapted my approach to the availability of data in the field by collecting a sizable random 
sample at each of the six faculties visited in an attempt to obtain a substantive amount of 
data across all participating faculties.  
A set of sub-samples was collected for each year of study and across various 
faculties (please see Table 4, p. 106): 366 students (48.0% of the sample) were 
completing their first year of studies; 251 students (32.9% of the sample) were second 
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year students; 89 students (11.7% of the sample) were in their third year; 51 students 
(6.7% of the sample) were near completion of their senior year in college, and 5 students 
(0.7% of the sample) did not provide any information on their completion status. In order 
to maximize their comfort and ensure the full confidentiality of all interviewed and the 
full anonymity of all surveyed participants, the faculty type, if needed, will be referred 
throughout the dissertation by its coded name. Specifically, out of a total of 762 students, 
at Faculty F1, 102 students participated in the study; at faculty F2, 68 students 
participated in the study; at faculty F3, 201 students participated; at faculty F4, 167 
students participated; at faculty F5, 195 students participated; and at faculty F6, 29 
students participated. As earlier noted, faculty F6 had a small population, thus limiting 
the sample size. Further, 64% of the participants were females, 2% did not indicate 
gender, and the rest were males (Table 4, p. 106). As to the ethnic composition, 96% 
were Bosniaks, 2% were Croats, and only 1 student (less than 0.01%) was a Serb 
(Table 4, p. 106). Also, about 2% of the sample either declared themselves as Bosnians 
and Herzegovinians or did not provide their ethnic affiliation (see Table 4, p. 106).  
Herein, it should be noted that the sampling took place in the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, so the ethnic composition is consistent with the regional and 
geographic setting in which surveying took place. It should also be remarked that one of 
the key limitations and challenges of the sampling process is that it did not include the 
Serb Republic as the other entity of the country, where there has been much talk of 
educational corruption as well. Instead, I focused on obtaining substantive samples at 




































Next, interview-based data on Bosnian students were obtained via purposeful 
sampling through my personal and professional contacts. Specifically, the analysis relied 
on extreme-case sampling (International Development Research Center, 2009), which 
again may not have been possible in the case of the Serb Republic, where my personal 
contacts among the younger population that is the subject of this study were limited, 
diminishing the needed sense of comfort for those who would have potentially 
participated in the study. While a comprehensive representativeness of the entire student 
population was unattainable using extreme-case sampling, this dissertation benefits from 
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the in-depth data collected from the individuals willing to speak openly of educational 
corruption, particularly as such interviews may not have taken place with students at 
Bosnian universities as of yet. In total, 15 interviews were conducted with students from 
various state faculties. 
The unique and “extreme case” feature that was common to all of the interviewees 
was their agreement and willingness to speak about the educational corruption, and to 
ensure such openness, I drew a sample from a pool of personal contacts with my 
colleagues, family members, and friends. A trusted personal relationship served as the 
additional assurance that the information shared during these interviews would be treated 
with the highest level of confidentiality. Given that educational corruption may often be a 
controversial and politically charged topic in Bosnia, this research’s ethical priority was 
to ensure that “the principal of ‘no harm’” is respected at all times (Bloor, 2006, p. 77). 
Extreme-case sampling is the sampling methodology that secured the necessary level of 
comfort, but also openness of the individuals involved in the interview process. 
Though the research might have benefited from opportunistic sampling focusing on 
interviewing a few professors or members of the faculty administration, fruitful and 
pertinent data on educational corruption, however, are likely to be shared by faculty 
members only if they are individuals interested in fighting against educational corruption. 
As anticipated, in the case of Bosnia, some professors and administration members have 
often downplayed the presence of educational corruption, or, if they acknowledged it, 
they noted their personal non-involvement in the corruption processes. Given the wealth 
of information on corruption in education collected from students and given the difficulty 
in evaluating whether faculty members were or were not objectively portraying 
corruption, in-depth interviews of administrative members were not conducted, and the 
student population took center stage in the data collection process. 
To sum up, having methodological flexibility when engaging in research on a 
complex topic such as corruption has enabled me as a researcher to adapt to the 
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challenges of the field research on corruption, to better address the educational corruption 
trends, and to rely, for instance, either on surveys or interviews or both depending on 
what data collection or data analysis tool appeared more fitting to answering a particular 
question. As others would agree (Creswell, 2009; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007), this 
research should arguably result in a more comprehensive analysis than it would had it 
relied solely on one data collection approach. 
Rationale for and Classification of Variable Categories 
To connect the theories I propose and the data sought to test them, I categorized 
survey-derived variables that I deemed essential to obtaining the information needed to 
respond to the research questions of this study. According to the Table 5 (p. 109), I 
created and classified the key variable categories that individually or collectively address 
the research questions. The categories include: Demographics, Education, Mobility, 
Mobility & Coping, Mobility & Voice, Mobility & Exit, EU-nionization, Ethnic-
fragmentation, and Socio-economic Background.  
While Demographics category does not directly answer the proposed research 
questions, it helps in gaining some basic level of knowledge about the sample, such as for 
example, its gender composition. Similarly, Education Category provides further insight 
into the student’s educational background, as, for instance, the student’s length of study. 
A number of other variables’ categories play more prominently in directly or indirectly 
addressing the questions raised in this research and thus help in testing and validating the 
hypotheses I earlier proposed in the overall corruption, social mobility and coping 
mechanism framework.  
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Table 5: Variable Categories 
 
As to the Mobility Category, it contains a number of variables that were directly 
derived from the survey and pose relevant questions on students’ perceptions of 
corruption, social mobility, and students’ view on the role one’s socioeconomic status 
plays in determining the types of corruption in Bosnia’s higher education (Table 5). 
Mobility & Coping, Mobility & Voice, and Mobility & Exit categories further build on 
the Mobility Category, and pose elaborate questions on the manner in which students 
cope when faced with corruption.  
Given the importance of the mobility and coping mechanisms as the key 
components of the earlier theorized view that post-war elite in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
has used higher education to legitimize its position of power, the Mobility-related 
categories of questions create an important link between the theoretical framework and 
data that holds answers to the study’s research questions. Though lesser of a focus, the 
CATEGORY SURVEY QUESTIONS              FACTORS/CONCEPTS 
Demographics                           1-3 Students’ background 
Education                            4-10                                         Educational background 
Students’ perceptions of education    
Mobility & Corruption                          10,11-17, 25-27, 30 Impact of corruption  






Mobility & Coping                                                  18-20 Coping mechanisms 
Formal coping mechanisms 
Difficulty coping  
Mobility & Voice                                                21-24 Voice mechanisms 
Voice mechanisms’ effectiveness 
Mobility & Exit                                               28, 29, 31 Exit mechanisms 
Corruption and exit 
EU-nionization                                                32 Effectiveness of Bologna 









EU-nionization and Ethnic-fragmentation sections play a role in determining the impact 
of the EU-instigated policies on the corrupt behaviors and processes within Bosnia’s 
higher education. Therefore, these two sub-sections focus on determining if the surveyed 
students perceive the EU-pushed Bologna framework as effective and if the ethnic-
fragmentation is in any way relevant to the emergence of the post-war educational 
corruption.  
Socio-economic Background Category has served as a proxy for the student’s 
socioeconomic status and socio-political involvement that would help in determining 
his/her position within the country’s socio-economic hierarchy and therefore his/her 
status’ impact on the student’s perception of corruption in higher education, his/her 
coping mechanism, and his/her view of mobility mechanisms in higher education. Lastly, 
I further elaborate on each of the sections by enlisting all relevant variables that are 
derived from 39 questions on demographics, education, mobility issues, coping 
mechanisms, view of EU-related processes in education, and socio-economic background 
as they, for the most part, have been used in this research (see Table 6, pp. 112-116).  
Lastly, the survey-derived variables are often recoded for the purpose of further 
analysis in this study. Once recoded and when appropriate, they are relabeled by adding 
word FINAL to indicate that they have been adequately recoded and are ready for use in 
further analysis. Also, Indicator contrasts are used throughout the analysis as the default 
form of the categorical coding, which means that the reference category is the highest 
category (i.e. out of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, 5 would be the reference category) and is presented 
by codes of zeros in all other categories. All missing and inapplicable responses are re-
coded as missing. 
In summary of Chapter IV and given the intricacies of corruption-related 
behaviors, complex student reactions, and potential organizational triggers of corruption, 
employing both quantitative and qualitative methods to explore students’ reactions and 
experiences with educational corruption was crucial for an improved understanding of 
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educational corruption in Bosnian higher education. On the one hand, the consumers of 
statistics-driven research often lack a full understanding of the survey findings unless 
they are introduced to the specific contexts within which the data were collected and later 
analyzed (MacKenzie, 1999). On the other hand, qualitative research has its own 
disadvantages, namely, it is highly time-consuming and therefore logistically harder to 
implement, as well as more difficult to present and reduce to simple trends that are often 
easier to detect with the survey-based analysis.  
Therefore, this chapter provided the rationale for the application of the 
comprehensive mixed-methods approach. It has also presented the key components of the 
methodological and sampling approach relevant to the study’s collection and analysis of 
the data on students’ perceptions of corruption, social mobility, and EU-nionization in 
Bosnia’s higher education. Lastly, this section of the study is a thorough prelude to 
Chapter V, in which the focus shifts from understanding the research framework to its 
implementation to the context of Bosnia’s higher education and consequent discovery of 





Table 6: Variable List 
# GROUP              NAME (ABBREVIATION) VALUE 
1 Demographics                          Born (BO) 1975, 1976… 
2 Demographics Sex (SEX) Female=0, Male=1 
3 Demographics Ethnicity (ETH) Bosniak=B, Serb=S, Croat=C, 
Other=O 
4 Education Student type (ST) Excellent (mostly As)=1,  
Very good (mostly Bs)=2, 
 Good (mostly Cs) =3, 
Poor (mostly Ds) =4 
5 Education Exams completed (EC) Some 1st year=1, 
Some 2nd year=2, 
Some 3rd year=3, 
Some 4th year=4 
6 Education Years studying (YS) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5… 
7 Education Repetition cause (RC)                              No Studying=1, No time=2,  
No interest but can’t transfer=3, 
Professors keep failing=4, 
No connections/bribe money=5, 
No motivation bc outdated 
studies=6, 
Studying no relevance=7, 
Other=8 
8 Education ECTS (ECTS) Yes=1, No=2, Don’t know=DK 
9 Education ECTS Transparent (ECTST) Definitely=1, Probably=2, 
Maybe=3, Not sure=4, No=5 
10 Education Competent Graduate (CG) Always=1, Almost always=2, 
Often=3, Rarely=4,  
Almost never=5, Never=6 
11 Mobility & Corruption Merited Promotion (MP) Always=1, Almost always=2, 
Often=3, Rarely=4,  
Almost never=5, Never=6  
12 Mobility & Corruption Teaching Satisfaction (TS) Very satisfied=1, Somewhat 
satisfied=2, Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied=3, Somewhat 
dissatisfied=4, Very dissatisfied=5 
13 Mobility & Corruption Teaching Dissatisfaction1 (TD1) Think about dropping out=1, 
Do not=0 
13 Mobility & Corruption Teaching Dissatisfaction2 (TD2) Discriminated against bc 
ethnicity=1, Not discriminated 
against bc ethnicity=0 
13 Mobility & Corruption Teaching Dissatisfaction3 (TD3) Fail exams though sufficient 
knowledge=1, 
Do not fail when sufficient 
knowledge=0 
13 Mobility & Corruption Teaching Dissatisfaction4(TD4) Some professors do not explain 
material=1, 
Some professors explain…=0 
13 Mobility & Corruption Teaching Dissatisfaction5 (TD5) Some professors do not know 
subject well enough=1, 
Some professors know…=0 
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Table 6 (continued) 
# GROUP              NAME (ABBREVIATION) VALUE 
13 Mobility & Corruption Teaching Dissatisfaction6 (TD6) Professors do not show up their 
lectures=1, 
Professor show up… =0 
13 Mobility & Corruption Teaching Dissatisfaction7 (TD7) Professors do not seem 
qualified=1, 
Professors seem qualified=0 
13 Mobility & Corruption Teaching Dissatisfaction8 (TD8) Professor treat faculty as personal 
property=1, 
Professors do not treat… =0 
13 Mobility & Corruption Teaching Dissatisfaction9 (TD9) Professor promoted bc of 
connections not qualification=1, 
Professors promoted NOT bc of 
connections but qualifications=0 
13 Mobility & Corruption Teaching Dissatisfaction10 (TD10) Professors pass students bc bribes 
or connection=1, 
Professors do not pass… =0 
13 Mobility & Corruption Teaching Dissatisfaction11 (TD11) Professors push for book-
buying=1, 
Professor do not push…=0 
13 Mobility & Corruption Teaching Dissatisfaction12 (TD12) Professors enter inappropriate 
relationships with students=1, 
Professors do not…=0 
13 Mobility & Corruption Teaching Dissatisfaction13 (TD13) Additional comments 
14 Mobility & Corruption Procedures Satisfaction (PS) Very satisfied=1, Somewhat 
satisfied=2, Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied=3, Somewhat 
dissatisfied=4, Very dissatisfied=5 
15 Mobility & Corruption Procedures Dissatisfaction1 (PD1) Would like to transfer to another 
faculty=1, 
Indifferent/would not like to 
transfer…=0 
15 Mobility & Corruption Procedures Dissatisfaction2 (PD2) Would like to take a course at 
another faculty=1, Indifferent/ 
would not like…=0 
15 Mobility & Corruption Procedures Dissatisfaction3 (PD3) Would like to change major=1, 
Indifferent/would not like…=0 
15 Mobility & Corruption Procedures Dissatisfaction4 (PD4) Wish exams broken into smaller 
sections=1, 
Indifferent/do not wish…=0 
15 Mobility & Corruption Procedures Dissatisfaction5 (PD5) Wish there were more 
opportunities to take exams=1, 
Indifferent/Do not wish…=0 
15 Mobility & Corruption Procedures Dissatisfaction6 (PD6) Wish grading was more 
objective=1, 
Indifferent/do not wish…=0 
15 Mobility & Corruption Procedures Dissatisfaction7 (PD7) Wish there was more access to 
faculty members=1, 
Indifferent/do not wish…=0 
15 Mobility & Corruption Procedures Dissatisfaction8 (PD8) Wish could get graded exams 
back=1, 
Indifferent/do not wish…=0 
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Table 6 (continued) 
# GROUP              NAME (ABBREVIATION) VALUE 
15 Mobility & Corruption Procedures Dissatisfaction9 (PD9) Wish there were better student 
support services=1, 
Indifferent/Do not wish… =0 
15 Mobility & Corruption Procedures Dissatisfaction10 (PD10) Additional Comments 
16 Mobility & Corruption Corruption Degree (CD) Highly widespread=1 
Widespread =2, 
Neither widespread nor absent =3 
Somewhat absent=4 
Completely absent=5 
17 Mobility & Corruption Corruption Type1 (CT1) No corruption=1, 
Other=0 
17 Mobility & Corruption Corruption Type2 (CT2) Buying passing grades=1, 
No buying… =0 
17 Mobility & Corruption Corruption Type3 (CT3) Buying diplomas=1, 
No buying…=0 
17 Mobility & Corruption Corruption Type4 (CT4) Publishing plagiarized books=1, 
No publishing…=0 
17 Mobility & Corruption Corruption Type5 (CT5) Inappropriate student-faculty 
relations=1, 
No inappropriate…=0 
17 Mobility & Corruption Corruption Type6 (CT6) Passing exams bc social 
connections=1,  
No passing…=0 
17 Mobility & Corruption Corruption Type7 (CT7) Diplomas in excessively short 
period of time=1, 
No diplomas…=0 
17 Mobility & Corruption Corruption Type8 (CT8) Passing exams bc of influential 
parents=1,  
No passing …=0 
17 Mobility & Corruption Corruption Type9 (CT9) Additional comments 
18 Mobility & Coping Difficulty Coping (DC) Very easy=1, 
Easy=2 
Neither difficult nor easy=3 
Difficult=4 
Very difficult=5 
19 Mobility & Coping Coping Mechanism1 (CM1) Keeping up with required work=1, 
Missing/NA…=0 
19 Mobility & Coping Coping Mechanism2 (CM2) Talking with family/friends=1, 
Missing/NA…=0 
19 Mobility & Coping Coping Mechanism3 (CM3) Planning to leave/transfer from 
faculty=1, 
Missing/NA…=0 
19 Mobility & Coping  Coping Mechanism4 (CM4) Bribing/looking for connections to 
pass=1, 
Missing/NA…=0 
19 Mobility & Coping Coping Mechanism5 (CM5) Complained about it within 
faculty-1, 
Missing/NA…=0 
19 Mobility & Coping Coping Mechanism6 (CM6) Other/Additional comments 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
# GROUP              NAME (ABBREVIATION) VALUE 
20 Mobility & Coping Formal Mechanism (FM) Yes=1, 
No=0 
21 Mobility & Voice Complaint Satisfaction (CS) Very satisfied=1, 
Somewhat satisfied=2, 
Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied=3, 
Very dissatisfied=4, 
22 Mobility & Voice Reasons No-Complaint (RNC) No particular reason=1, 
Scared=0 




















27 Mobility  Transfer Mobility (TM) Very easy=1, 
Easy=2, 
Neither difficult nor easy=3, 
Difficult=4, 
Very difficult=5 






29 Mobility & Exit Corruption Exit (CEX) No way =1, 
Partly corruption=2, 
Mostly corruption=3, 
Only bc corruption=4 
30 Mobility Reasons No-Transfer (RNT) Too complicated=1, 
Too expensive=2, 





Table 6 (continued) 
 
# GROUP              NAME (ABBREVIATION) VALUE 





32 EU-nionization Bologna Impact (BI) Yes=1, 
No=0 






















37 SES Father’s Position (FP) Worker=1, 
Intellectual but not executive=2, 
Executive of a company=3, 
Head of company=4, 
38 SES  Socio-political Involvement (SPI) Highly involved=1, 
Somewhat involved=2, 








CORRUPTION: ITS PRESENCE, FORMS AND FACILITATORS 
This findings section brings all methodological and theoretical elements 
together with the goal of providing a cohesive and insightful analysis of the 
educational corruption, social mobility, and coping mechanisms present in Bosnia’s 
higher education. Given the extensive nature of the data collected and analyzed, 
this study’s findings are separated into three chapters, where each chapter addresses 
one of the three research question posed earlier. I begin with Chapter V, where 
focus is on answering the opening research question that examines, first, whether 
corruption is present in the higher education of Bosnia; second, how it manifests 
itself; and, third, whether its emergence is in any way helped by the contextual 
factors such as the organizational structure of the educational system.  
The Chapter is further divided into three sub-sections addressing each of the 
above listed sub-questions (see Table 7, p. 118). Discussion begins by first defining 
corruption and reviewing levels at which students perceive corruption as existent in 
Bosnia’s higher education. It is then followed by an elaborate review of different 
forms of corruption that this research uncovered in Bosnia’s higher education. 
Chapter V ends with an analysis of all behavioral and organizational elements 
within higher education that the study participants perceived as inefficient and 
contributing to the current state of Bosnia’s corrupt educational system.  
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Lastly, throughout Chapter V, I present this study’s findings in line with the 
earlier introduced mixed methods approach. All relevant findings, whether they are 
sourced from interviews or surveys, are introduced concurrently to more 
comprehensively answer each research question. In other words, the organization in 
the findings-related chapters is theme-based. For example, under the Presence of 
Corruption sub-section of this chapter, I present findings that are survey-based, 
such as for instance trends extrapolated from the Corruption Degree (CD) variable 
that captures surveyed students’ perception on how widespread corruption is in 
Bosnia’s higher education (see Table 7 below). In other words, the Presence of 
Corruption sub-section addresses 1a Research Question (see pp. 22-24). Similarly, 
the next two sub-sections of Chapter V review this study’s findings as to the forms 
of corruption and facilitators of corruption, addressing Research Questions 1b and 
1c (Table 7 below). In addition and where they add value, I use a content analysis 
of the interview transcripts to further enhance the findings relating to the presence, 
forms, and facilitators of corruption (Table 7 below). This format is closely 
followed in all other chapters.  
 
Table 7: Chapter V - Organization by Sections and Sub-Sections 
 
SECTION TITLE – 
RESEARCH 
QUESTIONS 
HYPOTHESIS DATA SOURCE 
Presence of Corruption – 
1a  
 
Presence of corruption in higher 
education in Bosnia is significant. 
 
Corruption Degree (CD); 
Interview Transcripts 
Forms of Corruption – 1b Students face different types of 
corruption. 
Corruption Types (CT1-CT9); 
Interview Transcripts   
Facilitators of Corruption 
– 1c   
 
There are various elements and 
behaviors in Bosnia’s higher 
education facilitating corruption 
emergence and continuation. 






Presence of Corruption 
Following the above theme-based organization of Chapter V, I begin by 
presenting the study’s findings on the presence of corruption in Bosnia’s higher 
education. Of the total surveyed sample, I find, 8.5% of students view corruption as 
“completely absent”; 12.1% of the surveyed sample think of corruption as 
“somewhat absent”; 45.4% of the sampled student body stated that corruption is 
“neither widespread nor absent”; 22.3% of the sampled population believe that 
corruption is “widespread”; and 8.9% view corruption as “highly widespread” (see 
Figure 8 below). In sum, of 762 surveyed students, only 8.5% view corruption as 
“completely absent,” while a significant portion of the sample, 88.7%, believes 
corruption is present to some degree (Figure 9, p. 120). Based on the survey data, 
only 2.8% of the surveyed participants did not answer the question that asked about 
the educational corruption level in their faculty. 
 






"completely absent" "somewhat absent"
















Similarly, the interviewed group overall agreed that corruption was present 
in the educational system of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The extent and presence of 
corruption was also discussed with the pool of 15 interviewed students. One of the 
interviewed students noted that while educational corruption does not take a 
spotlight on a daily basis in the media of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is a daily 
occurrence in the educational process (Interviewee 6C). The issue, in one student’s 
view, partly rests with the institutions’ implicit endorsement of corrupt behavior: it 
is not in the interest of the universities to disclose the information on the presence 
of corruption and its extent (Interviewee 1C).  
In defining corruption within Bosnia’s higher education, only 2 interviewed 
students perceived corruption as “the criminal activity that involves the acceptance 
or giving of bribery,” while the remainder defined it more broadly as a cluster of 
activities ranging from bribery to reciprocation of favors among the social elite 
(Table 8, pp. 122-123). Among those who defined corruption more broadly 
including the forms of non-monetary exchanges as well, interviewee 9C estimated 




"present to some degree" "completely absent" "missing" 
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higher education, while about 20% is left to the bribing process (Table 8, 
pp. 122-123).  
Notably, the two interviewed individuals who believe that corruption is 
limited only to the bribing process were also politically active in their community. 
Interviewee 1C not only opted for the more limited definition of corruption but 
underlined that favor reciprocation is a form of nepotism not solely linked to the 
elites but is also culturally practiced. Interviewee 1C also remarked that professors 
look at the politically involved student “more seriously and with different eyes.” 
The student further attributed his own personal success to hard work, reiterating 
that he has had no problems or barriers in the course of his studies. Furthermore, 
the three interviewees who stated they were socio-politically “highly involved” 
were also on the lower-end of the student estimates as to the extent of corruption. 
Specifically, interviewees 1C, 11C, and 15C remarked that “30-40% of professors” 
are corrupt; corruption is “present, but not widespread”; and “50% of professors” 
are corrupt, respectively.  
Those students who declared they were less involved socio-politically 
within their communities often gave higher estimates of how widespread corruption 
is than those who claimed to have been “highly involved”. The study finds that 2 
out of 3 students who remarked they were “somewhat involved” estimated that 
70% of their professors are corrupt (see Table 8, pp. 122-123). Also, the 
“somewhat uninvolved” student who graduated from a public university and later 
got a job as a teaching assistant at a different university stated that corruption was 
even more widespread: the student perceived 90% to 95% of faculty members as 
corrupt (see Table 8, pp. 122-123). Though the sample size of 15 students is a 
limiting factor here, the patterns extrapolated from the available transcripts are 
suggestive of the previously hypothesized notion that corruption is perceived as 
less widespread by the most politically and socially prominent students who are 
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also the ones most likely to benefit from their access to the social elites and their 
ability to leverage the elites’ social networks. In the next sub-section of this 
chapter, the study continues to probe this notion indirectly by examining the types 
of corruption most frequently observed in Bosnia’s higher education. 
Table 8: Corruption Definition and Presence Matrix 









Perceived extent of 
corruption 
1C Highly Involved   30-40% of professors 
2C Uninvolved   Highly widespread 
3C Uninvolved   Very frequent 
4C Uninvolved   Highly widespread 
5C Uninvolved   Highly widespread 
6C Somewhat Involved 
 
 70% 
7C Uninvolved   80% 






 Increases during the 
exam period. About 
90-95% are corrupt. 
This is based on the 
faculty where I work. 
10C Uninvolved   90% 
 
11C Highly Involved   Present, but not 
widespread 
12C Uninvolved   70% 
 
                                                          
8After graduation, this interviewee obtained a job as a teaching assistant at another public faculty. 
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Table 8 (continued) 









13C Uninvolved   Only began studies 
and cannot evaluate 
14C Somewhat Involved   Present 
15C Highly Involved   Present, about 50% of 
professors 
TOTAL  Uninvolved 2 13  
 
Further, when looking to compare differences in corruption perception, if 
any, between the wealthiest segment in the surveyed sample and the rest of the 
sample, this research finds that only 2.6% of the total surveyed sample or 20 
students stated that their household income was above 3,500 Convertible Marks. 
Looking at the distribution of answers within this subgroup, I find that 30% thought 
that corruption is “highly widespread” while 10% of this elite sub-group was of the 
view that corruption was “completely absent” (see Figure 10, p. 124). When 
comparing this finding to that of the overall sample, it is interesting to note that the 
percentage of those who thought corruption was “completely absent” was similar in 
both groups: 10% of the wealthiest segment and 8.5% of the entire surveyed 
sample. However, when comparing percentages of those who thought corruption 
was “highly widespread”, the values differed: 30% of the wealthiest sub-group 
thought corruption was “highly widespread” while that was the case for only 8.9% 
of the surveyed sample.  
To the contrary of the finding that the interviewed students of higher socio-
political involvement thought corruption was less widespread, surveyed students 
from the highest income category were of the view that corruption is more 
widespread than the rest of the sample. This differential of views may partly stem 
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from the fact that, in surveys, the household income was used to differentiate 
between the wealthiest category and others while the interviewees’ status was 
approximated based on the interviewees’ direct sociopolitical involvement in their 
respective communities. The discrepancy may have emerged due to the small sub-
samples in both the case of interviewed and the surveyed students of the highest 
socioeconomic status, but it may also be partially attributed to the fact that the 
surveyed students feel more detached from the information shared when writing, 
which is in contrast with the interviewed pool. If so, the survey-based finding (see 
Figure 10 below) may be explained by the fact that the wealthiest students have 
greater knowledge of the corruption activities possibly due to their socioeconomic 
status, and were more inclined to share their views given their anonymity in the 
process.  
 









Forms of Corruption 
Now that the presence of corruption in higher education is Bosnia is clearly 






















of corruption forms that are presently practiced in Bosnia’s higher education. This 
sub-section specifically addresses Research Question 1b (see Table 7, p. 118) 
theorizing that students face various types of educational corruption. As the case 
with earlier section of Chapter V and in line with the mixed-methods methodology, 
I build a comprehensive picture that discusses various types of corruption in 
Bosnia’s higher education. In doing so, I draw on the most relevant survey- and 
interview-based data. 
As noted in the literature review, corruption in education can take on various 
forms. Herein, both interviewees and surveyed students confirmed the existence of 
diverse types of corruption as manifested in Bosnia’s higher education. Of 762 
surveyed participants, 8.8% of the sample was of the view that corruption appears 
in no form within Bosnia’s higher education while the two most frequently 
occurring forms of corruption involve passing exams by relying on personal 
connections and influential parents (Figure 11, p. 127). While the impact of 
corruption beyond educational sector was not the topic of this dissertation, some 
evidence emerged to suggest that the social exchanges amongst the privileged 
remain a relevant social dynamic even after graduation and especially when it 
comes to the public sector employment. According to a Bosnian public faculty 
graduate who sought to work as a teaching assistant post-graduation, she met with 
the dean of her faculty and expressed her interest in staying on as a teaching 
assistant. Given her exceptional performance as a student, she expected that the 
faculty dean would be interested in discussing employment opportunities with her. 
However, this faculty’s dean rejected her by saying: “I do not employ social cases 
... your parents are unemployed” (Interviewee 4C). The dean effectively stated that 
he would not associate himself or his faculty with a family of no social significance 
or financial backing. This coincidental finding helps validate the relevance of social 
networking that continues post-graduation and beyond educational sector, as well 
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as this study’s hypothesis that relationship leveraging is utilized only when the two 
sides involved recognize their mutually equivalent social and political status. 
Further, 339 students, or 44.5% of the sample, also said corruption takes the 
form of “purchased passing grades,” while a smaller segment of the sampled group, 
19.2%, stated that corruption manifests itself in the form of “purchased diplomas” 
(see Figure 11, p. 127). At times, professors may insist on getting their bribes by 
repeatedly failing a student, signaling to the student that he/she needs to pay to 
pass, even though doing so may involve significant financial sacrifice for the 
family. In fact, “it is normal that students who are of the worst economic 
circumstances are having [a] harder time passing their exams. They do not have or 
do not know where to pay for their exams; thus, they are forced to study” 
(Interviewee 1C).  
Repeatedly failing an individual of social importance, however, would rarely 
occur. In other words, “connections and acquaintances are the key” to one’s 
success, and it may often be the case that “the poor have to pay [emphasis added] 
while those with higher status only use their connections” (Interviewee 5C). In 
short, Bosnia has both students who work hard and those who are well-connected 
socially and continue to advance post-college at the expense of the hard-working 
individuals by taking what should have been their jobs (Interviewee 5C).  
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To add, of the total surveyed group, 18.6% considered “publishing of 
plagiarized books” by their professors as a recurring form of corruption (Figure 11 
above). At the same time, 12.5% saw corruption as manifesting itself in the form of 
the “inappropriate student-professor relationships” (Figure 11 above).  About 
10.4% of the students surveyed thought corruption can take on the form of 
diplomas obtained in an “excessively short period of time” (Figure 11 above). 
Lastly, while this research confirms that there are various forms of 
educational corruption in Bosnia, corruption here is approximated by the students’ 
perceptions of the same. For instance, when asked whether they physically know 
anyone who paid for a passing grade, 7 out of 15 interviewed students answered 
affirmatively (see Table 9, pp. 128-129). When asked if they knew anyone who 
relied on social connections to pass, 10 out of 15 students stated they did know one 
or more students who leveraged their personal connections (see Table 9, 
pp. 128-129).  
Others hesitated and some noted that the process is often so clandestine that 
for those who lack connections and instead wish to pay for a passing grade, it may 
take some effort to find out who the professor’s liaison in the bribing process may 

































individuals, one student responded, “I don’t know as I do not have any evidence [to 
back up my claims]” (Interviewee 1C). At the same time, however, this particular 
participant estimated that 30-40% of Bosnian higher education faculty is corrupt. In 
fact, much of the interviewed pool implicitly or explicitly suggested that despite the 
high-level of perceived educational corruption in higher education in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (see Table 9 below), witnessing of the corruption processes is rare and 
often shielded by those participating in corruption. 
 
 
Table 9: Perceived versus Actual Corruption 
Code 
Know anyone who bribed to pass? 
How much? 
How frequently? 
Know anyone who relied on family/social 
connections to pass? 
How frequently? 
1C Not sure. Not sure. 
2C I didn’t see anyone give a bribe. Yes. 
3C A fellow student once said he never took an 
exam, and came only to pick up his diploma. 
Yes, but relationships count beyond passing, 
and include ensuring a full-time status even 
when a student is not eligible. This ensures 
avoidance of fee payments associated with 
part-time studies. 
4C Informal stories, mostly focused on most 
desired diplomas (i.e. economics rather than 
technical faculties) where an exam costs from 
100KM to 500KM. ..but these are informal 
claims. 
All would agree that it is widespread, but 
people do not like to name anyone. I think that 
all of that takes place under the highest level 
of secrecy. No one will say that they passed in 
such a manner. 
5C Yes, about 10 who looked for connections or 
“asked” to pass. 
Yes, 5-6. 
6C Entry into college is all about connections. For 
exams, a typical price is 500 KM but varies 
depending on the exam difficulty. 
 
Yes, a girl who is related to one of the deans. 
7C I do know. The talk is that cost of an exam is 
5,000KM, which can be afforded only by the 
rich or the poor who took a loan out to bribe 
for the exam.  
No one told me personally,…All of us know 
that it is a public secret.  Those who are a bit 
more important in the city, their Moms and 
Dads ‘fix’ exams and that is it. 
8C I do not know personally. Some students 
suggest that price lists exist.  
I know a girl who went the elementary school 







Table 9: (continued) 
Code 
Know anyone who bribed to pass? 
How much? 
How frequently? 
Know anyone who relied on family/social 
connections to pass? 
How frequently? 
9C For money, I do not know. I should say again 
that I cannot say for sure, but there is a story 
that dean of my faculty received money for a 
student. But I do not know. I did not see it, so 
maybe he did not. 
Yes, I do. Favor for favor is always there and 
does not change. There is tendency relative to 
the period when I just started working not to 
ask, but now that I have been there for 
[several] years, because now they know me, 
so they feel more comfortable to ask me 
…..somehow with experience, the favor for 
favor concepts grows. This behavior is more 
frequent [than bribing]. 
10C I know students who transferred from [one 
faculty] to [another] without entry 
examination and even though there is no 
between the exams. They either paid or are 
politically connected. 
I know that there are many of them in my 
faculty.  
11C I know few tens of students from first year. 
Few exams each. 
I do, again few tens. 
12C A friend of mine paid 600KM for the exam I 
failed 20 times. I did not know that professor 
is asking for money, and then new professor 
came and I got 9. It depends, with some 
professors it is around 1,000KM per exam. 
My mom would need to take a loan out to pay 
for a passing grade, and higher grade is more 
expensive 
I know of few girls whose fathers are 
influential. . . Another friend has to pass 7 
exams, but for 3-4 she needs not to worry . . . 
She does not even show up, but gets 7-8. This 
I know for sure because she told me and she 
does not see anything bad in it. 
13C I do not know. Yes, I do. I think this occurs more often. 
14C Yes, I do know someone who paid to be 
admitted into college.   
I do not know, and I suspect those students 
mostly go into law, economics, and medicine. 
15C 500 Euros one [person], one 250 Euros, but 
they were stuck. That was wiser than failing 
all the time, and I shouldn’t even start talking 
about part-time students. They work and don’t 
have time, so that’s how they pass…  
There is a lot of that… 
Source: Interviews 
Reciprocity of Favors 
As hypothesized earlier and based on the trends that emerged from the 
survey analysis, the most frequently noted form of corruption in Bosnian higher 
education does not involve monetary exchange but rather the reciprocity of favors: 
more specifically, a significant majority or 62.1% of the student body (473 of 
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surveyed students) thought that corruption appears in the form of “passing exams 
because of one’s social connections” (see Figure 11, p. 127). The data collected via 
interviews similarly suggest that the reciprocity of favors is one of the key 
articulations of educational corruption in Bosnian higher education and, in the view 
of some, certainly the dominant one. Often, direct exchanges of money in the 
educational system to secure grades or diplomas are seen as less frequent relative to 
favor exchanges (Interviewee 4C; Interviewee 5C; Interviewee 7C). As one of the 
study participants was told by a student with connections: “I have the privilege to 
enter college without any criteria” (Interviewee 14C).  
Consequently, students now perceive corruption as no longer involving 
tangible goods but exchanges of jobs, favors, and promises. Out of 15 interviewed 
students, 9 students believe that corruption in higher education is a result of 
interconnectedness and in service of an elite described as, for instance, “local 
power-holders” (Interviewee 1C), “local leaders” (Interviewee 2C), “people with 
political power” (Interviewee 3C), “those who are politically suitable” (Interviewee 
4C), and “people in power” (Interviewee 8C). It is precisely this evolving nature of 
corruption resulting from the interconnectedness between the educational and 
political elite that makes comprehensive verification, detection, and proper 
quantification of corruption highly complex and virtually impossible. Therefore, 
this study relies solely on student perception as indicative proxy of what may be 
taking place in actuality and within the country’s higher education.  
Drawing on the analysis of students’ perceptions regarding various forms of 
educational corruption, the study confirms that materialistic exchange is not the 
sole source of corrupt behavior. Indeed, “favor-for-favor” is another form of 
corruption, producing a college-educated cadre among which some are believed to 
have never even taken an exam (Interviewee 3C). As another student observed, 
when going through the admissions process, it is important to have someone who 
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will “speak on your behalf as grades do not speak for themselves” (Interviewee 
15C). So, the student’s background may turn out to be the most relevant factor in 
the admissions process, diminishing the importance of grades as a measure of 
student’s performance. One of the interviewed students surprisingly noted that a 
teaching assistant openly talked about his child not being interested in studying but 
him still wanting his child to have a college-degree. This prompted the father to 
“fix him/her a diploma” (Interviewee 2C). To note here and unlike the case in the 
United States, where teaching assistants are often graduate students that are 
expected to graduate from their programs within a specified timeframe, teaching 
assistants in Bosnia are often full-time employees that frequently hold their posts 
indefinitely. While some teaching assistants pursue doctorates others may never 
obtain their doctorates and instead remain in their teaching assistantship posts for 
the rest of their professional careers. Also, given the general lack of the adequate 
cadre, teaching assistants are not necessarily in the graduate program at all but may 
be employed by the faculties in question because they have a prior degree or some 
experience in the field they are selected to teach in. Within Bosnia’s institutions of 
higher education, teaching assistants are more comparable to the lecturers in other 
educational systems, but do not hold doctorates and often do not advance into more 
established teaching positions.  
While the political elites operate based on the principle of “I do it for you, 
you do it for me,” those who lack strong connections “work hard and repeat years 
endlessly until either one or the other gives up [professor or the student] … or they 
will take a loan to bribe the professor or if the student is female, she will sleep with 
the professor” (Interviewee 7C). Even the professors who reject corruption and 
wish to differentiate themselves from the corrupt circles are frequently forced to 
take part in the corrupt process: they “pass students against their [professors’] own 
will. It is all systemically connected” (Interviewee 3C) and those that reject or 
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resist corruption may be deemed unsuitable for their positions. They are often 
politically marginalized and replaced by “little [gods] that listen” (Interviewee 4C). 
Here, one’s list of academic publications is irrelevant relative to one’s political 
suitability (Interviewee 4C). 
The second most frequently occurring form of corruption helped validate the 
hypothesis that the reciprocity of favors plays a crucial role in complicating 
educational corruption: 50.8% of the surveyed sample believe that educational 
corruption appears in the form of “passing because of one’s influential parents,” 
which reflects a very similar notion as does the earlier noted statistic that 62.1% of 
the surveyed student thought corruption appears in the form of  “passing exams 
because of one’s social connections” (see Figure 11, p. 127). This finding not only 
confirmed that students perceive favor-for-favor exchanges as corruption but has 
also tested one of the key premises of this research: it confirmed the importance of 
favor reciprocity and consequent implications for the social mobility mechanisms 
stemming from the students’ perceptions of favor-for-favor exchanges as 
corruption.  
Though the literature on educational corruption often focuses on bribery, the 
notion that this dissertation wants to bring into the limelight is the complexity of 
behaviors and interactions that occur in the form of favor exchanges, making 
educational corruption even more of an intractable activity than it might have been 
initially perceived as. Even with bribery that could arguably be traced, there are 
rarely direct exchanges of money; instead, the exchanges frequently include 
multiple steps designed to veil those involved. For instance, one participant 
witnessed an incident where “a student walked in during the S [code for the course] 
exam, and said to the professor, ‘Dad said you should stop by to pick it up,’ and 
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professor replied, ‘Give me your indeks9’ to [presumably] write in the grade for the 
exam that was in session” (Interviewee 2C). This exchange occurred and was 
uninterrupted in front of the entire class. 
Here, it is important to note that interviews with the participants have 
provided additional insights into the diversity of educational corruption forms. A 
teaching assistant who was depicted by a study participant (Interviewee 2C) as 
incompetent requested that the participant provide all notes and literature required 
for the teaching assistant’s child. In exchange, the teaching assistant offered a 
passing grade in another subject from the faculty’s curriculum. The participant 
stated that he refused to cooperate, but that the teaching assistant’s child completed 
the course of study and obtained a diploma equivalent to that of the study’s 
participant despite the entire class’ awareness that this individual passed the 
required coursework only thanks to the parent’s connections. This exemplifies the 
variety that exists in corruption-related proposals and interactions within the 
educational system, but it also reflects the workings of social mobility mechanisms 
within Bosnia’s society. Specifically, the study participant underlined the notion 
that the teaching assistant in question was highly incompetent himself, which is 
why he requested from a competent, yet repeatedly failed student, advice on the 
literature and knowledge required for an exam that was a part of the standard 
curriculum at the faculty where the teaching assistant was employed. 
Further, teaching assistants in Bosnia are in a different position than the 
teaching assistants who are graduate students in the US or other educational 
settings. With the continuing lack of educated cadre, Bosnia’s teaching assistants 
are often individuals with some level of expertise in the field they teach but are not 
necessarily students in a graduate program of their faculty. For instance, an 
                                                          
9
 Indeks is a gradebook in Bosnia. 
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accounting professor may not have a PhD in accounting, but may be an 
experienced accountant. While it is assumed that these assistants will eventually 
become professors after obtaining their doctorate, they often do not. Also and in 
line with other corruption-related behaviors, some obtain their positions because of 
their socio-political connections. In the process of conducting this research, one 
teaching assistant shared about a colleague of equivalent status, 
My colleague is completing a doctorate in Croatia with one of the, 
supposedly, prominent names in the field. He is constantly dining with 
the professor from Croatia. I suspect that that is how he is getting his 
doctorate. I, on the other hand, have been working for years on my 
doctorate, and everyone is surprised that I want to do it legitimately 
and that I am taking so long to complete it. (Interviewee 9C) 
This statement illustrates the severity of educational corruption whose 
negative implications ultimately affect the country as a whole. Bosnia’s role, 
if any, in being a part of the European and global economy and providing a 
functional, reliable, and educated workforce is, at best, in question given the 
manner in which personal connections and social status have overshadowed 
the salience of merit-based achievement in academia’s upward mobility 
framework and beyond.  
Diplomas as Credits for War-time Achievements 
The form of corruption that was discussed earlier and in the context of post-
war and post-communist elite formation is the process of diploma awards that took 
place immediately after the war. The Bosnian Army leadership during the war was 
comprised of very few formally trained military officials who left the Yugoslav 
Army to join the Bosnian Army. So, to reciprocate for one’s war achievements and 
heroic participation, many high-level military officials received diplomas. As a 
research participant openly stated, the participant’s father, who played a prominent 
role in military leadership during the war, was awarded a diploma from a higher 
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education institution “because of his participation in the war” (Interviewee 3C). 
Soon after the war ended, the members of the new elite were frequently rewarded 
for their war-related efforts or their participation in the nationalistic politics during 
and after the 1990s war. Further confirmed by another study participant, a 
prominent individual in the participant’s field of study was a former war hero who, 
prior to the war, had only a high school diploma, but immediately following the 
cessation of violence obtained several college degrees and now heads a prominent 
public company. As the interviewee further notes, “this is a public secret.... I never 
saw him at the [faculty] ... where one percent graduates in time [meaning 
graduating within 4 years] and he was one [of them]. Others who graduate in time 
usually do so with a damaged nervous system” (Interviewee 4C). 
In sum, the leaders of the war-time armed forces were self-driven individuals 
who rose to their positions during the actual fighting with Serbia’s army and the 
war-time army of Serb Republic. However, following the cessation of violence, 
many of these newly emerged leaders entered a post-war era in which construction 
of the new and multiethnic Bosnian Army was guided by the international 
community. In the process, certain requirements were placed upon the military 
leadership in terms of their education and academic qualifications, which in many 
cases the military officers from Bosnia lacked. To resolve the dichotomy between 
actual competence in the field shown during the war and the lack of formal 
academic and military training, many members of the military were helped in the 
process of obtaining their higher education diplomas: “With the lack of other 
awards, some individuals were awarded diplomas in appreciation for their war 
achievements” (Interviewee C4). While this form of privilege given to the war 
leaders and heroes could be justified with the award of honorary degrees, this 
privileging of some versus others later spread beyond a few selective cases. To help 
understand the reasons and complexities due to which the corrupt behavior has 
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spread beyond this initial war-related legitimization, the study here transitions into 
the last section of Chapter V that reviews, in detail, a number of the contextual 
factors that have helped facilitate expansion of corruption within Bosnia’s post-war 
higher education. 
Facilitators of Corruption 
The educational processes in Bosnia suffer from inconsistencies and 
inefficiencies that have opened up various opportunities in which the authority of 
professors and administrators can be inappropriately exercised over the students 
and, in indirect ways, their families. An interviewee under code name 6C depicts 
the situation in Bosnia’s colleges as “catastrophic” in terms of its organizational 
structure: “everything takes months, …our exam applications are lost, and exam 
periods are frequently postponed, often prolonging the length of studies, or 
professors simply do not show up for their scheduled exams, often causing students 
to repeat a year.” Consequently, a number of organizational, behavioral, and 
procedural traits of Bosnia’s higher education are now perceived as conducive to 
corruption. Some issues emerged more frequently than others and included: 
absenteeism of professors; lack of exam periods; problems with exam application, 
paperwork, laws and rules; lack of faculty access; grading and teaching 
inconsistencies; and culture of fear. The summary of behavioral and systemic 
elements that potentially help enable corruption is presented in Table 10 
(pp. 139-140). 
Absenteeism of Professors 
Often, Bosnian professors do not show up for their lectures and/or exams 
(see Table 10, pp. 139-140), consequently delaying students in the completion of 
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their studies and prompting them to think of ways to circumvent the system to 
compensate for the lost time and systemic inefficiencies. To be specific, one-third 
of the interviewed students noted absenteeism was a problem (see Table 10, 
pp. 139-140). The survey-based data confirmed that the faculty absenteeism is a 
notable issue. Of the surveyed student body, 36.6%, or 279 students, stated that 
some professors do not show up for their lectures or exams. To elaborate on the 
broader contextual setting enabling faculty absenteeism, Bosnian faculties lack 
sufficient teaching cadre. As a result, some professors are hired as consultants from 
neighboring countries (Croatia and/or Serbia), and they generally tend to arrange 
day-long teaching sessions over the weekends or on specific dates so that the 
content of an entire course can be covered in greatly compressed periods relative to 
what would be seen as a typical weekly schedule. For these outsourced courses, 
locally hired teaching assistants often compensate for the lack of face-to-face time 
with professors by holding weekly practice sessions.  
According to an interviewed participant, some professors show up so rarely 
that one group of students at the participant’s faculty complained to the dean about 
a professor being always absent. In response, the dean appeared uninformed and, in 
turn, stated that the professor in question was paid “5,000 KM [over 3,000 US 
dollars]” but the dean was visibly surprised to learn that the professor showed up 
only twice (Interviewee 7C). The interviewed student went on to suggest: “Most of 
these professors have other jobs, and this is their side activity....” (Interviewee 7C). 
Whether this behavior is perceived as corrupt, unprofessional, or irresponsible may 
be dependant on one’s definition of corruption; however, such observation 
enhances a student’s perception of an inconsistent and ad hoc setting that 
consequently opens itself up to the various forms of systemic abuse. 
What is also worth noting here is that another dissatisfaction students 
checked off in their surveys is the overall “lack of knowledge” by the faculty: 
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34.6% of the surveyed sample shared such a view, likely stemming from the 
inconsistent teaching stream and having to shuffle and change the consultancy-
based teachers. Not only do the students get frustrated and discouraged with 
professors who seldom appear, but such an ad hoc approach to college education 
creates inconsistencies in both students’ and professors’ expectations, discouraging 
many students from participating at all but also encouraging others, both students 
and professors, to take the advantage of the circumstances. Furthermore, in such 
settings, teaching assistants often largely dominate the teaching process and try to 
act as gatekeepers to the professors, limiting direct and continuous interaction 
between students and professors. While this study does not delineates significantly 
between professors and teaching assistants and generally lumps the two into the 
teaching cadre at Bosnia’s faculties, it ought to be noted that teaching assistants are 
as likely as other faculty members to take advantage of their positions. 
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Table 10:  Frequency of Systemic Corruption Facilitators     
 




















1C √ 500-1500 
KM 
  √  √ √ √ 
2C  600 KM   √  √ √ √ 
3C  1000-2000 
KM 
 √ √  √ √ √ 
4C  Under 500 
KM 
  √  √ √ √ 
5C  2,500-
3,500KM 
  √  √ √ √ 
6C √ 1,500-
2,500KM 
√  √ √ √ √  
7C  Don’t 
know 
√  √ √ √ √  
8C √ Below 
500KM 
√  √  √   
9C √ 500-
1500KM 




Table 10 (continued) 
 
 






















  √  √ √  
11C √ 1,500-
2,500KM 
  √     
12C  500-
1,500KM 
√  √ √ √   
13C  1,500-
2,500KM 
  √  √   
14C √ 500-
1,500KM 
  √     
15C √ 1,500-
2,500KM 
√  √  √ √  
TOTA
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Student Gradebook (in Bosnian ”Indeks”) 
In continuing the review of corruption facilitators, problems in Bosnia’s higher 
education often stem from the continuous use of the paper-version of the students’ 
gradebook or, in Bosnian, “indeks” (see Table 10, pp. 139-140). This gradebook is 
physically carried by students into each of their exams and given to professors to write in 
their grades. The book is a de facto transcript that evidences student’s progress. It makes 
visible, to each professor, all of the grades that student has previously received, as well as 
students’ basic familial information such as place and date of birth and father’s name. 
The Indeks has to be brought to each exam and is the main proof, in various 
administrative settings within and outside the university, of one’s student status. 
Providing professors with information on the student’s family background, such as 
father’s name, can prompt a discussion with the student on his or her social background, 
but even without any such discussion allows a professor to evaluate the student’s 
potential to bribe or ways to leverage the student’s connections and family’s political or 
social position.  
The Indeks also has the power to enable corruption in the most mechanical ways: it 
allows for bribes to be physically exchanged between the professor and student during 
the exam itself. The interviewee 1C stated that it is difficult to track the extent of 
corruption as “the exchange of money happens through liaisons rather than directly”. One 
of the potential physical liaisons, though not explicitly mentioned by the Interviewee 1C, 
is a grade book that every student directly hands to a professor at the onset of every 
exam. 
Furthermore, by being able to view all of the grades, professors may account for 
student’s previous performance in their grading process. According to the study 
participant, if a student received a grade 6 (out of 10 and with 5 being a failing grade) at 
his/her last exam, it is likely that the next professor will give a 6 regardless of the 
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student’s answer (Interviewee 3C). To further complicate the grading process, some 
professors who want their exams to be perceived as difficult to pass will give a lower 
grade than other grades in the Indeks book; again, this occurs irrespective of the 
knowledge the student has shown during the actual exam that is being graded 
(Interviewee 3C). 
As particularly relevant to the courses taught by professors from abroad, assistants 
frequently perform most of the teaching and grading tasks, limiting professors’ 
interaction with students. Consequently, many students are often making multiple 
attempts to contact their professors to get their grades officially written into their 
indekses. At times, indekses are shipped to a professor at another location, subjecting 
students to additional risks of losing their gradebooks or not getting them back in time for 
another exam. 
Lack of Access to Professors 
With the lack of an adequate teaching cadre within some faculties, student access 
to professors is limited. At the same time, teaching assistants tend to take on the role of 
liaisons between students and senior faculty members. In doing so, the status of teaching 
assistants is elevated, even though their educational backgrounds and experiences do not 
always merit their substantive control over their teaching and grading responsibilities. As 
one of the interviewed students said, the main obstacle to one’s success is that the 
relationships count because teaching is often done by assistants who are not necessarily 
capable of transferring knowledge (Interviewee 6C). In total, 3 out of 15 interviewed 
students brought up the lack of access to professors as one of the systemic problems. 
Similarly, 20.9% of the surveyed sample is of the view that some professors are not 
qualified, whereas, at some faculties, the full-time professors who qualify to teach in their 
field – as perceived by students – could be as low as one (Interviewee 7C). The 
remaining professors are labeled as “outside consultants” who, for instance, travel from 
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Croatia and teach when they can make it to the faculties in Bosnia (Interviewee 7C). 
According to the same participant, one of the best professors at her faculty was an outside 
consultant who, in only two days, covered the material for the entire semester, while 
others generally come every other weekend and hold lectures (Interviewee 7C). This 
particular participant transferred from one faculty to another within Bosnia and suggested 
that even differences between faculties within the country are enormous: one faculty had 
regular weekly schedules, while the one she currently attends holds lectures when 
professors are available (Interviewee 7C). 
A lack of consistent scheduling on a week-to-week basis goes hand-in-hand with  
infrequent in-person contacts with the actual professors, who tend to delegate all or most 
of their teaching to their locally hired assistants, further diluting the quality of the 
teaching process and placing authority over the teaching process into the hands of their, 
less qualified, teaching assistants. Specifically, 23.9% of the surveyed student sample 
would like to have better access to their faculty members, which would ensure more 
transparent and direct communication with faculty members, but also tip the imbalance of 
power and authority that some teaching assistants practice in the absence of more 
qualified faculty members. 
Lacking and Poor Harmonization of Rules, Laws, and Procedures 
Given the existing and politically charged division of the country into ethnic 
entities, the educational sector in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is under the 
jurisdiction of the cantonal ministries, including implementation and formulation of laws 
governing higher education. The politicalization of legal frameworks coincides with the 
ethnic division between the Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Also, the extensive subdivision in the country maintained by a government-
budgeted and heavily loaded administration was envisioned as a way to improve a 
participatory approach to the governance of Bosnia, but instead serves to complicate the 
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establishment of laws and policies that would better define, inform, and guide educational 
standards and behaviors within cantons. This is exemplified in the case of the Una-Sana 
Canton’s discussions on the passage of the Law on Higher Education. One of Bosnia’s 
political parties, Democratic People’s Union (Demokratska narodna zajednica), requested 
that the Law permit the use of the cantonal budget for the funding of private institutions 
in higher education. In essence, DNZ asked for the privatization of higher education at 
the expense of the public budget, justifying it as a need for higher educational alternatives 
in the disciplines in which the public sector has failed to provide sufficient opportunities. 
Regardless of whether the DNZ’s argument about educational diversity currently 
available to the Bosnian population is valid or not, what is clearly emerging from this 
request is the sense of entitlement that a political group may feel toward leveraging 
public institutions and funds to pursue its agenda. Even more concerning is that such 
requests are perceived as legitimate and are adequately debated and discussed while 
public institutions themselves already lack sufficient funds to fulfill the requirements of 
the Bologna Process. 
Another phenomenon that characterizes the social and political movements within 
the country and that allows for the upkeep of corruption-enabling mechanisms is the 
interconnectedness between the political and educational elites, which has provided 
fertile ground for educational corruption. Per one of the interviewed students who has 
completed her studies: “Much is under the control of politics. The Minister of Education 
is a political figure and is a government member who has a boss, and the boss is the head 
of his political party. Politics dominates and steers all” (Interviewee 3C). 
This scenery is complicated by the addition of private and unregulated institutions 
of higher education into the mix. The study participants have openly categorized these 
faculties and universities as diploma mills: “Financial lobby is very important here. The 
owners of private higher education institutions are wealthy and they ensure that, within 
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the state parliament, laws are passed to minimize control over private institutions in 
higher education” (Interviewee 1C). 
Frustration with the lack of organization in Bosnian universities, extensive 
bureaucracy, and complex procedures is clearly present among Bosnian students. Of the 
total number of the interviewed students, all 15 have at one point or another talked about 
the problems with their tests, organization, and procedures at their faculties (see Table 10, 
pp. 139-140). Some indeed perceive the Bosnian educational system as one where the 
interest of the “student is least important” (Interviewee 3C). For instance, Bosnian 
students are required to file an application each time they take an exam. Students often 
end up standing in line for several hours in order to sign up for an exam. In many 
faculties, they are unable to submit their applications online or drop them off collectively 
and pick them up individually at a later time. In doing so, both students and 
administrators processing exam applications are frustrated and overwhelmed, prompting 
administrators to lose applications and students to attempt to circumvent the process. The 
administrators interacting with students are often reluctant to engage in resolving student 
problems and are, therefore, depicted by students as “totally passive” (Interviewee 3C). 
Notably, 39.1% of the surveyed students would like to have a better support network at 
their faculties. As one of the interviewed participants specified: 
Usually you can submit the exam application on Mondays and Wednesdays 
from 10am to noon, and during those times thousand of students come in at 
once. For the rest of the times and days, the Student Services Office simply 
does not work, and around 10am they often take a break. (Interviewee 2C) 
Another student agreed that at his faculty, disorganization is a significant problem, as the 
Student Services Office works only two hours each day; when the exam grades need to 
be stamped by the Student Services Office, about 150 students wait in line for their turn 
during the two-hour-window (Interviewee 14C). 
Students also noted the tendency for exam applications to be lost, which results in 
students having to re-apply and pay the fee for the exam again. Even when the initial 
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application is found, the funds received from multiple applications for the same exam 
often remain with the Student Services Office, and the issue of multiple charges remains 
unaddressed (Interviewee 2C). In general, each document that is needed by students for 
various administrative purposes has an associated fee with it, which is not consistently 
affordable by all students given the poor standard of living in Bosnia (Interviewee 1C). 
Moreover, inconsistencies of various types - which are a repeated characterization of 
higher education in Bosnia and Herzegovina - exist even in terms of the fee that faculties 
charge for exam applications. For instance, one of the interviewed participants in the 
study transferred from one public faculty to another. She commented on the differences 
between the two schools, stating that her initial school charged only half of 1 KM for the 
exam application while her current faculty charges 20 KM and 3 KM for part-time and 
full-time students, respectively (Interviewee 7C).  
Inefficiencies and lack of consistency across faculties are not limited only to the 
exam application process. What is even more worrisome is the fact that students are often 
forced to re-take the same exams, even when they previously passed them; this is done 
mainly due to the lack of clear procedures and guidelines on how a student transfers from 
one program to another. Re-taking of already passed exams occurs even when the transfer 
takes place within the same faculty but the student moves from one program to another. 
Frustration with the dysfunctional and undefined system is explicitly echoed in the 
statement of a student who notes: 
There are cases where students decided to enroll into the 4-year program 
with the same major instead of only a 2-year program so that they can obtain 
a 4-year-college diploma. Some professors still make students take the same 
exams even though they already passed them as a part of their 2-year-
program study on the same subject and at the same faculty. (Interviewee 2C) 
For example, if a student who is enrolled in a two-year-program at the Economics faculty 
and passed a course in Mathematics decides to pursue a four-year-degree, he/she may be 
required to re-take that same exam in Mathematics. 
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Similarly, a study participant who remained in the same program but transferred 
from one faculty to another was asked to start from the beginning, even though she had 
successfully completed 1.5 years of study in her first school (Interviewee 7C). Both 
faculties were public and in the same field. Once she re-took and successfully completed 
the exams for the entire first year, one of the administration members asked her why she 
bothered re-taking exams she had already taken at her initial school (Interviewee 7C). 
While the facts of this particular case unveil the surprisingly low level of coordination, 
guidance, and consistency that students should be able to rely on in the course of their 
studies, an equally concerning element of this particular situation is the fact that the 
student in question simply accepted to spend 2 years virtually repeating the same 
curriculum. No serious attempts were made to request acceptance of her transfer credits 
within the new faculty. Along the same lines, another interviewee explained how during 
his course of study, courses were abruptly added and subtracted from the school’s 
curriculum, emphasizing the lack of organization by noting that one of the courses was 
simply taken off the student schedule midway through the semester due to the lack of 
faculty (Interviewee 7C). According to the same student, students can suddenly be told, 
“You do not have that subject, you have something else” (Interviewee 7C). Under such 
circumstances, Bosnian students often fail to respond with any kind of demands. Such an 
attitude is not solely characteristic of this participant’s experience but is a commonality 
encountered in speaking with the interviewed participants whose persistence and desire to 
get through the system translated into an acceptance of both corruption and 
disorganization, even when it exposed them to illogical, longer, and to some degree 
abusive behavior on their paths toward the completion of their degrees. 
Students also often complained about the lack of exam periods, which again 
prolongs the time needed to complete a college degree and results in the frustration of 
many students and their increasingly negative perception and dissatisfaction with the 
system. This issue, combined with the fact that professors at times schedule one exam 
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period during a semester and then do not appear for the exam, plays a significant role in 
delaying students by a semester, if not by a year or longer. Of the entire surveyed sample, 
25.5% would like to have exams broken into multiple pieces. What frequently occurs in 
Bosnia is that students take a semester-long course and then have a final exam at the end 
of the semester, which does not give them multiple ways to earn their grade as it is often 
done in the US. While some professors have made attempts to diversify grading process 
by splitting one exam into two or engaging students in some sort of presentations, the 
formality of students being delivered knowledge that ought to be memorized and recited 
either verbally or in a written format is still the dominant form of teaching in Bosnia’s 
higher education. Consequently, the previously noted statistic where 1 in 4 students 
would like to have their exams broken into multiple exams is not surprising. In fact, even 
a greater group of 301 students, or 39.5%, would like to have more opportunities to take 
the exams.  
As is presently the case and irrespective of whether students are part-time or full-
time, surveyed students often have courses where professors are coming from abroad to 
teach a course in a compressed time. At times, these visiting professors will teach during 
the weekends or, if their schedule allows, they will come and teach for a week at a time. 
Then they will return to their primary location of work and re-visit the faculty-in-question 
at another time of convenience to the visiting professor’s schedule. In this process, many 
students feel the opportunities for interaction with their professors are limited, especially 
when it comes to the opportunities to take an exam. For instance, even if the student is 
unable to attend due to illness or some other justifiable reason, there may not be an 
opportunity to take a make-up exam. Instead, student may simply fail the exam, and have 
to spend another semester or longer re-taking the same exam.  
In fact, the lack of procedural definition and clarification is a mirror image of what 
happens in the country overall. On the Federation side, 10 cantons act as largely 
independent administrative units with much of the power to define legal frameworks 
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when it comes to the educational sector. On the Serb Republic side, there are no cantons; 
instead this entity acts as a de facto state. In 2010, the Serb Republic passed the 
referendum law in an attempt to set the stage for the Serb Republic’s secession from 
Bosnia, a move that has drawn international criticism because it is in discord with the 
Dayton Accords, whose Annex 4 serves as the country’s Constitution. A study participant 
noted: “It so happens that in our law-making bodies work illiterate people and we have 
problems with the law for higher education where the illiterate try to block the passage of 
the law. An individual with only 8 years of schooling is requesting an amendment to the 
law on higher education” (Interviewee 1C). 
Overall, Bosnia needs a supervisory system to ensure the accountability of 
professors and faculty leadership, but doing so appears impossible given the political 
power over higher education and consequently the dominant mindset of higher education 
institutions and their personnel. Simply put, “professors do what they want and fail who 
they want based on impulses and not some systemic approach. Even if there are laws and 
procedures in place, they are not applied” (Interviewee 2C). Interviewee 3C agrees that 
the questionable effectiveness of professors, lack of control over their teaching and 
grading, and lack of implementation of rules and guidelines, if such exist, make it 
permissible for professors to fail students, even when they show sufficient knowledge on 
an exam. Every step taken by the educational system is seen as unpredictable and 
random, often due to the vaguely defined procedures, lack of guidelines or poor 
implementation (Interviewee 2C). 
Grading Inconsistencies 
In a setting of often absent professors, teaching assistants who dominate the 
grading and teaching process, inconsistent timing of lectures and exams, Indeks-related 
use and abuse, and lack of access to faculty, grading approaches vary greatly. The key 
consistency detected in Bosnia’s current system is an overall lack of fairness and 
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uniformity when it comes to grading. This poorly synchronized educational system has 
resulted in only 18% of the surveyed students being “very satisfied” with the procedures 
in their faculties. In the US-based university, it would be safe to assume that one would 
earn a letter grade of A or A- if more than 90% of the test were completed correctly. 
However, in the Bosnian examination system and irrespective of the accurately 
completed percentage on the exam, one can either pass or fail depending on a set of other 
circumstantial variables that go into the professor’s grading decision. For instance, a 
professor may fail or disallow a student from taking an exam if a student comes in 
wearing knee-high pants (Interviewee 2C). No specific guidelines as to the dress code 
existed at the time of this particular incident at the participating public institution 
(Interviewee 2C). 
More broadly, no grading policies or guidelines are applied across the board to 
ensure the fair treatment of all students at all times; in fact, 35.4% of the surveyed sample 
would like the grading process to be more objective. Of the 15 interviewed students, 14 
have remarked on the issue of grading inconsistencies (see Table 10, pp. 139-140). In 
some cases, grades are obtained easily, while in other cases, it is virtually impossible to 
pass an exam (Interviewee 7C). This extends to teaching quality as well, where some 
professors talk about topics unrelated to the course, and others are excellent teachers 
(Interviewee 6C). For instance, one study participant was told to “write as much as 
possible since professor does not read the exam anyway” (Interviewee 7C). In this 
course, virtually all students passed (Interviewee 7C). 
As discussed earlier, there is a high saturation of outside consultants at some of 
Bosnia’s higher education institutions, which makes the acquisition of knowledge in a 
highly disorganized setting difficult. In one case, an outside consultant came and covered 
an entire course in two days, and then graded the exams, with only 20 out of 80 students 
passing (Interviewee 7C). At the second exam given to the remaining group of about 60 
failed students, only 10 more students passed (Interviewee 7C). Due to the lack of 
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professors, some faculties make extreme and even abrupt changes to the curriculum 
depending on available faculty members; for instance, one of the study participants said 
that “we did not have at all one course “ and consequently will be offered the same exam 
later when and if the appropriate professor can be hired (Interviewee 7C).  
This randomness in grading and teaching makes it very difficult to decipher why a 
professor may be failing or passing a large group of students. In other words, the grading 
process, as seen in Bosnia, may prompt students to wonder as to whether the passing 
grade is a function of corrupt behavior, either favor-for-favor exchanges or bribes. 
Students are not only graded in ways that are not transparent, but they are at times unable 
to follow up with professors who are not present in their geographic vicinity except on 
select dates. As a result, even if the grading approach and a particular grade could be 
justified, the opportunities for the transparent and direct professor-student interactions are 
infrequent. Thus, students are often left to wonder whether the students who pass do so 
due to bribes or their connections.  
The grading practices in Bosnia allow professors to grade subjective, if they wish 
to do so. Professors are not held accountable by their students simply because students 
themselves are ambiguous as to how the grading process works and what they can and 
cannot expect of their professors. What is telling of the grading-related perceptions is that 
20.7% of the surveyed students would like to have their graded exams returned to them, 
an opportunity not always offered or given to students in Bosnia’s higher education. In 
other words, students are unable to get a physical confirmation of the grading process 
where they could see the logic behind the lost points and compare their exam books with 
the correct answers. In most cases, professors publicly post a list of students and their 
grades but often do not return exams to the students or provide further feedback on why a 
certain grade was received. This behavior raises questions as to why professors would 
feel compelled to disallow students from seeing their own work. One of the interviewed 
students provided some additional insight into the issue. According to the student, who 
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has now graduated (Interviewee 2C), a professor once failed him, even though the student 
was certain he answered most, if not all, questions correctly. When the study participant 
went to the professor’s office and insisted on seeing the exam, the professor disclosed 
that he, in fact, never looked over the exam in question because it was at the bottom of 
the exam pile (Interviewee 2C). The professor graded the exam on the spot, passed the 
student, and freed him of the oral exam requirement under the condition that no 
information on the issue of giving out grades without grading exams would be disclosed 
to the rest of the class. This behavioral trend suggests that professors may not feel 
accountable for their actions, which allows them to abuse their authority in this manner, 
consequently prolonging the degree completion time of Bosnia’s youths. In some 
instances – and despite students’ complaints about failing the exam – professors will still 
disallow students from reviewing their exams and will continue to provide a rationale as 
to why they have failed their students. According to one student, “the exams are always 
designed to be sufficiently hard so that no one can complete 100% of the exam in the 
time allotted for the test” (Interviewee 2C). With an imperfect score and the lack of 
grading standards, the failure of a student can always be rationalized. 
With the possible motivation to prolong studies, professors will often look over the 
Indeks book and note the timing when the student passed previous exams. If the time 
period between the exams is short, professors may fail the student, rationalizing that 
insufficient time was spent between the two exams to adequately prepare for passing 
both. Therefore, the gradebook clearly helps facilitate decisions that lead professors to 
abuse their position of power and subjectively grade. Professors may, in fact, purposely 
discourage hard work and thwart those students who invest more of their time and effort 
studying to complete their studies in time. In the words of one study participant and a 
recent college graduate,  
A professor failed me when I completed everything, stating I had one wrong 
answer. I knew my answer was correct, but the professor failed me because I 
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passed another exam earlier that day.... He would not let me pass. Next time, 
I did less than the first time and I got 9 [out of 10]. I completely lost interest 
for the subject. (Interviewee 3C) 
The randomness of the examination process is further exacerbated by those 
teaching assistants who apply grading methods hardly seen elsewhere. There are teaching 
assistants who calculate exam grades by subtracting the number of incorrect 
questions/points from the number of correct questions/points. So, if a student takes an 
exam with 10 questions each worth 10 points and answers 5 correctly and 5 incorrectly, 
the student’s incorrect answers will in essence nullify the correct ones. In other words, 
instead of earning 50% as the final grade on the test, the teaching assistant will subtract 
lost points from the earned points and come up with the final grade of 0 points on the test 
(Interviewee 6C). 
One of the key systemic corruption enablers that has emerged from this discussion 
is clearly the lack of a consensus on grading standards and continuation of individually 
devised approaches. This vagueness in evaluating a student’s level of knowledge and 
competence, in return, provides a space in which grades can be easily produced, 
modified, and manipulated, permitting faculty full freedom over the decision about who 
passes and who fails. In such a grading environment, students are continuously perplexed 
as to what constitutes a passing grade. At the same time, this ambiguity enables 
professors to manipulate the grades and abuse the system according to their personal 
interests. As one of the interviewed students noted, professors go as far as to directly ask 
students where their parents are employed, underlining the relevance of one’s social 
prominence in society perhaps even more so than the knowledge demonstrated by the 
student at his/her exam (Interviewee 4C). 
As estimated by one of the study’s participants, “about half of grades are fairly 
earned and the other half are not” (Interviewee 6C). Another interviewee stated: “There is 
no concrete rule as to which percentage means passing” (Interviewee 2C). The level of 
confusion among Bosnian students is well illustrated through the presentation of what is 
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often perceived as the typical outcome of an exam: “100 students take an exam, 2 pass, 
and 5 pass conditionally [emphasis added], yet all 100 work on the exam for three hours” 
(Interviewee 2C). A particularly appalling and irresponsible grading that reflects the blunt 
abuse of the official authority is a situation where: 
a professor praised my work on the written exam, but failed me. I never 
asked for that exam, but others have asked for theirs and the professor 
showed them my exam [sharing the student’s name] to exemplify how the 
work was to be done, but the professor failed me on that very exam! 
(Interviewee 2C) 
In the context of Bosnia, it appears that the grading process is individually tailored 
to each student, his/her socioeconomic background, and a particular moment in which 
professor finds himself/herself; failing a student with a successfully completed test bears 
no consequence for the professor, while it elevates the sense of loss and helplessness on 
the part of the student. To illustrate, a participant stated: 
In my first year, a professor failed me on a SM [coded name of the course] oral 
examination even though I knew even the page number of the correct answer I 
provided. It is the most I ever studied. Next time, when I took the same 
examination, I provided the same answers, and got 8 [out of 10].  As I was 
walking out, I said, “Thank you and good bye.” The professor started to scream at 
me saying that I have no reason to say thank you to him, that I have nothing to 
thank him for. I was speechless and confused. (Interviewee 2C)  
In sum, the grading process’ ambiguity is porous, allowing subjective factors 
reflective of one’s social background to possibly take the front row in the decision-
making process. In such a setting, a grade is more easily purchased or secured via 
connections, as the manner in which the grades are obtained cannot be reviewed against 
an accepted norm or compared to an established set of guidelines. In Bosnia, students 
have no expectations going into exams in terms of the match between their level of 
knowledge and the grade they may earn, which is why professors - without raising an 
alarm within their faculty or beyond - can easily award passing grades for minimal 




Another trait of Bosnia’s higher education that acts as the corruption facilitator is 
the variation and inconsistency in the quality and manner of teaching. Bosnia’s higher 
education is lacking in its ability to track professors’ performance and ensure that the 
individual performance does not deviate from a certain minimum standard of teaching 
quality, knowledge, and qualifications that is expected at a university level. Of the 
surveyed students, 20.9% think that professors lack adequate qualifications, which is 
similar and in line with 18.3% of the student body stating that professors are promoted 
without merit (please see Figure 12, p. 156). This finding was validated by some of the 
interviewed students as well: of the 15 interviewees, 9 were in agreement that there are 
teaching inconsistencies within Bosnia’s higher education. One of the participants, for 
instance, compared his computer science professor’s inability to speak English to 
“driving a bus without knowing how to ride a bicycle” (Interviewee 2C). Another 
interviewed participant demonstrated frustration with the inconsistency in the difficulty 
of subjects taught by Bosnian professors, where some of the subjects were at the level of 
“elementary school” while others were not “passable” (Interviewee 7C). She added that, 
for this reason, there are students who in their senior year of college may not have the 
basic knowledge in some of the subjects they studied (Interviewee 7C). 
Students are most dissatisfied with the lack of actual teaching and explanations of 
the covered material by the professors; almost half of the surveyed sample, 48.5%, 
thought that professors do not explain their material sufficiently (see Figure 12, p. 156). 
In fact, the inconsistencies between the lectures and exam materials are a reflection of 
another systemic deficiency that students specifically point to as problematic: “Professors 
may never mention a topic, but will put it as an exam question failing most students” 
(Interviewee 6C). In the process, the students who have studied the covered material may 
fail, while those who have had insight into the exam questions through the professor or 
teaching assistant pass the exam.  
  
156
These inconsistencies have only helped build negative perceptions of higher 
education in Bosnia. In fact, 41% of the surveyed students (see Figure 12 below) believe 
that there are students who pass their exams because of corrupt activities they engage in. 
Similarly, 26.4% or almost a third of the surveyed student population believes that they 
are being failed on their exams even when they know the subject (see Figure 12 below).  
Furthermore, 36.8% of the surveyed participants were dissatisfied with professors not 
showing up for their lectures or exams, while 34.8% of the participating students believe 
faculty members lack knowledge on the subject they teach (see Figure 12 below).  
 














In sum, there are a number of dissatisfactions pertaining to the teaching process in 
Bosnia’s higher education, creating opportunities for different forms of power abuse to 
emerge as the authority and control over the educational processes are often in the hands 
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Often, professors require students to purchase the books they authored, which – 
given the scarcity of academic literature in the post-war Bosnia – would be appropriate if 
it were not for the professors’ tendencies to disallow the purchase of used books and 
insist on students purchasing the new books. In other words, some Bosnian professors 
simply take this mandatory reading requirement to an entirely new level by making these 
book purchases a significant source of income for themselves. To elaborate, each student 
is required to purchase a new book directly from the professor or a specific bookstore 
rather than buy a used one from another student or possibly borrow it from the library. To 
make sure that each student has purchased his/her own book, professors, at times, 
demand that each student bring a book to an exam, at which time professor autographs 
the book and thereby marks it as un-sellable to another student at a later time. Signed 
books are effectively unauthorized for future use, ensuring that each student purchases a 
book for himself/herself. In such cases, a decision not to buy a new book is a sure fail on 
the exam despite a student’s knowledge or competence, which is likely why an 
astounding 45.3% of the surveyed sample stated that “book purchases” is one of their 
primary dissatisfactions with the teaching process (see Figure 12, p. 156). While this is 
not a practice used across the board by all professors, its frequency certainly reflects an 
overall sense of immorality that permeates higher education in Bosnia. As based on the 
surveyed population data, the mandatory book purchases are second in line on the list of 
reasons for students’ dissatisfaction with teaching practices in the country’s educational 
system (Figure 12, p. 156). 
Culture of Fear and Entitlement 
In a politically tense setting, such as that of Bosnia and Herzegovina, educational 
issues cannot be observed nor analyzed in a vacuum and away from contextual pressures. 
Many of the administrative roles in the educational system of Bosnia are decided by 
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political factors rather than merit, due to which many students see politics as not only 
being intertwined with educational processes but also as being in control of them 
(Interviewee 2C, Interviewee 3C, Interviewee 4C). Some study participants have 
emphasized both their own fear of the corrupt and dominant circles but also the fear felt 
by those professors or teaching assistants who face threats because they demand 
knowledge regardless of one’s political or social status. There are instances where 
professors have had to “pass a student because the professor was afraid” (Interviewee 
3C). The same study participant further suggested that “there are professors who would 
do as they should but cannot say no to politics and are forced to pass ... regardless of their 
own moral and ethical principles” (Interviewee 3C). Others reiterated that “favor for 
favor, you will need me later” is the modus operandi of Bosnia’s corrupt educational 
system, while political pressure and threats are also utilized when the members of the 
academic cadre seem less obedient (Interviewee 4C). 
Some of the most persistent professors who try hard to distance themselves from 
the corrupt echelons go as far as to require a student to find a witness for an oral exam to 
send the message to the student population and faculty administration that a passing 
grade for their exam cannot be bought or awarded via connections. One of the 
participants faced such a situation where a professor refused to examine the candidate 
without at least one student witness to listen in on the exam (Interviewee 3C). So the 
participant had to walk around the faculty building looking for a student who would be 
willing to volunteer and listen in on the exam. This approach is certainly a logistical 
burden on a student, but, more importantly, reflects the extreme measures taken by the 
uncorrupt professors in their attempt to differentiate themselves from the corrupt circles. 
Moreover, it is further indicative of the systemic lack of support for those professors who 
wish to separate themselves from the corrupt and dominant elite. 
Another element of the higher education and the post-socialist culture in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is its inherited mentality of control and dominance. The sense of social 
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importance and control over something or somebody is highly pronounced in this post-
socialist system, where those who are socially relevant seek some type of control and 
frequently feel compelled to reiterate their own self-importance (Interviewee 4C). In 
academia, this exhibitionist behavior often takes the form of referring to the inferiority of 
others. The sense of inferiority, combined with the fear of taking action against 
corruption publicly, ensures that students “only talk but do little” (Interviewee 5C). 
Young students can easily be subjected to the exercise of authority and power, so the 
university is a suitable setting for applying the socialist mentality still present within the 
system. In other words, “we in the post-socialist society suffer from the syndrome of 
having the need to show power in order to please ourselves … and professors manifest 
this syndrome by exercising their power and authority through their professorships and 
their grading“ over the susceptible and vulnerable student population (Interviewee 4C). 
Another prevalent source of fear is students’ awareness that the mechanisms or 
committees to punish the perpetrators of corruption are either absent or devised by the 
individuals likely involved in corruption themselves (Interviewee 4C, Interviewee 5C). 
Consequently, the verbal and systemic intimidation ensures students’ obedience and 
silence in dealing with the ongoing corruption and immorality in higher education in the 
country.  
In summary and as theorized earlier, inconsistencies and inefficiencies of Bosnia’s 
higher education provide a setting that enables corruption to deepen and spread within the 
institutions of higher education. More importantly, this chapter also confirms the 
presence of educational corruption, as well as the dominance of non-monetary forms of 
corruption over bribery. With these findings, Chapter V provides a prelude to a more 
extensive discussion on the notions of corruption and sponsored versus contest-based 
social mobility in the next chapter. In Chapter VI, this study looks at the corruption’s 
elaborate societal impact as manifested through the elite’s use of higher education for 
self-legitimization and self-perpetuation. The newly formed and still forming post-war 
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elite in Bosnia remains in flux, and some without established social backgrounds 
certainly make it through the higher educational system. For the poorer segments of the 
society, obtaining higher education for their children is a difficult struggle and involves 
tolerance of the system’s unfairness and corruption within it. It is these students’ personal 
drive and determination to succeed that brings them over the finish line. For the elites, as 






The impact of various forms of educational corruption is highly complex, and 
many aspects of its broader influence will not be discussed in this dissertation due to the 
limitations of the information that can be captured through the data on students’ 
perceptions, as well as this work’s specific focus on its key research questions. As 
Table 11 (p. 162) indicates, Chapter VI is divided into three distinct sub-sections on 
corruption’s impact. The chapter begins by discussing the impact, if any, corruption has 
had on various ethnic groups within Bosnia. This first sub-section directly answers 
research question 2a. I then move on in detail to findings relating to research question 2b 
by re-evaluating and re-contextualizing Turner’s concepts (1960) of sponsored versus 
contest-based mobility within Bosnia’s corrupt higher education. In its third and last sub-
section, Chapter VI provides a brief review of the findings relating to corruption’s impact 
on horizontal mobility within Bosnia’s higher education. Chapter VI continues to follow 
the thematic organization of the previous chapter, so the findings arrived at using 








Table 11: Chapter VI – Organization by Sections and Sub-Sections 
 
 
SECTION TITLE – 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS HYPOTHESIS RELEVANT VARIABLES 
Differential Impact on 
Ethnicities – 2a 
 
Students who are ethnic minorities 
perceive corruption as often occurring 
within their faculty relative to ethnic 
majority. 
 
Y= Corruption Degree (CD);  
X1=Exams Completed (EC); 
X2=Years Studying (YS); 
X3=Household Income (HI);  





Impact of Corruption: 
   Contest versus Sponsored   
    Mobility – 2b 
                         
 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Often, professors 
/teaching assistants are not promoted 
based on their qualifications but rather 
connections. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Student satisfaction 
with the state of their faculty and 
teaching affects their perception of the 






HYPOTHESIS 3: Students’ social and 
political involvement affects whether 
they perceive promotions as merit-








HYPOTHESIS 4: Vertical mobility 
mechanisms are dysfunctional as the 
best are often not first to graduate. 
 
 





Y=Merited Promotion (MP); 
X1=Procedure Satisfaction (PS); 
X2=Teaching Satisfaction (TS); 
X3=Years Studying (YS); 
X4=ECTS 
X5=Exams Completed (EC); 
X6=Sex (S) 
X7=Competent Graduate (CG) 
 
 
Y=Merited Promotion (MP); 
X1=Sociopolitical Involvement (SPI); 
X2=Procedure Satisfaction (PS); 
X3=Teaching Satisfaction (TS);  
X4=Years Studying (YS); 




X9=Exams Completed (EC); 
X10=Student Type (ST); 
 
Y=Competent Graduate (CG); 
Interview Transcripts 
Impact of Corruption: 
   Horizontal Mobility – 2b  
 HYPOTHESIS 5: Students do not 
transfer within national system because 
of corruption. 




The forthcoming discussion confirms that the process of fully quantifying the 
implications of favor-reciprocity among the elite for the broader development of the 
country is complex, especially if one is aiming to determine the full impact of the 
inadequately educated individuals who may be in control of influential and decision-
making positions in the country’s healthcare, media, government, and educational 
systems. Consequently, Chapter VI also finds that educational corruption impacts 
Bosnia’s youth in multiple ways, particularly focusing on the manner in which corruption 
influences the elites versus non-elites. As discussed earlier, the elite vacuum in post-war 
and post-socialist Bosnia was followed by the need to legitimize the country’s new elite. 
Not always, but often, obtaining diplomas served to legitimize members of the newly 
emerging elite was then followed by the expansion of corruption practices more broadly 
throughout the educational system. 
Over time, Bosnia became tolerant of a distorted value system that rewards 
personal relationships and political prominence rather than hard work and 
meritocratically achieved success. In the words of a study participant: “Consequence of 
the war time are distorted moral norms because into the elite came corrupt individuals 
and they believe that it is OK to arrive [into the highest social status] via corruption” 
(Interviewee 5C). The fundamental contradiction that the study has worked to draw 
attention to has emerged as a theme throughout this chapter: the wealthy typically do not 
bribe to pass because they often have, at their disposal, a menu of personal and political 
connections that, if they wish to, they can leverage to obtain passing grades, while the 
poor are more likely to be subjected to the bribing process. In sum, distinctively clear 
differentiations may exist between the haves and have-nots as to their experiences and 
perceptions of corruption processes, and this chapter makes every effort to unveil the 




Differential Impact on Ethnicities? 
Bosnia’s educational and political system is premised on the notion of 
representation, which goes as far as to ensure that the country is presided over by three 
ethnic members: one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb. The efficiency, functionality, and 
implementability of ideas are secondary to the notion of representation. As expected, 
ethnic affiliation plays an important role in all spheres of life in Bosnia. Interestingly, 
however, this study finds that while some interviewees (e.g., Interviewee 5C) thought that 
belonging to a particular ethnic group would affect the student-professor relationship, 
others thought that those who are minorities were actually more protected and given 
greater attention by the internationals (Interviewee 4C). Specifically, “since there are a lot 
of Bosniaks [in the geographic area where the research was conducted], then it is easier 
for it [corruption] to be more discreet and invisible” if Bosniaks are involved than would 
have been the case with minority populations (Interviewee 4C). 
In addition, a vast majority of the surveyed sample, 72.7%, did not think ethnic 
division stands as a barrier in resolving the issue of corruption in higher education, 
suggesting that corruption as an overall societal problem can be de-linked from the ethnic 
issue that dominates Bosnia. This finding may also be a reflection of the students’ desire 
for educational corruption to be resolved without complicating it or associating it with the 
notion of ethnicity. To further exemplify, one interviewed participant stated: “Serb, Croat 
… can pay for the exam. There is absolutely no obstruction as far as ethnicity is 
concerned. I am not aware of a case that someone was failed because of their ethnicity” 
(Interviewee 1C).  
Other students are of the view that the reality of ethnic discrimination within the 
country as a whole is indisputable. A study participant illustratively exemplified the 
presence of ethnic tensions by sharing her observations of her classmates’ reactions when 
asked by their professor in which language they studied (i.e., Bosnian, Croatian, or 
  
165
Serbian). She noted that there was a group of students, from the Serb Republic (likely 
Serbs), who raised their hands for each language because people who come from the 
“Serb Republic into [the Federation] are scared because of ethnic tensions [against 
them]” (Interviewee 7C). Similarly, she further shared that “a friend of hers from Banja 
Luka [Serb Republic] who is a Bosniak and whose father was killed during the war was 
constantly harassed, so he slept with a knife while studying.” Another participant brought 
up the often neglected group of Bosnian Roma (Interviewee 3C). The ethnic tensions 
within the country characterizing political relations between Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs 
overshadow the issue of the Romas’ exclusion from the mainstream society and deflect 
from the fact that “Romas are at no faculty” (Interviewee 3C). 
One curious finding that arose and was not anticipated by this research is that there 
is significant – though atypical in the Bosnian milieu – inter-ethnic cooperation between 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a predominantly Bosniak and Croat entity, 
and the Serb Republic, a largely mono-ethnic Serb entity, when it comes to educational 
corruption. Specifically, a number of participants shared that students from the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (mostly Bosniaks and Croats) often travel to the 
Serb Republic (mostly Serbs) to obtain their diplomas, as 
there are more private universities in the Serb Republic, where each village 
has a faculty. Students from here [Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina] go 
and pay 2,000-3,000 KM for each year, which enables them to obtain a 
college degree quickly and keep their [government] jobs. (Interviewee 1C) 
The interviewee here is referring to the individuals already holding government posts and 
wanting to cement and legitimize their positions by obtaining diplomas quickly. 
Ethnicity Base and Expanded Models 
Furthering the analysis, the study embarked on examining whether students who 
are ethnic minorities perceive corruption as more widespread within their faculty relative 
to the ethnic majority. Assuming that ethnic discrimination is present to some degree, I 
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expect to find that the minority students are subjected to some form of corruption by the 
professors of other ethnicities. So, I examined whether the perception of corruption 
(CORRUPTION DEGREE_FINAL or CDF) as present (coded as 1) versus absent (coded 
as 0) is affected by students’ ethnicity (ETHNICITY_FINAL or EF) in the base model, 
and whether – in the expanded model – CDF is affected by students’ ethnicity and other 
variables reflective of a student’s gender, his/her academic performance, and the father’s 
background. To note, variables are often recoded and then relabeled by adding the word 
FINAL to indicate that they were recoded for further application. For instance, 
ETHNICITY is recoded into ETHNICITY_FINAL, where 1 and 0 are codes for Bosniaks 
and non-Bosniaks. Similarly and as earlier explained, CORRUPTION_DEGREE 
_FINAL is CORRUPTION_DEGREE, where 1 and 0 are assigned to corruption being 
present to any degree and absent, respectively. All other missing and inapplicable 
responses were re-coded as missing. The model specifically included student’s year of 
birth (BORN_FINAL or BF), number of years spent studying (YEARS_STUDYING_ 
FINAL or YSF), status of the exam completion (EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL or 
ECF) indicating whether student was completing 1st year, 2nd year, 3rd year, or 4th year 
of her/his studies, and student’s gender (SEX_FINAL or SF). The expanded model also 
included the variables reflecting father’s position at work, as well as a set of dummy 
variables reflecting different household income levels. However, the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) analysis of all independent variables determined that multicollinearity was 
present, as VIF for HOUSEHOLD_INCOME_1500 was greater than 10 (see Table 12, 
p. 167). If VIFs are higher than 10, multicollinearity is presumed to be high (Kutner 
et al., 2004). Consequently, the expanded model was revised by excluding the 






Table 12: VIF Analysis of Independent Variables for Ethnicity-related Models 
* Multicollinearity is present due to VIF being higher than 10. 
 
In addition and as discussed in the research methodology chapter, 
YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL and BORN_FINAL, continuous variables, and 
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL, an ordinal variable that categorized students by the 
academic seniority within their faculties, were tested to determine whether the linearity 
assumption between the CORRUPTION_DEGREE_FINAL’s logit and each of these 
individual variables was violated. The Box-Tidwell Transformation test determined that 
the coefficients for LN_YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL (LN_YSF) and 
LN_EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL (LN_ECF) are insignificant (p-value > α = .05); 
thus, the linearity assumption is not violated. However, the coefficient for 
LN_BORN_FINAL was significant (p-value < α = .05), so the linearity assumption was 
violated and the variable was excluded from the analysis. 
The surveyed sample consists of 762 cases in total, of which 732 students declared 
themselves as Bosniaks and 30 students declared themselves as non-Bosniaks. The binary 
MODEL NAME/ 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
INDEPENDENT                            
VARIABLE    
VIF 


































FATHER_POSITION_INTELLECTUAL     
FATHER_POSITION_EXECUTIVE  
ETHNICITY_FINAL 











logistic regression initially finds that the Base Ethnicity Model is not significant, 
confirming that student’s ethnicity alone does not help in predicting whether corruption is 
present in Bosnia’s higher education (Table 13, p. 169). The Expanded Ethnicity Model, 
which in addition to student’s ethnic affiliation contained dummy variables reflecting 
different positions that students’ fathers held professionally, as well as a number of other 
variables relating to the student’s academic background and gender, examined whether 
students’ ethnic affiliation and other predictors would be helpful in predicting the 
perceived presence of corruption in Bosnia’s higher education. However, the model 
overall proved insignificant in predicting students’ views of educational corruption, 
confirming that students were not seeing the issue of corruption in higher education 
through the ethnic lens as may be the case with a number of other issues in the country. 
This finding may suggest that students perceive educational corruption as 
important to the point that their corruption-related views are not overshadowed and 
influenced by the ethnic tensions that may continue to play a significant role in other 
arenas of their lives. In other words, whether a student belongs to the ethnic majority or 
minority in their faculty is not a factor through which students filter their corruption-
related perceptions. Similarly, the Expanded Ethnicity Model suggests that students’ 
perceptions of corruption are being formed irrespectively of their fathers’ positions at 
work. This finding is contradictory to this study’s expectation that students’ 
socioeconomic background, which is approximated here by the father’s position at work, 
would likely lead to the differentiations of views among students on whether or not 
corruption is present. It is possible that students may have felt compelled to evaluate the 
presence of corruption, irrespective of their socioeconomic background and the degree to 
which they personally may have benefited from corruption. 
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Table 13: Effects of Ethnicity and Other Independent Variables on Perceived Corruption  
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01 
Impact of Corruption: Contest versus Sponsored Mobility 
The key premise of this study is that, in highly corrupt educational settings, 
different sets of rules, behaviors, and mobility mechanisms within the same educational 
system apply to students depending on their social categories. To examine this linkage 
between social mobility and corruption, the study embarks on testing multiple hypotheses 
of this study’s Research Question 2. In the process and in line with the mixed methods 
approach, the findings are organized thematically. 
 
 





   Bosniak=1 





  Worker=1 
  All else=0 
NA 1.147 
FATHER_POSITION_INTELLECTUAL  
  Intellectual =1 
  All else=0 
NA 0.868 
FATHER_POSITION_EXECUTIVE  
  Executive =1 
  All else=0 
NA 0.771 
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL1 
   1st year=1; All else=0 
NA 4.070 
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL1 
   2nd year=1; All else=0 
NA 1.968 
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL1 
   3nd year=1; All else=0 
NA 0.557 
YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL  NA 2.286** 
SEX_FINAL 
   Male=1 
   Female=0 
NA                                                           0.586 
Constant 23.000 3.431 
Chi-square, df 







Hypotheses 1 and 2: Faculty Competence and Upward Mobility 
To explore relationship between competence and upward mobility, the study 
examines Hypothesis 2 (see Table 11, p. 162) of Research Question 2b, which looks into 
whether the probability of faculty promotion, being based on merit or not, can be 
predicted by a number of student-related variables. The expectation here is that the less 
satisfied students are with the teaching and procedural processes, the more likely they are 
to perceive their educational institutions as lacking merit-based mobility. I expect to find 
that the lesser the student satisfaction, the greater the perception of the non-merited 
promotions within their faculties.  
By measuring the level of perceived merited promotion amongst faculty members, 
this study directly answers to the question raised in Hypothesis 1: only 13.7% of the 
surveyed students believe in merited promotion occurring always; 28.5% are of the view 
that it occurs almost always; and 29.0% think that it often happens. Interestingly, 23.2% 
of the surveyed sample believe that the competent rarely graduate first, and only 2% 
think it almost never happens. Lastly, 1.0% see it as never happening, and the rest did not 
provide answers. These findings suggest that about 1 in every 4 surveyed students 
continues to doubt meritocracy as the basis of the social mobility model in higher 
education while, at the same time, a large group sees social mobility as associated with 
competence. Such findings may point to the presence of a dual social mobility system. 
To move to testing Hypothesis 2 and further examine social mobility issues, the 
Base Model assumes that the best way to predict the likelihood of whether students 
perceive faculty promotion as reflective of individual qualifications or not is by looking 
into students’ satisfaction with the procedures at their faculties. In the process, the Base 
Model predicts the effects of PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL (PSF), where 
each of its categories is turned into a dummy variable, on MERITED_PROMOTION_ 
FINAL (MPF) that captures students’ perceptions of whether or not professors are 
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promoted based on their qualifications.10 So, while the PSF-related variables capture 
different levels of student satisfaction with the procedures at their faculties, the MPF 
reflects the students’ perception of the upward mobility mechanisms as manifested 
through the promotion of faculty members (Table 14, pp. 173-174). 
According to Table 14 (pp. 173-174), the Base Model is significant, indicating the 
importance of procedural satisfaction among students in affecting their perception of 
upward mobility mechanisms. This finding suggests that existent procedures within 
Bosnia’s higher education may help the upward mobility of incompetent professors. In 
addition, there exists a significant and inverse correlation between MPF and PSF 
(r = -0.284, at α = .01): as the level of satisfaction with faculty procedures increases (i.e., 
with the categories declining from 5 to lower values, actual satisfaction increases), 
students’ perception of faculty promotions shifts away from not often seeing merit-based 
promotion to often seeing merit-based promotion. In other words, the study finds that 
knowing how students perceive procedural transparency and efficiency within the 
faculties helps with the research’s overall ability to predict the manner in which the 
upward mobility mechanisms operate in higher education.  
Looking into the significance of specific variables and per Table 14 (pp. 173-174), 
PSF1, PSF2, and PSF3 are significant. Significant PSF1 suggests that when students are 
‘very satisfied’ with the procedures at their faculties, the odds of students perceiving 
‘merited promotion as occurring often’ are 5.922 times greater as compared to those 
students who are ‘very dissatisfied.’ For PSF2, the odds ratio of 3.972 means that the 
students who are ‘satisfied’ are 3.972 times more likely, relative to those students who 
are ‘very dissatisfied,’ to perceive promotion within their faculties as being merit-based 
                                                          
10The MERITED_PROMOTION_FINAL is a recoded MERITED_PROMOTION variable where categories 
of 1, 2, and 3 (‘always,’ ‘almost always,’ and ‘often,’ respectively) are recoded into 1 (promotion at least often 
occurring based on merit), while 4, 5, and 6 (‘rarely,’ ‘almost never,’ ‘never’) were recoded into 0 (promotion not often 
occurring based on merit). 
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rather than not. Similarly, PSF3’s odds ratio suggests that students who are ‘neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied’ are 2.091 times more likely to see their faculty members’ 
promotion as merit-based relative to those students who are ‘very dissatisfied.’ These 
findings suggest that in the educational systems where dissatisfaction with the system’s 
procedures is significant, the likelihood of students’ perceiving the merit-based 
mechanisms of mobility in academia as failing is likely to increase. The policy 
implications of such findings are significant in that the elimination of some of the key 
students’ dissatisfactions with the educational system in Bosnia could help in reducing 
the perceptions of corruption. 
The next step in the analysis is inclusion of additional predictors into the Expanded 
Merited Promotion Model to determine whether the predictability of the model could be 
improved. For instance, ECTS_FINAL (ECTSF) is included to determine whether the 
faculty’s ECTS membership would in any way affect students’ perceptions of the level of 
merited promotion in Bosnia’s higher education (see Table 14, pp. 173-174). Similarly, 
YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL (YSF) is added to determine whether the number of years 
studied helps predict whether faculty promotions are perceived as merit-based or not. The 
Expanded Merited Promotion Model also includes TEACHING_SATISFACTION 
_FINAL (TSF) as an interesting predictor that captures the level of student satisfaction 
with the teaching processes. This study theorizes that TSF may impact students’ 
perceptions of merited promotion: as their satisfaction with teaching practices grows, I 
expect students to be more likely to perceive promotions of their faculty members as 
merit-based. Lastly, the predictor of COMPETENT GRADUATE_FINAL (CGF) also 
plays a role in the Expanded Merited Promotion Model under the assumption that 
students’ perceptions of who graduates first are also likely to impact students’ 
perceptions of whether the upward mobility mechanisms amongst faculty members are 
merit-based or not. Additionally, students’ gender (SEX_FINAL) and students’ progress 
in terms of exam completion (EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL) were included. 
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Table 14: Effects of ECTSF, YS, PSF, CGF, TSF, SF and ECF on Merited Promotion 
 
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01 
Variable  Base Model:  
Exp (B) 
Expanded Model:  
Exp (B) 
 ECTS_FINAL (ECTSF) 
       Member=1 







YEARS_STUDYING _FINAL (YSF) NA  0.820 
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL1 (ECF1) 




    
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL2 (ECF2) 
      1st year=1; All else=0 
NA  1.256 
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL3 ((ECF3) 
      1st year=1; All else=0 
NA  1.841 
SEX_FINAL (SF) 
      Male=1 




 PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL1 (PSF1) 
      Very satisfied=1 








      Somewhat satisfied=1 
      All else=0 
3.972**  1.632 
 
PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL3 (PSF3) 
      Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=1 
      All else=0 
2.091**  1.527 
 
PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL4 (PSF4) 
      Somewhat dissatisfied=1 
      All else=0 
0.908  0.652 
COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL1 (CGF1) 
      Always=1 
      All else=0 
COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL2 (CGF2)     
      Almost always=1 
      All else=0 
COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL3 (CGF3) 
      Often=1 
      All else=0 
COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL4 (CGF4) 
      Rarely=1 
      All else=0 
   NA 
 
 
   NA 
 
 
   NA 
 
 




  6.228 
 
 
  6.867 
 
 
  2.087 
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Table 14 (continued) 
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01 
 
To ensure that there are not any multicollinearity issues among the independent 
variables incorporated into the model, the VIF tests were first performed, confirming that 
multicollinearity is not an issue, as VIF values were much lower (see Table 15, p. 174) 
than the suggested cutoff value of 10 (Kutner et al., 2004). 
 
Table 15: VIF Analysis of Independent Variables for Expanded Merited Promotion  
Model 
 
Additionally, as discussed in the research methodology chapter, YSF is a 
continuous variable and as such was tested to determine whether the linearity assumption 
Variable  Base Model: Exp (B) Expanded Model: Exp (B) 
   TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL1 (TSF1) 
       Very satisfied=1 
       All else=0 
  TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL2 (TSF2) 
       Somewhat satisfied=1 
       All else=0 
   TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL3 (TSF3) 
       Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=1 
       All else=0 
 TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL4 (TSF4) 
      Somewhat dissatisfied=1 














  5.410** 
 
 
  3.602** 
 
 
  1.990 
Constant 1.245    0.276 
Chi-square, df 
% of Cases Correctly Predicted 















COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL                  
TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL  
SEX_FINAL 










between the MPF’s logit and YSF is violated. The Box-Tidwell Transformation test was 
performed within the Expanded Merited Promotion Model, and it determined that the 
coefficient for LN_YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL (LN_YSF) is insignificant (p-value > 
α = .05); thus, the linearity assumption is not violated. Similarly, the Box-Tidwell 
Transformation test was performed to determine whether the linearity assumption holds 
between the MERITTED_PROMOTION_FINAL’s logit and EXAMS_COMPLETED_ 
FINAL, an ordinal variable. The Box-Tidwell Transformation test confirmed that the 
coefficient for LN_EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL is insignificant (p-value > α = .05); 
thus, the linearity assumption is not violated. Consequently, both 
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL and YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL were included into 
Expanded Merited Promotion Model. Most importantly, this research finds that the 
Expanded Merited Promotion Model is statistically significant in predicting the presence 
of merit-based promotion among professors and assistants (see Table 14, pp. 173-174).  
As to the individually significant predictors, TEACHING_SATISFACTION_ 
FINAL(3) (TSF3) is significant, and the odds of students perceiving merited promotion 
as occurring rather than not are 3.602 times higher for respondents who are ‘neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied’ with the teaching practices than those of the students who are 
‘very dissatisfied’(see Table 14, pp. 173-174). As the level of student satisfaction with 
teaching practices increases, this study finds the odds of students perceiving upward 
mobility amongst their faculty members as merit- rather than sponsorship-based increase 
significantly as well. For the independent predictor of TEACHING_SATISFACTION_ 
FINAL(2) or TSF2, the odds of ‘merited promotion occurring often’ relative to ‘merited 
promotion not occurring often’ are 5.410 times higher when students are ‘satisfied’ than 
when they are ‘very dissatisfied’ (see Table 14, pp. 173-174). These odds of seeing 
merited promotion amongst faculty members occurring continue to increase even more so 
as the students’ level of satisfaction increases: TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL1 
(TSF1) shows that the odds of students’ perception of faculty promotion as being 
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competence-based rather than achieved through connections for those students who are 
‘very satisfied’ are an impressive 24.407 times the odds of those students who are ‘very 
dissatisfied’ with the faculty’s teaching practices (see Table 14, p. 173-174). These 
findings are in line with the study’s expectation that, with the increased overall 
satisfaction amongst students as to the teaching processes within their universities, the 
students’ perceptions of their professors do become increasingly positive and have a 
potential of reigniting students’ belief that upward mobility amongst their faculty 
members is based on merit rather than faculties’ social standing and connections to 
political elites. This analysis also finds that number of years students studied, their 
satisfaction with faculty procedures, their gender, and how far they have advanced in 
terms of exams they are completing are not significant factors for whether or not they 
perceive promotion as merit based.  
Also, COMPETENT_GRADUATE(1) (CG1) is a significant predictor and 
indicates that the odds of students perceiving merited promotion as often occurring are 
43.831 times higher than odds of merited promotion not occurring often when students 
believe that the competent ‘always’ graduate first relative to the reference category of 
competent students ‘never’ graduating first. This indicates that with the belief in students’ 
competence as a deciding factor in determining graduation timing comes students’ 
perception of faculty-related promotions as merit-based. For ECTS_FINAL(1) (ECTS1), 
the odds of ‘merited promotion occurring often’ as compared to ‘merited promotion not 
occurring often’ are increased by a factor of 0.697 when the respondent believes that the 
system is ECTS-based compared to not knowing at all whether or not the program is 
ECTS-based. In sum, these findings collectively suggest that students’ perceptions of the 
state of their faculties – be it in the form of their views about the teaching practices, 
graduating students’ competence, or faculty’s espousal of the Bologna-instigated ECTS 
framework – are valuable predictors of the type of upward-mobility mechanisms 
espoused by their faculties. While evaluating students’ perceptions has its limits in terms 
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of my inability as the researcher to evaluate what is perceived to be occurring against 
what is actually occurring, the consistency of the trends observed pointing to students’ 
dissatisfactions within the system is telling of the possible direction in which educational 
reforms should take place to deflate students’ negative perceptions of Bosnia’s higher 
education. The lesser perception of unmerited forms of upward mobility within Bosnia’s 
higher education would arguably be indicative of the improved state of Bosnia’s higher 
education. 
Hypothesis 3: Effect of Sociopolitical Involvement on Merited Promotion 
I test the impact of students’ sociopolitical involvement on subjects’ perceptions 
of the upward mobility mechanisms within their faculties, and I do so under the 
assumption that students’ sociopolitical involvement would play a significant role in 
improving the model’s predictability of the subjects’ views on merited promotion. This 
sub-section specifically focuses on addressing Hypothesis 3 of Research Question 2b 
(Table 11, p. 162). 
In the Base Sociopolitical Involvement Model, MERITED_PROMOTION_ 
FINAL (MPF) as a dependent variable is regressed on SOCIOPOLITICAL_ 
INVOLVEMENT_FINAL (SPIF), as this predictor embodies the level of a student’s and 
his/her family’s involvement in sociopolitical activities in the community. The Base 
Sociopolitical Model is overall significant, but the only predictor of significance is 
SOCIOPOLITICAL_ INVOLVEMENT_FINAL(4) (SPIF4) (see Table 17, pp. 180-181). 
The odds of ‘merited promotion occurring often’ are 0.522 times the odds of ‘merited 
promotion not occurring often’ when the respondent is ‘somewhat uninvolved’ compared 
to being ‘uninvolved.’ Interestingly, this finding suggests that even a slight change in 
moving towards sociopolitical engagement may improve the odds of students perceiving 
faculty promotions as merit- rather than sponsorship-based. 
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For the Expanded Model, I examine for any multicollinearity issues between two 
or more predictors. The VIF tests were conducted and confirmed that no multicollinearity 
is present (see Table 17, pp. 180-181). To account for other variables potentially pertinent 
in predicting whether the faculty promotion is merited or not, this study expands the base 
model by adding the following variables: EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL, 
YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL, BORN_FINAL, COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL, 
TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL, ECTS_FINAL, SEX_FINAL, 
PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL, and STUDENT_TYPE_FINAL.11 The new 
predictors reflect students’ past and present academic performance, their satisfaction with 
teaching and procedures at their faculties, views of the Bologna Process within their 
faculties, their gender and age. 
 
 
Table 16: VIF Analysis for Expanded Sociopolitical Involvement Model 
 
MODEL NAME/ 



























                                                          
11
 Box-Tidwell Transformation Tests were conducted for YSF and BF as continuous variables and 
ECF and STF as ordinal variables to ensure that the linearity assumption between the logit of the 
dependent, MPF, and each of the relevant predictors is not violated. The Box-Tidwell Transformation Test 




In the Expanded Sociopolitical Involvement Model, there are several statistically 
significant predictors, including TSF1, TSF2, TSF3, CGF1, and ECTSF (Table 17, 
pp. 180-181). To begin with the interpretation of TSF1, the odds of ‘merited promotion 
occurring often’ are 22.255 greater than the odds of ‘merited promotion not occurring 
often’ if a study participant is ‘very satisfied’ relative to being ‘very dissatisfied.’ 
Similarly, TSF2 has a 4.870 odds ratio, which tells us that the odds of ‘merited promotion 
occurring often’ are 4.870 times greater than ‘merited promotion not occurring often’ for 
those students who are ‘somewhat satisfied’ relative to those who are ‘very dissatisfied.’ 
To note, the higher the teaching satisfaction, the greater the odds of observing the merited 
promotion model amongst the faculty members. Further, TSF3 is also statistically 
significant, with an odds ratio of 3.263, which tells us how much greater are the odds of 
seeing ‘merited promotion occurring often’ over ‘merited promotion not occurring often’ 
among those surveyed students who are ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’ with teaching 
processes relative to those who are ‘very dissatisfied.’ 
Another variable that is statistically significant is CGF1; its odds ratio shows that 
the odds of perceiving ‘merited promotion occurring often’ relative to ‘merited 
promotion not occurring often’ are 41.738 times greater for those who believe that the 
competent graduate ‘always’ relative to those who believe that the competent ‘never’ 
graduate first. Again, while sociopolitical involvement did not improve the overall 
prediction of the expanded model, the analysis confirmed that the increased experience 
within the faculty, positive views regarding teaching practices, and belief that those who 
graduate first are the most competent students significantly improve the likelihood of 
students’ seeing their faculty members’ promotions as based on achievement rather than 
political affiliations and sponsorship. 
  
180
Table 17: Effects of Independent Variables (ECTSF, PSF, TSF, SPIF, CGF, YSF, SF, 
BF, STF and ECF) on Merited Promotion 




Variable  Base Model:  
Exp (B) 
Expanded Model:  
Exp (B) 
ECTS_FINAL (ECTSF)  
       Member=1 
       All else=0 
            NA 
 
 
        1.794** 
 
PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL1 (PSF1) 
       Very satisfied=1 
       All else=0 
PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL2 (PSF2) 
       Somewhat satisfied=1 
       All else=0 
PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL3 (PSF3) 
       Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=1 
       All else=0 
PROCEDURE_SATISFACTION_FINAL4 (PSF4) 
       Somewhat dissatisfied=1 
       All else=0  
            NA 
 
 
            NA 
 
 
            NA 
 
 
            NA 
 
 
        2.052 
 
 
        1.692 
 
 
        1.555 
 
 
        0.704 
TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL1 (TSF1) 
       Very satisfied=1 
       All else=0 
TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL2 (TSF2) 
       Somewhat satisfied=1 
       All else=0 
TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL3 (TSF3) 
       Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied=1 
       All else=0 
TEACHING_SATISFACTION_FINAL4 (TSF4) 
       Somewhat dissatisfied=1 
       All else=0 
            NA 
 
            NA 
 
            NA 
 
 
            NA 
       22.255** 
 
 
        4.870** 
 
 
        3.263** 
 
 
        1. 824  
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL1 (ECF1) 
      1st year=1; All else=0    
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL2 (ECF2) 
      2nd year=1; All else=0 
EXAMS_COMPLETED_FINAL3 (ECF3) 
      3rd year=1; All else=0 
            NA          2.532 
         
         
         1.251 
         
         1.852 
SEX_FINAL (SF) 
      Male=1 
      Female=0 
            NA          1.209 
BORN_FINAL (BF) 
            NA          1.103 
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Table 17 (continued) 











 SOCIOPOLITICAL_INVOLVEMENT_FINAL1 (SPIF1) 
       Highly involved=1 
       All else=0 
 SOCIOPOLITICAL_INVOLVEMENT_FINAL2 (SPIF2) 
       Somewhat involved=1 
       All else=0 
 SOCIOPOLITICAL_INVOLVEMENT_FINAL3 (SPIF3) 
       Neither involved nor uninvolved=1 
       All else=0 
 SOCIOPOLITICAL_INVOLVEMENT_FINAL4 (SPIF4) 
       Somewhat involved=1 





















 COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL1 (CGF1) 
     Always=1 
     All else=0 
 COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL2 (CGF2) 
    Almost always=1 
    All else=0 
 COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL3 (CGF3) 
    Often=1 
    All else=0 
 COMPETENT_GRADUATE_FINAL4 (CGF4) 
    Rarely=1 


















 1.974  
 YEARS_STUDYING_FINAL (YSF) NA   0.928 
 STUDENT_TYPE_FINAL1 (STF1) 
    Excellent (mostly As) 
    All else=0 
 STUDENT_TYPE_FINAL2 (STF2) 
    Very good (mostly Bs) 
    All else=0 
 STUDENT_TYPE_FINAL3 (STF3) 
    Good (mostly Cs) 








  6.363 
 
 
  4.870 
 
 
  6.056 
 
 Constant 2.622   0.003 
Chi-square, df 
% of Cases Correctly Predicted 
9.496*, 4  
73.0% 




Hypothesis 4: Student Competence and Upward Mobility 
One of the key questions that emerges from this research is whether the 
mechanisms of social mobility are affected by the presence of educational corruption in 
Bosnia. As earlier theorized in Hypothesis 4 of Research Question 2b (see Table 11, 
p. 162), this study sees vertical mobility mechanisms as dysfunctional within higher 
education affecting the composition of the graduating class, so that the best students are 
not always the ones to graduate first. Based on the surveyed population, this analysis 
confirms that only 8.4% of the surveyed participants believe that the most competent 
students are “always” the first to graduate (see Figure 13 below). In other words, less 
than 1 in 10 surveyed students is of the view that the most competent students are always 
first to graduate, which is in line with the study’s argument that the social mobility 
mechanisms have, at least in part, shifted toward the sponsored-mobility model. In fact, 
one of the interviewed students directly responded to a question on “who are those that 
will first graduate in your generation” by saying: “Boys from SDA [Party of 
 

































Frequency Table for Competent Graduate Variable
other almost never rarely often almost alw ays alw ays
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Democratic Action] and then those who are from SDP [Social Democratic Party] and 
then those holding ... positions in the government” (Interviewee 4C). To specify further, 
if not more relevant, corruption is seen as at least as relevant a factor in determining 
one’s potency for upward mobility as is academic success (Interviewee 3C). 
At the same time, however, the number of those surveyed students who believe that 
the most competent students “almost always” graduate first is significantly larger and 
amounts to 31.3% of the surveyed students (see Figure 13, p. 182). This large jump may 
be explained in part by the fact that the country’s educational system simultaneously 
espouses two modes of social mobility. As this study earlier theorized, the sponsored-
mobility and merit-based social mobility models are not mutually exclusive. To the 
contrary and in the case of Bosnia, both mobility mechanisms may be present but are 
applicable to two different populations within Bosnia’s universities: there are the elites, 
who leverage their connections to graduate, prompting only 8.4% of students to share the 
view that the most competent are “always” first to graduate. There are also the poor, who  
can only experience upward mobility thanks to their hard work, prompting close to a 
third of the surveyed population to suggest that the most competent “almost always” 
graduate first. About 37.6% of the surveyed students stated the most competent students 
are “often” first to graduate, while 17.8% felt this occurs rarely. Lastly, 1.2% of the 
surveyed participants felt that the most competent students “almost never” graduate first, 
while “other” answers represented 3.8% of the surveyed students (see Figure 13, p. 182). 
There are also specific barriers in the selection process for upward mobility that 
can be better understood through the data collected via interviews. The repetitive and 
often unfounded failings are perceived by students as student filter: “there has to be one 
or two courses that are so hard to filter through the student population and cut the number 
of the students. That takes away several years of life for an individual student” 
(Interviewee 4C). One of the study participants was failed 11 times on the same exam, 
eventually prompting her to transfer to another faculty (Interviewee 7C). In the 
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participant’s initial faculty, the student reached a point where she realized that, regardless 
of the level of demonstrated knowledge, she would never pass (Interviewee 7C). She 
passed the same exam at her new faculty. 
Given the high unemployment in post-war Bosnia, many high-school graduates 
enroll in college without seriously intending to complete their studies, often resulting in a 
greater student population initially and a significant decrease later on (Interviewee 5C). 
While some of the massive entry into higher education can be understood, given the 
particulars of the country’s environment, of interest here is the trend of repeatedly failing 
students, even when they demonstrate knowledge that warrants a passing grade. By 
failing deserving students, only the most persistent ones join the well-connected 
individuals in moving up through the system. In one participant’s own words: “You have 
to work as hard as a horse and take M [coded name for the course] 100 times to pass … 
while a student who did not know basics passed after the first try” (Interviewee 2C). So, 
Bosnia’s graduating classes likely consist of the students that have taken vastly different 
paths to arrive at their ultimate goal of graduating: this dual system is precisely what is at 
the heart of students’ disenchantment with the system that has deviated from the basic 
merit-based mobility model and has allowed the sponsorship mobility mechanism to 
propel the connected elites. As the interview participants noted, there are two very 
different, though not mutually exclusive, groups of individuals: first, those who graduate 
only by working hard and, second, those who are not in a rush and can afford to study 
(Interviewee 1C, Interviewee 2C, Interviewee 3C). Such findings suggest that one’s 
social positioning is indispensable in helping determine who gets selected and moves 
upward within the system. 
The interviewed students further suggest that those who study the longest are “the 
poor who have no connections and those who are disliked [emphasis added] by the 
professors” (Interviewee 3C). In this process – and largely responsible for the length of 
some students’ studies – are professors who feel “more free ... to fail” those who do not 
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have connections and are not members of political parties (Interviewee 4C). 
Consequently, students who complete their studies on time are “in small percentages 
[emphasis added] the most capable students and mostly the corrupt ones” (Interview 1C), 
creating graduating classes that fuse the two extremes: the hardest workers who have no 
political affiliations and connections and those who rely on their political circles to 
ensure continuation of the elite’s political lineage and to legitimize the position of power 
and authority often already reserved for the well-connected (Interviewee 4C). 
Next, to ensure the upward mobility of their affiliates, particularly relevant is the 
process involving political parties pressuring members of academia to pass “party 
members” (Interviewee 4C). State institutions have failed in containing and minimizing 
corruption, “perhaps because they are significantly involved in all of that” (Interviewee 
5C). Understanding that familial and political relations play an important role in 
constructing the political and educational scenes in Bosnia, an economically 
disadvantaged student stated: 
No, academic work is not the determining factor. There are other factors…. 
You don’t have to be always prepared as long as you work hard in other 
areas [emphasis added], such as being involved with other organizations. It 
is then that the professors take you seriously [emphasis added].... Since I got 
involved, both professors and the political elite look at me differently 
[emphasis added]. (Interviewee 1C) 
Furthermore, the participant went on to rightly observe: 
People here do not understand democracy and they are afraid of the political 
elites who are working to prevent [change]. Here, our people are still 
frightened by the war, and whoever has a job sees having a job as a family 
treasure ... simply people have accepted the illogical situation. We are in a 
collective fear. Everyone complains and talks about bad situation and we all 
are aware of it, but no one dares to publicly speak up because fear lives in 
our people. (Interviewee 1C) 
While the marriage of upward mobility and corruption in education clearly exists, 
it was also repeatedly brought up in the post-graduation context, where moving upwards 
in unmerited ways largely continues (Interviewee B3). Students who work hard to obtain 
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their diplomas and lack connections are often firsthand witnesses to the privileges given 
to the politically involved and interconnected classmates during and beyond their studies. 
One of the study participants, who graduated from the public higher education institution 
in Bosnia, explicitly confirmed that upward mobility is achieved through political 
influence rather than intellectual capability and academic effort: 
Once I was taking an oral exam together with a political figure [and two 
other students]. Our professor asked the political figure about politics and, 
others about the exam material.... I also had a classmate who came to each 
exam with his father. Now he has only one more exam to get a graduate 
degree in our field. His father obtained higher education diploma in the same 
manner. That man [the father] works in a ... government-based institution, 
which is why he got his diploma in the first place. For instance, we would 
take the exam and the father would leave with the professor for a coffee 
break. (Interviewee 3C) 
A fact emerges from the findings of this study, which is: academic effort is not crucial in 
determining whether and when one will graduate, but “knowing certain people 
personally” is of direct relevance (Interview 4C). 
While not the primary concern of this research, it should be noted that it is difficult 
to decipher the good quality private higher education institutions from the ghost 
universities due to the lacking supervision, accreditation, standards, and regulation. 
Private faculties, whether internationally or locally funded, often lack sufficient levels of 
regulation and supervision. Consequently, it is difficult to ensure a standardized level of 
educational quality across all private institutions and, even more so, across all universities 
in Bosnia. However, one of the most prominent foreign universities in Bosnia that has 
worked toward providing better education to Bosnian students and has harmonized its 
processes with Bologna requirements is American University, which was established in 
2005 in partnership with the State University of New York (SUNY) (American 
University, 2011). It presently operates in four localities: Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar, 
and Tuzla (American University, 2011). 
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In addition, the International University of Sarajevo was established in 2004 and is 
run by the representatives of the Turkish and Bosnian business communities 
(International University of Sarajevo, 2011). Similarly, the International Burch 
University, established in 2008, is a part of the private Turkish educational institutions 
group that consists of primary, secondary, and higher education institutions throughout 
Bosnia (Today’s Zaman, 2011). What is interesting to note is that these reputable foreign 
universities in Bosnia are also known for having high numbers of foreign students; for 
instance, the International Burch University has 50% foreign students (Today’s Zaman, 
2011). Esmir Ganic, from the American University in Bosnia, noted that the greatest 
number of foreign students in Bosnia comes from Turkey (Al Jazeera, 2011). 
While the establishment of these few reputable higher education institutions 
constitutes a positive development for Bosnia’s higher education, there have also been a 
number of private institutions that have taken advantage of the unregulated and 
unsynchronized higher education space in Bosnia. According to the Chair of the Rectors 
Conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mitar Novakovic, the state of Bosnia’s higher 
education is further complicated by private universities, “whose number is impossible to 
determine because of the licenses that they obtain without any criteria” (Slobodna 
Evropa, 2011). For instance, after the Center for Investigative Journalism published an 
article about the Century University – which, in the past, had described itself as an 
American university in Bosnia – questioning the validity of the Century University 
diplomas in the US and Bosnia, the named university closed its Sarajevo office, and the 
phone of its representative to Bosnia was disconnected (Center for Investigative 
Journalism, 2008). Furthermore, Century University did not have the permit of the 
Ministry of Education of the Sarajevo Canton where it operated, nor was the Assistant to 
the Minister of Education for the Sarajevo Canton, Almir Masala, familiar with this 
particular institution (Center for Investigative Journalism, 2008). Furthermore, Century 
University is not one of the US-accredited higher education institutions, even though it 
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acted as the US-based educational institution and priced a college diploma at about 
US 4,600 dollars (Center for Investigative Journalism, 2008). Though this behavior is not 
the case with all foreign or private universities in Bosnia, participants in this research 
pointed out that there are private faculties serving  those individuals who are “already 
employed in government [and] who are, by law, required to have certain qualifications 
that they do not have. They quickly finish and obtain their degrees at such [private] 
institutions” (Interviewee 1C). With few notable exceptions, the private higher education 
institutions are frequently perceived as the locations where many government employees 
purchase college diplomas. This enables those in need of diplomas to officiate and 
legitimize their positions, often within government-run institutions. 
In discussing private higher education institutions and their relative standing and 
role as compared to public institutions, the impact of these institutions in affecting 
upward mobility in the post-war period has also been seen as significant. Private 
faculties, with the lack of regulation and tradition in the previously communist regime, 
are unlike private institutions in Western countries. As often pointed out, they “are places 
for people already employed in governmental institutions who are, by law, required to 
have certain qualifications that they do not have. They quickly finish and obtain their 
degrees at such [private] institutions” (Interviewee 1C). Thus, the private higher 
education institutions are widely perceived as the locations for the purchase of diplomas 
by government employees who work in ministries or run government institutions and 
whose positions require sound qualifications and college diplomas. With few exceptions, 
private higher education institutions are usually turned to for obtaining diplomas in a 
matter of weeks or months so that one’s existing position of power and authority or 
promotion within the government structure could be officiated and legitimized. 
Interestingly, while private and unregulated institutions of higher education serve 
as diploma mills for those already employed, those who lack the connections and security 
of government jobs would likely not revert to buying diplomas because of public 
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awareness about the local diploma mills, whose degrees – in the absence of social 
connections – would only increase one’s un-employability in the job market (Interviewee 
1C; Interviewee 5C). In other words, if one is strongly connected to the existing circles of 
power, then it does not matter where they obtained their diplomas, as their career path 
and mobility will often be ensured (Interviewee 5C). However, if the poor and socially 
marginalized wish to enter colleges and graduate from them, their employability would 
be nullified by attending most of the private schools, assuming they would be able to 
afford them in the first place. Therefore, the wealthy and connected can study either at 
private faculties, where financial backing of the student can expedite completion of the 
desired course of study, or they can opt to attend public institutions where they can 
leverage their relationships and again finish with significantly fewer obstacles and 
frustrations than the rest of the student population in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To sum 
up, public institutions are where professors and faculties work for the elite “pro bono. For 
them they work pro-bono” (Interviewee 3C). 
In sum, these findings suggest that Bosnia has an educational system with two 
parallel universes espousing different social mobility mechanisms. One’s individual 
wealth and social status play a prominent role in the degree completion process, as there 
are those students who are “mom and dad’s sons” and have the “privilege of passing 
irrespective of our [emphasis added] knowledge relative to them [emphasis added]” 
(Interviewee 14C). This study confirms the existence of dual social mobility models as 
devised by Turner (1960): those in Bosnia’s higher education who greatly leverage their 
societal prominence to advance academically rely on Turner’s sponsorship mobility 
model, while another group within the student population continues to rely on contest-
based mobility and hard work as means to academic success. 
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Impact of Corruption: Horizontal Mobility 
Following the thorough review of the findings relating to the upward mobility 
mechanisms, this study moves onto testing the Hypothesis 5 of Research Question 2b 
(see Table 11, p. 162). This particular claim theorizes that students within Bosnia’s 
educational system do not transfer from one faculty to another because of corruption. The 
study confirms this claim and finds that students, even though they may view their 
faculties as corrupt, still opt to stay at their schools because corruption is present at other 
faculties as well. Based on the survey data, students chose corruption as the key reason 
for not transferring: specifically, 18.5% of the surveyed respondents do not wish to 
transfer because other schools are corrupt as well (see Figure 14 below). 
The second most frequently cited individual cause of not-transferring is students’ 
view that the process of transferring is “too complex”: 16.6% of students thought it was 
the complexity of the administrative processes that precluded them from transferring (see 
Figure 14 below). Third in line is the cost of transferring: 13.6% of students viewed the 
transfer process as too expensive, while 3.3% were discouraged by the paperwork 
involved (see Figure 14 below). Lastly, almost half of the surveyed respondents, or 
45.6%, said that two or more of the above listed factors jointly affected their decision not 
to transfer (see Figure 14 below). 
 

































paperwork 2 or more
answers
missing
Reasons for not  Transfering
too complex too expensive other schools corrupt paperwork 2 or more answers missing
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I also evaluated the ease with which mobility occurs horizontally and within the 
national framework. Students answered the question on how easy it is to transfer 
(TRANSFER_MOBILITY) within the higher education system. The study finds that 
almost half of the surveyed students felt it was ‘neither difficult nor easy’ to transfer (332 
students or 43.3%) (see Figure 15, below). However, 21.8 % of the surveyed sample was 
of the view that it is ‘difficult’ to transfer, while 14.0 % thought that it is ‘easy’ to 
transfer (see Figure 15, below). Of the total sample, 8.1 % believe that it is ‘very 
difficult’ to transfer; to the contrary, 10.1% of the sample view the transfer process as 
‘very easy’ (see Figure 15, below). In reconciling the finding that a substantial portion of 
the sample views transfer as somewhat easy while others view it as difficult to a certain 
degree, it may be that those students who have the financial means to pay for private 
education find it relatively easy to navigate the administrative procedures and exit public 
universities so that they can enter even less regulated private institutions, while those 
with lesser financial backing find the transfer process much more complex, expensive, 
and harder to navigate. 
 




























Diff iculty of Transferring
very easy easy neither diff icult nor easy diff icult very diff icult missing
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In closing, Chapter VI largely examined corruption’s impact through the vehicle of 
social mobility, validating the presence and relevance of Turner’s (1960) models of social 
mobility in Bosnia’s educational setting, as well as pointing to the limitations of 
horizontal mobility partly stemming from the high transaction costs and presence of 
corruption throughout much of higher education in Bosnia. Here, I proceed with 
Chapter VII, engaging in discussion on the coping mechanisms adopted by students in 





COPING MECHANISMS: VOICE, EXIT, AND LOYALTY 
Bosnian youth’s compliance and tolerance has allowed for the uninterrupted 
continuation of corruption in higher education. When and if professors behave 
inappropriately, students tolerate and accept it, only providing further reassurance that the 
immoral behavior can remain inconsequential. Understanding the coping mechanisms 
that Bosnian students have adopted over the years is the focus of Chapter VII, which is 
divided into three distinct sub-sections. The first sub-section reviews the forms of 
corruption coping practices students have adopted, aiming at understanding how the 
prevalence of educational corruption has impacted students’ coping abilities (see 
Table 18, p. 194). This sub-section addresses Question 3a and hypothesizes that students 
have adopted a variety of ways in which to cope with corruption.  
The study then transitions into a discussion on the extent to which corruption has 
become a pertinent factor as students decide whether or not to exit their faculties (see 
Table 18, p. 194). While working toward answering Research Questions 3a and 3b, this 
sub-section subtly incorporates Hirschman’s (1970) interpretative framework and its 
expanded notions of exit, voice, and loyalty as contextualized into the Bosnian setting.  
With its third and last sub-section on EU-nionization’s effect on corruption, 
Chapter VII brings the study’s findings discussion to an end by reviewing any and all 
findings relating the Bologna process and how its ECTS system has affected students’ 
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perception of corruption in Bosnia’s higher education (see Table 18 below). In doing so, 
this last sub-section of Chapter VII directly answers Research Question 3c.  
 
Table 18: Chapter VII - Organization by Sections and Sub-Sections 
 
Different Forms of Coping Mechanisms 
There exists an indisputable tolerance toward corruption in Bosnia’s higher 
education, and this tolerance is seeded in the students’ fear of their faculty’s control over 
their futures. One of the study participants articulated: “Most of the complaints [on 
corruption] were never resolved within the university senate, court or the public. Some 
processes were started but were never resolved. I do not know a situation where a 
professor was left without a job because of corruption” (Interviewee 5C). Consequently 
and as this research has shown, 58.5% of the surveyed sample copes with corruption by 
“keeping up with the required work” (see Figure 16, p. 195). 
 
 
SECTION TITLE – 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 HYPOTHESIS             RELEVANT VARIABLES 
          
Different Forms of Coping 
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The second most frequent coping mechanism was “talking with family and 
friends,” which was chosen by nearly half, or 44.8%, of the surveyed students. As 
interviewees had repeatedly stated, it is the “persistent” (Interviewee 3C) ones rather than 
those who are politically vocal about corruption that ultimately graduate. Understanding 
this behavior within the earlier introduced and then expanded Hirschman’s (1970) voice 
framework, the study proves that Bosnian students largely exercise their internal or low 
voice. In doing so, Bosnian youth is ineffective in substantively changing their corrupt 
circumstances. Though Bosnian students’ low voice helps students release their 
frustrations with corruption as they converse with their family members and friends, 
more importantly and in its present form, their low voice fails to serve as the corrective 
and politically capable tool Hirschman (1970) envisioned it to be. A study participant 
confirmed that stories of educational corruption are often told “when we [friends] sit 
down for coffee and then start talking about who bought what [exam]” (Interviewee 7C). 
Another study participant added, “We have no one to complain to as all is connected 
among the personnel at the faculty. Doing so could cost you a [lost] year or the entire 
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Responding to a question about whether a student had a friend who had 
complained about corruption and how satisfied or not the friend was about the process, 
out of 220 students (28.7% of the sample), 129 students or 58.6% of the sub-sample said 
their friend was ‘very dissatisfied’ (see Figure 17 below). While 14.5% stated their friend 
was ‘somewhat dissatisfied’ and 17.3% were ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied,’ only 
1.2% of the entire surveyed sample or 4.1 % of the sub-sample that answered this 
question stated that their friends were ‘very satisfied’ with the manner in which the 
complaint was processed (see Figure 17 below). Similarly, 12 students or 1.6% of the 
entire sample said that the level of satisfaction would best be depicted by ‘somewhat 
satisfied’ (see Figure 17 below). 
 











This hesitance with disclosing one’s grievances is associated with a fear of 
repercussions, since corruption has infiltrated the country’s educational system. To 
further elaborate, only 9.6% of the surveyed students (see Figure 16, p. 195) would 
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to an official inquiry into the student’s complaint, it also increases potential for students’ 
exposure to further abuse and marginalization. Consequently, fearing repercussions 
following their complaint, Bosnians generally opt for the low voice. As one of the 
participants put it: “Students are talking but not loudly [emphasis added]. No one is 
courageous to speak up publicly” (Interviewee 1C).  
Interestingly, 23.8% of the surveyed participants were unwilling to completely 
ignore corruption and chose to cope by ‘looking for connections or giving bribes to pass’ 
(see Figure 16, p. 195). To re-phrase, instead of fighting against it, approximately every 
5th student in Bosnia’s public higher education seeks ways to find connections or bribe 
professors (Figure 16, p. 195). This process ultimately leads to a fundamental change in 
the manner in which students understand and pursue academic and, arguably, 
professional achievement. Even the student union, an organization formed to represent 
and protect the interests of students, rarely uses its voice effectively; instead, students 
look “after themselves without having a broader perspective” (Interviewee 3C). When the 
student union acts, “it is usually for someone’s hidden agenda to be achieved through the 
union” (Interviewee 3C). 
Corruption and Exit 
The fear of authority has impaired Bosnia’s student body from exercising its 
potentially reformative and political power. Most students have come to terms with the 
conditions in which they operate. As earlier noted, 18.5% of the surveyed respondents do 
not wish to transfer because they see other schools as corrupt as well (see Figure 14, 
p. 191). Therefore, the broad presence of corruption within higher education in Bosnia is 
an important consideration as students decide whether or not to exit their faculties. This 
finding confirms the validity of the earlier hypothesized claim that corruption is a salient 
factor in deciding whether to exit the existing institution or not. To re-validate the finding 
(Figure 14, p. 191) of the surveyed students who have thought or are thinking of 
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transferring at some point in their college career, 35.7% view other schools as “equally 
non-transparent,” while 31.9% think that the transfer process is “too complicated” and 
are, therefore, not transferring. 
Despite this evident dissatisfaction with corruption and corruption-related 
behaviors, very few students are willing to leave the system because of corruption. The 
rationale for this decision, however, does not rest with students’ conviction that they are 
at a transparent institution but rather relies on the students’ awareness that other faculties 
are equally corrupt and the costs of transferring to another faculty clearly outweigh the 
benefits of the same. Therefore, widespread corruption is a relevant factor that deters 
students from transferring nationally and makes students more accepting of the 
corruption at their existing faculties. When asked if they would leave their faculty due to 
corruption, 59.1% of surveyed sample or 453 students replied with “No way,” while 
29.2% or 224 said they would leave “partly” due to corruption (see Figure 18, p. 199). In 
line with this study’s expectations, only 3.4% and 4.3% of the surveyed sampled would 
consider leaving their faculties “mostly because of corruption” and “only because of 
corruption,” respectively (see Figure 18, p. 199). 
Going through Bosnia’s higher education, students have built a certain level of 
ignorance and resilience concerning their repetitive exposures to educational corruption. 
While one would expect that those in disagreement with the ongoing immoral behavior 
within their faculties would look for alternatives, the students often stay put. Though it 
may seem counterintuitive, one of the study participants classified staying at the corrupt 
faculty as a form of resistance to the ongoing corruption (Interviewee 1C). Departing 
from the faculty would be a preferred reaction for those who wish to eliminate 
competition from the capable and hard-working students: “The only way to fight against 
the uneducated is to educate oneself” (Interviewee 1C). 
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With the lack of transfer alternatives and students’ low voice, there exists a general 
tendency to endorse the status quo: a participant underlined that “[corruption] does not 
affect motivation … all students are aware of it but stubbornly choose not to pay attention 
to it” (Interviewee 1C). Looking through Hirschman’s (1970) modified lens, students, in 
effect, remain loyal to the system. For instance, even though 26.2% of the surveyed 
students believe that they fail an exam despite demonstrating sufficient knowledge, only 
8.5% (Figure 16, p. 195) think of leaving their faculty. While remaining within their 
universities, in Hirschman’s jargon, signals loyalty, this behavior is more likely to point 
to the existence of what I had previously labeled as mental exit. When students mentally 
exit, they physically remain in their faculties despite their dissatisfaction with the issues 
at hand. In the process and within the context of educational corruption, such findings 
show that students have gradually accepted the shift away from merit-based and toward 
sponsorship-based mobility. 
In fact and as earlier noted (see Figure 16, p. 195), 23.8% of the surveyed students 
seek ways to become part of the corrupt circle rather than to resist corruption and pursue 
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system, while appearing loyal to a particular faculty, students do not remain within their 
faculties because of their loyalty or their belief that occasional lapses can happen and be 
rectified at any institution. Instead, it is the students’ awareness of the systemic 
corruption and their realization that the power of their voice is negligible and unlikely to 
produce a fundamental change that lead them to tolerance or endorsement of the status 
quo. By now, educational corruption has largely been accepted as a norm in Bosnia’s 
cultural mind, and 38.5% of the surveyed sample believe that dealing with corruption at 
their faculty is ‘neither difficult nor easy’ (see Figure 19, p. 201). 
In December of 2011, findings of the research on educational corruption conducted 
by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in the Serb Republic similarly confirmed 
that students are unwilling to react to cases of corruption, if and when they witness them 
(Srna, 2011). Specifically, research by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights was 
conducted at five faculties in the Serb Republic, where a shocking 53.2 % of the 450 
surveyed students would not react or do anything if they “knew about a concrete case [of 
corruption at their faculty]” (Srna, 2011, n.p.). In agreement with this study’s findings, 
the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights unveils that the barrier to students’ greater 
engagement is that the “vast majority of students think of corruption as a normal 
occurrence” (Srna, 2011, n.p.). It should also be noted, however, that this study found 
that 29.4% and 16.3% of the surveyed students, respectively, believe that it is ‘difficult’ 
or ‘very difficult’ to cope with educational corruption. So even though corruption is 
widely accepted, with little tendency amongst Bosnia’s students to resist or demonstrate 
against this behavior, there is still a significant number of those students who have a very 
difficult time dealing with it (see Figure 19, p. 201). At the same time, only 5.7% and 
4.8% of the sample was of the view that it is ‘easy’ or ‘very easy’ to cope with 
corruption, respectively (see Figure 19, p. 201). 
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The significant presence of reactive indifference on the part of the student 
population as to the presence of corruption helps maintain the status quo. When looking 
at the patterns on students’ intent to leave their current faculties (see Figure 20, p. 202), 
this study finds that only 6.0% of students ‘always’ think about leaving their faculty, 
while only 3.8% of students think of it ‘almost always.’ However, a significantly larger 
percentage, 27.9%, ‘often’ thinks of leaving, while 24.8% of the sample ‘rarely’ thinks of 
leaving their faculty; at the same time, 8.9% students ‘almost never’ think of leaving, 
while 25.8% ‘never’ think of leaving their faculty (see Figure 20, p. 202). The fact that 
more than half of the surveyed sample does not entertain the thought of parting with their 
faculties may be due to the earlier noted issues of cumbersome transfer, lack of 
transparent and affordable alternatives, and a general sense of inability to change the 
status quo as pertains to the level of educational corruption at Bosnia’s faculties. In other 
words, what Hirschman (1970) would have characterized as loyalty in the case of 
Bosnian corrupt educational institutions could be relabeled as youth’s tendency to 
mentally exit their educational institutions, which directly stems from a broadly corrupt 
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Public-Private Crossover and Exit 
For the most part, public institutions are seen as the government-associated places 
where the linkages to social and political personas can assure one’s completion of higher 
education or help along with any significant obstacles. However, in the private sector, 
there is some level of irrelevance of social and political relationships as the individuals 
cross ethnic lines in search of their academic validation: students from the Federation will 
cross into the Serb Republic where the number of private colleges and universities has 
grown, in some estimates, at greater rates than in the Federation. Students from the 
Federation opt to go to even more corrupt universities in the private sector, as doing so 
“enables them to finish quicker” (Interviewee 3C). This may be the case especially with 
those students who are not as politically connected and have faced obstacles in passing 
some of the filter courses in public universities, where either superb knowledge or 
superbly strong political ties are necessary. 
Additionally, there are also students who, despite their possible political 
connections, do not want to waste any of their time studying at the public institutions as 
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legitimize their positions and are not intending to obtain jobs based on merit. They 
transfer or begin their studies at the private schools located in the Serb Republic to obtain 
degrees faster. It is salient to note that the multiethnic cooperation that is hardly 
achievable in any other sphere of life throughout the country and between the Federation 
and the Serb Republic is practiced daily at the private institutions of higher education in 
the Serb Republic: financial gain for the private institutions in the Serb Republic and the 
conservation of time for students from the Federation outweigh any ethnic tensions that 
may otherwise be present. In the context of Bosnia, employers are generally 
knowledgeable of which institutions are corrupt. Therefore, those students who lack 
social backing and cannot easily obtain jobs simply do not consider transferring to the 
private institutions at all because the lack of connections, coupled with a degree from an 
unreliable institution, would make it very difficult for a non-elite member to obtain a job. 
Simply, Bosniaks and Croats attend private schools in the Serb Republic and, as ethnic 
minorities, complete their studies without much obstruction and by engaging in bribery at 
the private institutions in the Serb Republic. So, if one has the funds to complete his/her 
studies or has already secured a job, completion of a degree will be relatively quick and 
without any barriers within the private sector either in the Serb Republic or the 
Federation. This may not be the case with the public institutions that still hold some 
standards for the non-elites and generally remain more reliant on the political and social 
relevance of their students and their families. 
Formal Mechanisms of Voice 
While this research recognized students’ limited reactions in the form of voice and 
exit, the finding may not be as surprising when analyzed within the context of the 
absence of infrastructure that would allow students to voice their views on corruption. 
When the surveyed pool was asked whether there are any formal committees where 
students’ concerns about corruption can be addressed, a vast majority or 84.5% (647 
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students) responded that there were no committees of such type; only 11.3% were aware 
of the formal committees’ existence (see Figure 21 below). 
 
 








Further confirmation that the current environment impacts students’ perceptions 
and behaviors is the finding that a vast majority of students would be inclined, at least to 
some degree, to voice their dissatisfaction with corruption if they could do so safely and 
anonymously. A surprisingly high portion of the surveyed sample or 78.4% stated that, if 
they could complain anonymously, they would do so: specifically, 35.9% said they would 
‘definitely’ complain; 21.9 % stated they would ‘probably’ complain; and 20.6% said 
they would ‘maybe’ complain. However, even if anonymity were secured, 8.1% would 
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EU-nionization Effect: Organizational Change and Corruption 
EU-nionization Effect and Coping Mechanisms 
Though many of the study’s participants recognized the salience of the Bologna 
Process for Bosnia’s EU membership, this study finds that the students’ perceptions 
about the corruption processes in Bosnia’s higher education, to some degree, remain 
unaffected by the Bologna Process (”Bologna”). As one of the students said: prior to 
Bologna, the exam prices were in “convertible marks [Bosnian currency] and now they 
are in Euros” (Interviewee 6C). The Bologna Process aims at achieving comparability of 
the educational institutions and systems regardless of their geographic location. However, 
the institutional inability to define and implement adequate rules and procedures makes 
change difficult in Bosnia’s context.  
The main challenge of the Bologna Process in Bosnia has been its inconsistent 
implementation across various faculties and even among different professors. Some 
professors have introduced and adapted to the interactive form of teaching, while others 
remain married to a largely uni-directional methodology of lecturing to students 
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student at her faculty, “no one ever said what that [emphasis added] is” (Interviewee 7C). 
Another interviewee reaffirmed that the Bologna Process is being implemented 
without educating professors and students on what the Bologna Process “truly is” 
(Interviewee 1C). Moreover, about 1 in 3 surveyed students did not know if he/she were a 
part of the ECTS-based system or not; more specifically, 28.6% of the students did not 
know whether they were enrolled in an ECTS-based system or not. This statistic itself is 
reflective of the lack of knowledge about the Bologna Process among the students most 
directly affected by it. 
Interviewee 7C also observed that, based on her understanding of Bologna, the option 
of part-time studying was going to be eliminated; however, there are now “parallel 
students” instead of “part-time” students, where the differences between what were 
previously called “the part-time” students and what are now called “parallel students” are 
minimal, as parallel students continue to pay the same tuition as the part-time students 
and have the same number of exam periods. The parallel students, though, are expected 
to attend lectures regularly, which the part-time students do not do (Interviewee 7C). In 
other words, “they [institutions] took from Bologna what suits them while also keeping 
from the old system whatever suited them before” (Interviewee 7C). 
For some, the Bologna Process is equated to easing the educational process and 
turning exams into papers (Interviewee 3C, Interviewee 5C), which were not generally 
accepted practices in the past. Introducing papers as a course performance measure, 
however, has also had some negative side effects in the context of the corrupt educational 
system because many students deem it acceptable to plagiarize (Interviewee 5C). In an 
environment where students are exposed to professors who sell books that, at times, have 
been copied verbatim from already existing publications, students have been exposed to 
seeing the application of plagiarism without any consequences and, therefore, may not 
hesitate to replicate their professors’ behaviors. 
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The exam dynamic has also changed to some degree: some courses were previously 
taught for a year with the exams being offered at the end of the year, but now some 
courses have shortened to one semester and offer exams at the end of each semester 
(Interviewee 7C). Similarly, classroom participation, which earlier played no significant 
and consistent role in the grading process, is now gradually being incorporated into 
grading. If a student has a borderline grade between 6 and 7, if he/she is active during the 
class discussions, the final grade will likely be 7 (Interviewee 7C). While some students 
see these changes as positive improvements to the state of Bosnia’s education, others 
believe they have only resulted in lower expectations and less knowledge among 
Bosnia’s students (Interviewee 14C). Though this research clearly showed that some 
students lack awareness of the Bologna Process and what it exactly means for their 
education, a student who is more involved in its implementation within his faculty was 
quick to illustrate Bosnia’s limitations relative to Bologna’s requirements by juxtaposing 
the Bologna requirement of 12 square meters of the university space per student against 
what he approximated as only 1 square meter per student at his faculty (Interviewee 1C). 
To fully and successfully implement the Bologna Process, it is clear that more attention 
should paid to the general social and financial circumstances of the country 
(Interviewee 1C).  
Narrowing down to the most relevant aspect of the Bologna Process as it relates to 
this research specifically, the changes – whether they are consistent or not – that are 
taking place in Bosnia’s higher education have had a somewhat positive effect on the 
students’ perceptions of the transparency levels in their faculties relative to the pre-
Bologna period. Of the total surveyed sample, 14.5% believe that the ECTS-based 
program is “definitely” more transparent than the old program, while 24.5% of the 
surveyed students perceive it as “probably” more transparent than the old program (see 
Figure 23, p. 208). Also, 26.4% of the sampled group are less convinced but still think 
that the new ECTS program is “maybe” more transparent than the old one (see Figure 23 
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below). In total, 65.4% of the surveyed students believe that, to some degree, the 
Bologna-based program, even with all of its limitations in the contextualized application 
within Bosnia’s higher education, still helps improve transparency. However, 26.1% of 
the surveyed sample is “not sure” whether one program is more transparent than the 
other, while, interestingly, only 6.4% of the sampled students said “no” when asked 
whether the ECTS program is more transparent than the old program. 
 









So, the study finds that the ECTS-based programs were generally deemed more 
transparent, indicating, more importantly, that Bosnian students can improve their 
perceptions of higher education in Bosnia. In contrast with their general passivity as 
illustrated through the previous findings of predominantly low voice and mental exit, 
Bosnian students seem to be trusting of the EU-instigated processes as to the internal 
changes within Bosnia’s higher education. In part, a generalized sense of dependency on 
the international community post-war may be responsible for the students’ localized 
expectation that the internal changes in Bosnia’s education would be instigated, not by 
the dissatisfied student body, but by an external source.  
Further, when students were asked if horizontal mobility across faculties, 
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introduction of the ECTS, 71.1% were of the view that these corruption-specific activities 
were not affected in any way by the introduction of the ECTS. It seems that Bosnian 
students have a different understanding of transparency and corruption, where corruption 
activities continue to be perceived as largely unchanged despite many students seeing 
ECTS-based programs as likely improving transparency. The source of this discrepancy 
may be that Bologna continues to be implemented selectively, and the Bologna-related 
changes are still not seen as course-changers for the educational system in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Interviewee 3C). Simply said, the dominant sentiment among Bosnian 
students is that the Bologna Process has had a limited impact on curtailing corruption, 
and corruption continues to be viewed as “independent of Bologna” (Interviewee 5C). 
What is too complicated, expensive, or difficult to achieve is often excluded from the 




CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
Summary of Guiding Theories and Findings 
The main purpose of this research was to embark on the complex task of 
understanding the intricacies surrounding the presence and formulation of corruption in 
Bosnia’s higher education, as well as its impact on the social mobility and coping 
mechanisms of Bosnia’s students. With the lack of academic research exposing links 
between social mobility, coping mechanisms, and corruption in the higher education of 
developing countries, this dissertation had an opportunity to tackle a set of complex and 
challenging issues that are consequential to the emergence and prevalence of educational 
corruption, especially in the post-socialist setting. 
While the study benefited from an extensive review of other relevant research on 
educational corruption, its theoretical framework rests on two guiding theories: that of 
Turner (1960), which differentiates between sponsored and merit-based social mobility, 
and that of Hirschman (1970), which captures reactions of stakeholders to failing 
organizations in the form of voice, exit, or loyalty. Turner’s (1960) concepts were most 
helpful in analyzing the relation between educational corruption and social mobility and, 
once contextualized within Bosnia’s setting, suggested that both sponsored and merit-
based mobility can take root simultaneously in the post-war and newly forming 
educational settings so that the poorer segments of society still have the potential of 
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upward mobility through merit-based achievement, while the emerging elites increasingly 
rely on sponsored mobility to cement and legitimize their positions of power. 
In addition to Turner’s (1960) invaluable insights, the study also employed 
Hirschman’s (1970) work on customers’ responses to the failure of an organization, 
where, in this case, students would presumably exit their relationship with their 
educational institution, voice their dissatisfaction with the failing organization, or remain 
loyal to their university, especially if the lapses in organizational performance are seen as 
temporary and rectifiable. This theoretical framework and its valuable insights are 
contextualized, expanded, and adapted to Bosnia’s corrupt higher education, informing 
the creation of an elaborate and education-specific reactionary framework with a range of 
new outcomes both for the voice and exit mechanisms. With voice mechanism, as 
contextualized to Bosnia’s corrupt higher education, ranging from official, public, to 
internal, and with exit mechanism including mental exit, transfer within the nation, 
international transfer, and full exit, the study provides an elaborate interpretive 
framework for the survey- and interview-based data collected at the institutions of higher 
education in Bosnia. Using this interpretative framework, I found that the prevalent form 
of voice in Bosnia’s higher education is internal voice, a minimally invasive form of 
voice, which fails Hirschman’s (1970) presumption of voice as a powerful political tool. 
In the context of Bosnia, voice as a reactionary tool is disarmed from its potential for 
change, as it largely manifests itself through conversations with other students, friends, 
and family members and is, thus, characterized with low impact and continuation of the 
status quo. 
As to the exit mechanisms, the physical exit, be it to more or less corrupt 
institutions, does not occur most frequently in Bosnia. Instead, it is the mental exit that 
dominates the educational setting. Most students, following realization that their 
individual exits or voices would not instigate a systemic change or that the transaction 
costs of transferring would be too high, either lose motivation to work hard or simply 
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ignore broader corruption and push through the system as if ongoing corruption in no 
way obstructs their path. 
Coupled with the noted interpretative frameworks, the study also employed a 
comprehensive approach to data collection and analysis. With three research questions in 
mind – which addressed specifics surrounding corruption’s presence and formulation, its 
impact on social mobility, and its relation to the students’ coping mechanisms – this work 
aspired to provide a memorable contribution to the existing pool of research on the topic. 
The application of the mixed methods approach, both for data collection and analysis, 
meant the use of surveys, interviews, binary logistic regression, and content analysis. 
With this set of analytical tools in hand, the study embarked on data collection within 
Bosnian faculties, where approximately 750 students were surveyed and 15 students were 
interviewed on the issues of corruption, social mobility, and their coping mechanisms. 
This approach ultimately led to a discovery of a number of findings, including:  
1. Prevalence of Corruption – The study confirmed that students perceive 
corruption as present in Bosnia’s higher education to various degrees and in 
numerous forms, but with non-monetary forms being prevalent over bribing. While 
it is difficult to fully quantify the implications of non-monetary forms of 
corruption, this confirms that the elite’s involvement in educational corruption has 
helped shape students’ perceptions of corruption and social mobility mechanisms, 
as well as affected students’ own ability to cope with the dominant forms of 
corruption in Bosnia’s higher education. While only 8.5% of the surveyed sample 
(see Figure 8, p. 119) thought there was no corruption in higher education, 62.1% 
and 50.8% of the same pool (see Figure 11, p. 127), respectively, viewed “passing 
exams via connections” and “passing exams solely due to having influential 
parents” as the most dominant forms of corruption. These findings proved the 
dominance of non-monetary forms of corruption, as well as the relevance of social 
status within Bosnia’s higher education. 
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2. Favor Reciprocation – In line with the findings that social and family 
connections are the most relevant factors in shaping corruption in Bosnia’s higher 
education, Bosnian students see favor reciprocation as dominant over other, though 
still significant and relevant, forms of corruption. With the earlier noted top two 
forms of corruption being “passing of the exams via connections” and “passing 
because of influential parents,” the social mobility trends that have emerged in 
post-war and post-socialist Bosnia clearly suggest that the favor reciprocation is 
becoming essential to the formulation of the social mobility model for the socially 
superior. This model’s emergence and expansion has gradually diminished the 
need for what Turner (1960) would label as merit-based achievement for these 
privileged elites. 
3. Students’ Upward Mobility and Competence – In further examining corruption’s 
impact through the vehicle of social mobility, I find that Bosnia’s youth perceives 
competence as relevant but not essential to the upward mobility processes that take 
place throughout academia. More than a third of Bosnia’s students believe that the 
most competent students “often” graduate first, while only 8.4% believe it 
“always” occurs (see Figure 13, p. 183). Indeed, it is the poor who work hard to 
graduate in time while the well-connected need not do so and can rely on their 
social networks and their political party status – a finding that helps confirm the 
co-existence of both Turner’s (1960) sponsorship and merit-based social mobility 
models in Bosnia’s higher education. 
4. Teaching Satisfaction and Faculty’s Upward Mobility – In addition, the study 
finds that knowing subjects’ satisfaction with teaching processes proved important 
in the study’s overall ability to predict the subjects’ perception of upward mobility 
mechanisms in academia. Also, when students were of the view that competent 
students always graduate first relative to those that do not believe it ever happens, 
the odds of merit-based promotion occurring in Bosnia’s higher education are 
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much higher relative to non-merit based promotion. Thus, students’ belief in 
competence as a relevant factor impacting the timing of one’s graduation also helps 
in predicting whether faculty members’ promotion is merited or not.  
5. Low Voice and Mental Exit – In examining Hirschman’s (1970) theory of voice, 
exit, and loyalty within Bosnia’s framework, I found that students’ coping abilities 
have been impaired by extensive and systemic corruption. Students’ fear of 
authority and the overall prevalence of corruption have not only deterred students 
from realizing their full educational potential but have also stripped the country’s 
youth from its reformative and political power to change the status quo and move 
the country forward. Hirschman thought that, with a greater exodus from a failing 
institution, voice would lessen as the powerful political tool of change. In Bosnia, I 
discovered that, despite the presence of corruption and students’ clear 
disenchantment with the system, very small numbers of students are thinking of 
physically exiting or planning to exit their faculties. The study confirms that exit in 
Bosnia is limited: if students are not filtered by the system itself, most students 
physically remain within their faculties despite a number of indicators reflective of 
the students’ overall dissatisfaction with corruption and the systemic inefficiencies. 
Instead, I find, many students mentally exit either due to their lowered motivation 
to fully engage in the educational processes when the setting is corrupt or because 
they accept and ignore their corrupt setting and remain committed to the 
completion of their degrees. While Hirschman would have possibly explained this 
lack of students’ exiting as occurring due to their loyalty toward the institutions in 
question, this form of loyalty does not stem from students’ belief that the lapses 
occurring within their institutions are reparable or temporary but rather from the 
lack of alternatives and prevalent presence of corruption nationally.  
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At the same time, I find that the form of voice mechanism practiced by the students 
in Bosnia is highly disempowered and politically disabled. In Bosnia, powerful 
signals in the form of massive exit and loud voice are both absent.  
In contrast with Hirschman’s (1970) expectations, exit and voice are not 
necessarily inversely correlated to each other when the setting in which they 
emerge is highly dysfunctional and corrupt, as is the case with Bosnia’s higher 
education. Here, the voice mechanism has taken a new form, which I label as a low 
and internal voice. This type of voice is used by the disengaged and fearful student 
body and has no political purpose but serves as an outlet for students’ frustrations 
with the system. So, the extensive low voice, coupled with frequent mental exit, 
forms the most regularly relied upon coping framework utilized by Bosnian 
students as they adapt to functioning within a corrupt educational setting. 
6. Horizontal Mobility – On the issue of horizontal mobility within the country’s 
higher education, the study finds that students’ views are split between those who 
see transfer as somewhat easy while others view it is as more difficult, suggesting 
that there are likely those who are capable of paying to transfer to private faculties 
and those who find it much more difficult to exit the public school system because 
of the paperwork and expense associated with the transfer. In other words and as is 
the case with the social mobility mechanisms, the experiences of students may 
differ depending on their financial and social backing. 
7. Corruption Enablers – Systemic traits such as inconsistent procedures 
throughout higher education at the national level preclude students from having a 
set of standards against which to measure the level of quality and reliability in 
current teaching, grading, and exam/course management practices. One of the key 
systemic corruption enablers is the lack of consensus on grading standards and 
continuation of individually devised approaches, allowing for a set of varied 
assessment practices and procedures to be used so that grades can be easily 
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produced, modified, and manipulated. In such a grading environment, students are 
not privy to the grading process and what would constitute a passing grade. To put 
it simply, professors in Bosnia operate in a setting where they can subjectively 
decide on a student’s passing or failing status and are often seen as not being 
accountable for their actions. Consequently, abuse of authority can frequently 
occur and result in a delay of the degree completion plans of Bosnia’s students.  
8. EU-nionization of Bosnia’s Higher Education – In an environment that provides 
duals paths of social mobility, additional complexity emerges with the EU’s push 
toward implementation of the Bologna Process in Bosnia, which, as this research 
finds, has been only sporadically implemented. The analysis finds that 70.8% of 
the surveyed students believe corruption and mobility processes have not changed 
with the introduction of the ECTS. However, some hope emerges in the finding 
that 65.4% of the surveyed students think that overall transparency has improved, 
at least to some degree, with the introduction of ECTS. The finding is indicative of 
Bosnian students’ hope that change within their educational institutions may be 
instigated by the external pressures, as has been the case in most other arenas of 
economic and political life in Bosnia.  
Lastly and in the process of conducting this research, one of the most surprising 
elements of the research conducted herein was the fact that I was able to obtain access to 
Bosnia’s faculties to the degree that I did. I expected that a higher proportion of the 
faculties approached would decline to participate given the delicate nature of the issues 
studied. My hope as the researcher is that this response rate, at least in part, is an 
indication of Bosnian faculties’ gradual shift toward institutional willingness to study and 
ultimately rectify the problem of corruption. Regardless of whether this change in 
institutional mentality is self-induced or consequential to the long-term presence of 
international actors in Bosnia, the change within is a necessary prerequisite for reforms 
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that would ultimately work toward addressing the institutional inefficiencies and 
corruption in Bosnia’s higher education.  
I am also, to a certain extent, surprised by the degree of students’ willingness to 
participate in the study. Given the indolence and acceptance of corruption that students 
have manifested in their behavior within Bosnia’s universities, I did not expect the 
student participation rate to be as high as it was. In my estimation, of the invited students, 
about 90% in the study indeed participated. I suspect that the participants did so as this 
was both a novel and relevant experience in their daily lives. Another unexpected element 
of this research was learning that nearly all students at the faculties surveyed were 
Bosniaks.  
Policy Implications of the Study’s Findings 
The findings of this study suggest that there are significant problems in Bosnia’s 
higher education that have resulted from corruption. In my view, implementing policies 
that jointly help foster competence and meritocracy are likely to positively impact and 
shape students’ views of upward mobility mechanisms and lesser corruption within their 
faculties. As earlier noted, this research has found that the odds of observing merit-based 
promotion were improved significantly when students were more satisfied with the 
teaching processes. While this does not establish causality between faculty members’ 
promotions and students’ satisfaction with teaching processes, it does have notable policy 
implications. Addressing students’ dissatisfaction with the teaching practices and 
students’ concerns about the relevance of competence may lessen the level of perceived 
educational corruption, ultimately helping shift students’ views of the upward mobility 
process within their faculties toward a more merit-based modality. Some of the key forms 
of teaching dissatisfaction amongst students included having professors who do not 
explain, do not know their subject, lack qualifications, or simply do not show up for their 
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lectures. While policies that directly address corruption may be resisted given the 
prevalence of corrupt behavior in the country, addressing students’ teaching 
dissatisfaction may be a more subtle and acceptable way of addressing the broader 
problem.  
Given the earlier shared statistics of the International Organization for Migration 
(2007) that an estimated 38% of Bosnians live abroad, Bosnia’s diaspora should be 
looked at as a potential source of a new and uncorrupt class of Bosnia’s professors. 
Though even the returning diaspora members could arguably succumb to corruption 
pressures, the diaspora members – whose success within the more merit-based American 
or European educational systems was arguably secured through competence and hard 
work – are much more likely to value student’s effort rather than his/her social standing. 
At the present time, Bosnia’s higher education institutions often rely on contracting 
consultants from the neighboring countries rather than offering incentives to Bosnians 
educated abroad to return and teach at Bosnia’s universities.  
If Bosnia’s faculties were able to retain some of the foreign-educated Bosnians as 
their full-time professors rather than contract Bosnia’s education to foreign consultants, 
teaching processes would likely improve given the quality of the new faculty. Having 
Bosnians educated abroad within the country’s public education would also help ensure 
that the exam-related processes are less cumbersome and exam topics are content-
relevant, as the new faculty members would, consciously or not, bring the accountability, 
mentality, and teaching approaches they were exposed to while studying abroad. Having 
quality professors within Bosnia’s public education would also lead to the local faculty’s 
exposure to the grading standards, practices, and methodologies used by the foreign-
educated faculty members. Over time, a new set of methods and behaviors could emerge 
and serve as a reference point, at least at the faculty-level, where the foreign-educated 
Bosnians teach. This would certainly aid in creating a more transparent educational space 
for Bosnia’s students. Adequately covering the course curriculum and evaluating 
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students’ knowledge fairly would help improve students’ satisfaction with the teaching 
processes, consequently improving students’ perceptions of upward mobility processes in 
academia.  
There may exist some level of governmental and institutional resistance toward 
organizing such projects due to the fear of competition with the qualified members of 
Bosnia’s diaspora, but this competition may be precisely what is needed to push the local 
institutions away from their reliance on favor-reciprocation processes and move them 
toward a merit-based modality. Recognizing the need for some level of cooperation on 
the part of local communities to allow for the re-engagement of the educated diaspora 
with higher education in Bosnia, a significant push and support from international actors 
for a successful implementation of the diaspora-engagement policy would be necessary 
for the viability of this solution as it relates to Bosnia’s higher-education. 
Noting the importance of continued international involvement, students’ belief that 
their program is ECTS-based rather than not has also improved the odds of students 
seeing their faculty members’ promotions as merit- rather than not merit-based. As to the 
policy implications, this finding is indicative of the continuing relevance of the external 
actors in Bosnia. In other words, the finding underlines that, despite the contextualized 
and partial implementation of the Bologna Process in Bosnia, Bosnians see the 
EU-sourced initiatives as relevant and important in moving Bosnia ahead.   
The study has also confirmed the relevance of the international and EU-sourced 
involvement, influence, and support as Bosnia and Herzegovina pursues educational 
reforms. In light of the financial crisis the European Union faced in 2011, the likelihood 
of greater assistance to help modernize, organize, and standardize Bosnian education may 
be lower than before, but an effort should be made to maintain a greater international role 
in cost-effective ways. Both the EU and the US may be able to instigate a change on 
multiple levels and at a relatively low cost by directly funding a defined number of 
professorships at Bosnia’s public faculties. The selection process for these professorships 
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should be publicized in Bosnia to illustrate the merit-based selection. Making this faculty 
selection process more transparent by involving students through the candidates’ visiting 
lectures would assist in increasing Bosnian students’ sense of ownership in the process.  
Not only would exposure to better teachers help lessen opportunities for corrupt 
behaviors amongst Bosnia’s students, but such policies may help alter the overall status 
quo by reviving Bosnian students’ belief that change is possible. This initial change may 
ultimately have a significant and broader long-term impact on moving students toward 
being more vocal and active against corruption. In fact, this study confirmed that, despite 
students’ current passivity, their voice can be empowered by introducing credible 
processes they can reliably use to complain anonymously. Specifically, 35.9% of the 
surveyed students would “definitely” complain if they were provided with the 
anonymous tools to do so, while 21.9% would “probably” and 20.6% would “maybe” 
complain (see Figure 22, p. 205). These findings collectively suggest that students’ voice 
is amenable to change and can be empowered by providing a safe and secure place where 
students can share their views on the corruption-related problems within their educational 
system.  
Continued involvement by the external actors coupled by the leveraging of the 
country’s well-educated diaspora would be most effective if coupled with the elimination 
of the political parties’ involvement, directly or indirectly, in faculty selections and 
nominations. This element of change that would have to come from within the corrupt 
system is least likely to occur independent of external pressure. Therefore, greater 
insistence by the international actors that faculty leadership and selection be based on 
academic credentials rather than political profiles would be necessary and, if successful, 
would have a crucial impact on students’ perceptions of corruption and mobility 
mechanisms in Bosnia’s higher education. 
In conclusion, I hope this study has made a valuable contribution to the overall 
understanding of corruption, social mobility, and coping mechanism as applied to the 
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post-socialist and post-war developing contexts. While I used the well-established 
theoretical frameworks of Hirschman (1970) and Turner (1960), I have also expanded 
and adapted these guiding theories to the new and emerging contexts that need a 
continuing focus by researchers in education to broaden our knowledge base on one of 
the most important obstacles to progress in the post-conflict and developing settings – 
systemic corruption. Though this research confirms that corruption significantly impacts 
formulation of social mobility and coping mechanisms of students in higher education, it 
also points to several areas within the institutions of higher education in Bosnia where 
improvements could be made with the right set of policy applications. Bosnia’s student 
base is disenchanted with the elite’s dominance over higher education in the country, and, 
in its current state, Bosnia’s youth is indolent and accepting of the status quo, but given 
the right tools to voice their dissatisfactions and right alternatives to which to exit from 
their currently corrupt institutions, Bosnia’s education could be where change in Bosnia 
begins.   
Research Limitations and Agenda for Future Research 
Though this study made an effort to provide a comprehensive view on the issues 
of corruption, social mobility, and students’ coping mechanisms, there are a number of 
research limitations to any case study, and those are possibly even more pronounced 
when faced with the topic of educational corruption. As noted earlier, two out of eight 
institutions invited to participate in the research declined participation. Assuming that the 
management of the most corrupt faculties would be least inclined to partake in this 
research, this research may be biased, as it has possibly excluded the most corrupt 
institutions within Bosnia’s public education. Nonetheless, in the absence of broader data, 
I am unable to conclude whether inclusion of the two institutions that declined their 
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participation would have made a substantive and significant impact on the results of this 
study.  
The faculties surveyed were in the localities where the majority of the population 
is Bosniak, but also with some visible presence of other ethnic groups. I suspect this 
over-representation of Bosniaks at the surveyed faculties may partly be explained by the 
fact that the ethnic minorities in this region of Bosnia may be more likely to attend 
universities where their ethnic group constitutes a majority, given the ethnic tensions that 
continue to linger throughout the country. For instance, those who are Bosnian Croats 
may be more willing to study at the University of Mostar (Bosnia), go abroad and study 
at the University of Zagreb (Croatia), or study elsewhere within the EU. Bosnian Croats 
and Bosnian Serbs may be more likely than Bosniaks to hold dual citizenship with 
Croatia or Serbia and, therefore, have more options in terms of traveling and studying 
abroad.  
As far as the sampling of the interviewed students is concerned, the study 
conducted interviews with a relatively small group of students, and those participants 
were not sampled randomly. Sensitivity of the corruption topic required a trusted 
relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee to allow for a reliable and 
unrestrained exchange between the interviewer and interviewee. While the interviewee 
pool was not extensive, the interviews were. Interviewed students had enough flexibility 
to share their views, observations, and concerns on the topic and any related issues they 
deemed of substance and relevance to this research. This insight, though limited by the 
lack of the sample’s randomness, has enriched the survey-based findings and has, overall, 
helped in understanding the trends that have emerged from the survey-based data. 
The study was conducted in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which 
differs in its political structure of multiple cantons from the more unified Serb Republic. 
Given the sensitivity of the topic and my own comfort level as a researcher, I opted to 
conduct research in the Federation. In future research, however, it would be of value to 
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conduct a similar type of research in the Serb Republic and comparatively determine 
whether there are any significant parallels between the two major entities within the 
country. Throughout this research, a number of the interviewees claimed that many 
students from the Federation cross the entity border and obtain quick and questionable 
diplomas in the Serb Republic, which is a unique cross-ethnic phenomenon that this study 
was not tasked with exploring. The lack of cross-ethnic cooperation is often cited as a key 
barrier in the political life of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it would be of value to study 
the phenomenon of cross-entity and multiethnic cooperation when educational corruption 
and trading of diplomas are at work. 
Another barrier that is not unique to this study is its limitation in time and funds to 
conduct broader and more extensive research, which is why I focused on the faculties 
where the research was logistically possible. Therefore, the findings of this study may not 
be generalizable and applicable to other countries that have experienced systemic 
corruption in education, as there may be a number of other significant variables that have 
not played an important role in the case of Bosnia or have not been considered in this 
study. However, the time involved, logistics required, and funds needed to conduct such a 
study comparatively across several countries would extend beyond the capabilities and 
funds available to me as a researcher at this time. 
While the combined mixed methods research approach seemed a logical approach 
to me as the researcher, there are a number of other analytical angles from which this 
study could have been pursued. For instance, I have stayed away from pushing for the 
establishment of causality in this research because my research was based on the 
perceptions students have about corruption. I have relied on students as the source of 
information rather than directly and independently confirming the cases of corruption. 
This in fact is one of the key shortcomings, as is the case with most educational 
corruption research, because it is virtually impossible to verify the cases of corruption 
involving students and their professors. These are well concealed practices that 
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researchers unfortunately do not witness in real time, but instead have to devise other 
tools that will unveil the trends relating to corruption.  
As for the thematic content of this research, I chose to focus on the issues of 
social mobility, students’ coping mechanisms, and corruption in higher education. Each 
of these three concepts opens up a field of possible avenues I could have taken in the 
course of my research. Nonetheless, I tried to focus on the corruption, mobility, and 
coping in higher education but with an awareness that corruption may well be present at 
other educational levels as well. So, additional research into corruption at other levels of 
education would be invaluable. Furthermore, I have touched upon the linkages between 
social mobility and corruption, but I have not extended this discussion much beyond the 
educational setting, even though the implication of this work is that the impact of 
corruption on social mobility would extend beyond the educational venue. In other 
words, research looking into how corruption has shaped social mobility mechanisms and 
the extent to which they remain in place in students’ professional careers post-graduation 
would possibly further validate and expand on the findings of this study. In closing, while 
this research did not aim at capturing every possible variable and addressing every issue 
stemming from corruption’s influence on education, social mobility, and youth’s coping 
potential, I do hope other researchers will be intrigued by this study and moved toward 
exploring more closely corruption’s relationship to social mobility mechanisms and their 
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Teachers College, Columbia University 
INFORMED CONSENT FOR SURVEY PARTICIPANTS 
DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH: You are invited to participate in a research study on 
processes relating to social mobility, corruption, and Bologna Process in higher education of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. The purpose of this research is to examine ways in which educational corruption 
affects social mobility in higher education and how this plays out while the Bologna Process is 
underway.  Another key purpose of this research is to examine student views and ways in which 
students cope with educational corruption. You will be asked to fill out a survey on an anonymous 
basis.  The research will be conducted by Amra Sabic-El-Rayess. The research will be conducted 
at your faculty.   
RISKS AND BENEFITS: The potential risk of participating in this survey is that you may feel 
discomfort when asked questions on corruption. The potential benefit of participating in this survey 
is that it provides you with an opportunity to share your honest views and experiences about 
corruption, social mobility, and Bologna Process at your university. Another potential benefit of 
participating in this survey is that you would be contributing to an academic study that makes an 
effort to understand the complexities of Bosnia’s higher education. If you choose not to participate in 
this activity, you may feel free to leave the classroom or continue on with the tasks you were 
engaged in prior to the survey announcement. 
DATA STORAGE TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY: All surveys will be conducted on an 
anonymous basis. All surveys will be handled with the utmost care and securely locked in a file 
cabinet at all times. The results of this study will be used for professional purposes only and for 
doctoral dissertation, academic journal(s), book(s), and presented at conference(s). The data will 
be used collectively and there will be no way to identify any of the participants in any publication 
or the presentation of results of this study.   
TIME INVOLVEMENT: Your participation will involve filling out a survey that will take 
approximately 20 minutes of your time. 
HOW WILL RESULTS BE USED: As noted above, the results of the study will be used for 




Teachers College, Columbia University 
PARTICIPANT'S RIGHTS 
Principal Investigator: Amra Sabic-El-Rayess 
Research Title: Social Mobility, Corruption, and EU-nionization in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
Higher Education 
• I have read and discussed the Research Description with the researcher. I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions about the purposes and procedures regarding this study.  
• My participation in research is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or withdraw from 
participation at any time without jeopardy to future medical care, employment, student 
status or other entitlements.  
• The researcher may withdraw me from the research at his/her professional discretion.  
• If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been developed 
becomes available which may relate to my willingness to continue to participate, the 
investigator will provide this information to me.  
• Any information derived from the research project that personally identifies me will not be 
voluntarily released or disclosed without my separate consent, except as specifically 
required by law.  
• If at any time I have any questions regarding the research or my participation, I can 
contact the investigator, who will answer my questions. The investigator's phone number 
is 011-203-355-9448 and email is as2169@columbia.edu.  
• If at any time I have comments, or concerns regarding the conduct of the research or 
questions about my rights as a research subject, I should contact the Teachers College, 
Columbia University Institutional Review Board /IRB. The phone number for the IRB is 
(212) 678-4105. Or, I can write to the IRB at Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 
W. 120th Street, New York, NY, 10027, Box 151.  






DISSERTATION RESEARCH SURVEY FOR STUDENTS IN B&H 
 
IMPORTANT NOTE: Your participation is voluntary. Please read questions carefully 
and answer them honestly. All your answers will be analyzed on an anonymous basis. 
PLEASE do NOT include your name or names of others anywhere in the survey. Thank 
you very much for your participation. 
 
A. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
1. When were you born?               ___________  
             Year 
2. What is your sex:  ___ Male ___ Female 





If other, please specify:____________________ 
 
B. STUDENT EDUCATION 
4. What kind of student you were in high-school:  
__exceptional (all As) 
__excellent (mostly As) 
__very good (mostly Bs) 
__good (mostly Cs) 
__poor (mostly Ds) 
__very poor (mostly Fs) 
5. How many years have you completed: 
___ Some exams from first year 
___ All exams from 1st year 
___ All exams from 2nd year 
___ All exams from 3rd year 
___ Some exams from 4th year 
6. How many years have you been studying in total: 
___ 1 year 
___ 2 years 
___ 3 years  
___ 4 years 
___ 5+ years 
7. If you repeated one or more years, please check ALL statements that apply (otherwise, 
please proceed): 
___ Not studying hard enough 
___ Limited time to study 




___One or more professors keep failing me for no apparent reason 
___ Do not have connections or money to pay for a passing grade in some cases  
___ Outdated knowledge is no longer relevant for finding jobs 
___ Studying does not matter as much as having influential parents 
___Other. Please explain below: 
 
8. Is your program ECTS based (Bologna based): 
__Yes 
__No 
__I don’t know 








10. Do most competent students graduate first from your faculty? 
___ Always 
___ Almost always 
___ Often 
___ Rarely 
___ Almost never 
___ Never 
11. Are professors generally promoted based on their qualifications? 
___ Always 
___ Almost always 
___ Often 
___ Rarely 
___ Almost never 
___ Never 
12. How satisfied are you with the teaching cadre? 
___ Very satisfied 
___ Somewhat satisfied  
___ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
___ Somewhat dissatisfied 
___ Very dissatisfied  
13. If you are dissatisfied with the teaching cadre in your faculty, please check ALL that 
applies (otherwise proceed to the next question)? 
___ I think about dropping out 
___ I have been discriminated against because of my ethnicity 
___ I fail my exams though I show sufficient knowledge  
___ Some professors do not explain their material 
___ Some professors do not know their subject well enough 
___ Some professors do not show up for their lectures 
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___ Some professors do not seem qualified for their positions 
___ Some professors treat faculty setting as their personal property 
___ Some professors get promoted because of their connections and not 
qualifications  
___ Some professors pass students because of bribes or because of their 
connections  
___ Some professors push for book-buying 
___ Some professors enter inappropriate relationships with students 
___ Other. please specify here:___________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________ 
14. Are you generally satisfied with the structures/procedures at you faculty (i.e. 
paperwork involved, opportunities to take exams, applications for exams, having access 
to faculty, getting your grades after the exam, having opportunity to repeat a failed exam, 
standardized grading, having resources within the faculty to ensure you succeed)?  
___ Very satisfied 
___ Somewhat satisfied  
___ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied  
___ Somewhat dissatisfied 
___ Very dissatisfied  
15. If you are dissatisfied with the structures/procedures in your faculty, please check 
ALL statements that apply to you (otherwise, please proceed)? 
___ I wanted to transfer to another faculty but could not 
___ I could not have credits transferred from elsewhere 
___ I wish I could take classes at another faculty but I cannot do it 
___I wish I could change my major, but it is impossible 
___ I wish exams were broken into smaller sections 
___ I wish there were more opportunities to take exams 
___ I wish grading was more standardized  
___I wish there was more access to faculty members 
___I wish I could get my graded exams back  
___I wish there were better student support services within faculty  
___Other: Please explain ____________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
16.  How widespread is corruption? 
___ Completely absent 
___ Somewhat absent 
___ Neither widespread nor absent 
___ Widespread 
___ Highly widespread 
17. Which forms does corruption take (please check all that applies): 
___ none 
___ buying passing grades 
___ buying diplomas 
___ publishing plagiarized books  
___ inappropriate relationships between students and members of faculty 
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___ passing exams because of social connections 
___ obtaining diplomas in excessively short period of time 
___ passing exams because of influential parents  
Other, please specify: _______________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
18. How difficult is it to cope with corruption in your faculty?  
___ Very easy 
___ Easy 
___ Somewhat easy  
___ Neither difficult nor easy 
___ Very difficult 
___ Difficult  
19. How do students cope with corruption? Please check ALL that apply: 
___ keeping up with required work  
___ addressing it through the faculty administration 
___talking with family and friends 
___ planning to leave/leaving the faculty   
___ bribing to pass  
___ complained about it 
___ Other. Please explain: ____________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________ 
20. Are there any committees where students’ concerns about corruption can be 
addressed? 
___ Yes  
___ No 
21. If you know someone who has complained about corruption, were they satisfied with 
how the complaint was handled? (otherwise, please proceed): 
___ Very satisfied   
___ Somewhat satisfied 
___ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
___ Somewhat dissatisfied 
___ Very dissatisfied  
___Other. Please explain: ____________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
22. If you think there is corruption and you did not complain about it, why not? 
(otherwise, please proceed):  
___ No particular reason 
___ Scared 
___ Other. Please specify:_____________________________________________ 









24. If you/your friends complained about corruption, would it lead to an effective change 




___ Not sure 
___ No 




___ Not sure 
___ No 




___ 60-80%  
___ 80-100% 
27. How difficult is to transfer to another faculty in B&H?  
___ Very easy 
___ Easy 
___ Neither difficult nor easy 
___ Difficult 
___Very difficult  
28. Do you think of leaving your faculty or transferring to another faculty in B&H? 
___Always  
___ Almost always 
___ Often 
___ Rarely 
___ Almost never  
___ Never  
29. Do you think about leaving your faculty or transferring because of corruption?  
___ Not at all  
___ Partly because of corruption 
___ Mostly because of corruption 
___ Only because of corruption 
30. If you are thinking or have thought of transferring, why have not you done so? 
(otherwise please proceed).  
___ Too complicated 
___ Too expensive 
___ Other universities/faculties are also non-transparent 
___ Not familiar with paperwork required 
___Impossible  








___ Not sure 
___ No 
32. Has your thinking on corruption, leaving your faculty, or complaining about 













34. Please indicate the average monthly household income? 
___Below 500 KM/month 
 ___ 500-1,500 KM/month 
 ___ 1,500-2,500 KM/month 
 ___ 2,500-3, 500 KM/month  
___ Above 3,500 KM/month  












__Other. Please explain______________________________________________ 
37. Which is/was your father’s highest position? 
___ Worker 
___ Intellectual but not executive 
___ Executive 




38. How involved are you or other members of your closest family (i.e. your spouse, 
father, mother, siblings) in socio-political activities in your community? 
___ Highly involved 
___ Somewhat involved 
___ Neither involved nor uninvolved 
___ Somewhat uninvolved 
___ Uninvolved 






Teachers College, Columbia University 
INFORMED CONSENT FOR INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
DESCRIPTION OF THE RESEARCH: You are invited to participate in a research study on 
processes relating to social mobility, corruption, and Bologna Process in higher education of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The purpose of this research is to examine ways in which educational 
corruption affects social mobility in higher education and how this plays out while the Bologna 
Process is underway. Another key purpose of this research is to examine student views and ways 
in which students cope with educational corruption. You will be asked to answer questions in an 
interview format and on a confidential basis. The research will be conducted by Amra Sabic-El-
Rayess. The research will be conducted at a location mutually agreed upon by you and the 
researcher.   
RISKS AND BENEFITS: The potential risk of participating in an interview is that you may feel 
discomfort when asked questions about corruption. The potential benefit of participating in the 
interview is that it provides you with an opportunity to share your honest views and experiences 
about corruption, social mobility, and Bologna Process in your country’s higher education. Another 
potential benefit of participating in the interview is that you would be contributing to an academic 
study that makes an effort to understand the complexities of Bosnia’s higher education. Without any 
consequences to you, you may choose not to participate in this activity. 
DATA STORAGE TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIALITY: Your interview will be conducted on a 
confidential basis. All interview notes will be handled with the utmost care and securely locked in 
a file cabinet at all times. Researcher’s interview notes will not contain any of your personal 
information. Researcher will only use code names to organize her interview data. There will be no 
way in which to link coded data to a specific individual. Once interview notes are emailed to 
researcher by the researcher, the original written notes will be destroyed. The results of this study 
will be used for professional purposes only and for doctoral dissertation, academic journal(s), 
book(s), and presented at conference(s). The data will be used collectively and there will be no 
way to identify any of the participants in any publication or the presentation of results of this 
study.   
TIME INVOLVEMENT: Your participation will involve responding to questions in an interview 
format for up to 1.5 hours. 
HOW WILL RESULTS BE USED: As noted above, the results of the study will be used for 





Teachers College, Columbia University 
PARTICIPANT'S RIGHTS 
Principal Investigator: Amra Sabic-El-Rayess 
Research Title: Social Mobility, Corruption, and EU-nionization in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
Higher Education 
• I have read and discussed the Research Description with the researcher. I have had the 
opportunity to ask questions about the purposes and procedures regarding this study.  
• My participation in research is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or withdraw from 
participation at any time without jeopardy to future medical care, employment, student 
status or other entitlements.  
• The researcher may withdraw me from the research at his/her professional discretion.  
• If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been developed 
becomes available which may relate to my willingness to continue to participate, the 
investigator will provide this information to me.  
• Any information derived from the research project that personally identifies me will not be 
voluntarily released or disclosed without my separate consent, except as specifically 
required by law.  
• If at any time I have any questions regarding the research or my participation, I can 
contact the investigator, who will answer my questions. The investigator's phone number 
is 011-203-355-9448 and email is as2169@columbia.edu.  
• If at any time I have comments, or concerns regarding the conduct of the research or 
questions about my rights as a research subject, I should contact the Teachers College, 
Columbia University Institutional Review Board /IRB. The phone number for the IRB is 
(212) 678-4105. Or, I can write to the IRB at Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 
W. 120th Street, New York, NY, 10027, Box 151.  




Student Interview Guide 
 
1. Perceived Corruption, Corruption Facilitators, and its Persistency 
i. What is Bosnian higher education’s biggest obstacles to becoming a 
more effective and transparent educational system?  
ii. What do you think of the system’s organization/procedures (grading, 
transfer, admissions, exam applications, nostrifications)?  Have you 
experienced any obstacles during your studies? 
iii. Have you faced any obstacles in terms of 
students/professors/administration members?   
iv. How prevalent do you think is corruption in Bosnia? How would you 
define corruption in higher education in Bosnia? If you think there is 
corruption, why do you think it occurs in higher education in Bosnia? 
v. Do you know someone who has bribed a professor/teaching assistant to 
pass?  If so, how much was the bribe?  How prevalent is this behavior in 
your faculty?  Do you know someone whose parents called a friend or a 
family member in order to intervene with an exam?  How prevalent is 
this behavior in your faculty? Would you classify such behavior as 
corruption? Or else? 
vi. What do you think should be defined as corruption in education? 
 
2. Socio-economic Differences 
i. Who are the students that study the longest?  Why that particular group? 
Who are the students that graduate in shortest time? Why this particular 
group?  
ii. What type of students do you think will graduate first in your class?  Do 
you think academic perforomance is the key to graduating in time? If 
yes, what other factors contribute to in-time completion? If not, what 
other factors would you list as important to graduate in time?    
iii. Do you think that the student’s ethnicity has any bearing on one’s 
experience of corruption in education?  How about student’s 
socioeconomic background?  Does one’s background play any role in 
how one experience’s corruption? Could you elaborate on your answer? 
 
3. Coping with Corruption 
i. Have you ever spoke to your peers about corruption?  
ii. When? How often?  
iii. What do you think most students do when they face corruption?  
iv. Do you know students who complained about it? 
v. Would you ever leave your faculty because of corruption? Do you have 




4. EU-nionization  
i. Do you know what Bologna Process (ECTS) represents?  If you do, has 
it been introduced in your faculty?  
ii. If it has, do you think that Bologna/ECTS program has changed your 
program/faculty/higher education in Bosnia in any way? Have 
professsors changed the way they teach/grade?  
iii. Has the organization of exams/admissions changed?  
iv. Did you enroll before or after ECTS system was introduced? If you 
enrolled before, do you wish you could switch to the ECTS system or it 
makes no difference? If you enrolled after ECTS was introduced, do you 
think you are better off than students from the “old” system? How about 
corruption, has it been affected, either positively or negatively, after the 
ECTS change?  
v. Now that the ECTS system has been introduced, are you in any way 
more likely to voice your grievances regardless of what those may be? 
Or are your attitudes towards speaking up about any dissatisfaction 
unchanged? Would you complain about corruption now?  
vi. Have your views in any way changed about your desire to exit your 
faculty after the ECTS change? Would you now leave your faculty to go 
to another faculty in your country if you could? Would you go abroad if 
you could?  
 
